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Do Saving Incentives Work? 
AMERICAN  SAVING  RATES  have recently fallen to their lowest levels 
since 1950. After averaging  roughly  8 percent in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s,  the net national  saving rate fell to about  4.5 percent in the 1980s 
and  has fallen  below 2 percent  since 1990.'  The personal  saving  rate has 
also declined,  from  an average  of 7 percent  between 1950  and 1980  to an 
average  of 4.6 percent since 1990.2  These declines have raised  concerns 
that the economy may be unable to finance investment and sustain 
growth  over the long run  and  that  a significant  fraction  of the baby-boom 
generation  may not be saving  adequately  for retirement.3 
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1.  The data are taken from the Economic Report of the President 1994, tables B-23 and 
B-29, and the Economic  Report of the President  1991, tables B-22 and B-28. The net na- 
tional saving rate is gross saving less depreciation,  all divided  by net national  product. 
Congressional  Budget  Office  (1993a)  provides  an assessment  of the saving  decline. 
2.  The data are taken from the Economic Report of the President 1994, table B-27, and 
the Economic Report of the President 1991, table B-26. The personal saving rate is defined 
as personal  saving  divided  by disposable  personal  income.  Bosworth,  Burtless,  and  Sabel- 
haus  (1991)  provide  an analysis  of the decline  in personal  saving. 
3. See Bernheim  (1992),  Bernheim  and Scholz (1993),  and Congressional  Budget  Of- 
fice (1993a, 1993b). 
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As a consequence, raising  the saving rate has been a frequent  focus 
of policymakers  and  academics.  Over  the past 20 years, a popular  legis- 
lative remedy  for stimulating  saving has been the development  of spe- 
cially designated  personal saving accounts, such as individual  retire- 
ment accounts (IRAs), 401(k) plans, and Keogh accounts. These 
voluntary  accounts, which we refer  to as saving  incentive  plans, feature 
preferential  tax treatment  of contributions  and  investment  earnings,  an- 
nual contribution  limits, and penalties for early withdrawals.  The pro- 
grams  have been popular:  since 1986,  contributions  to these saving in- 
centive plans have amounted  to about one-third  of personal saving as 
measured  by the National  Income and Product  Accounts.4  Yet, despite 
their popularity,  saving incentives may not work-they  may not raise 
national  saving. 
The effect of saving incentives on national  saving is the sum of their 
effects on public and private saving. To raise private saving, an incen- 
tive  must  reduce  consumption  or raise  labor  supply.5  Standard eco- 
nomic theory  indicates  that  raising  the after-tax  rate of return  on all pri- 
vate saving has an ambiguous  effect because of opposing income and 
substitution  effects. Saving incentive programs  that raise the after-tax 
return  on limited  amounts  of assets placed in designated  accounts may 
be an even less effective way to stimulate  private  saving  than  increasing 
the rate of return  on all saving. This is because a household does not 
need to reduce  consumption  or raise  labor  supply  to claim  the tax advan- 
tages of a saving incentive. Instead, the contributions  may be financed 
by transferring  existing taxable  assets, by increasing  debt, or by reallo- 
cating  current  saving  that  would  have been done anyway. Moreover,  be- 
cause the subsidies in saving incentive plans are capped by the annual 
contribution  limit, the saving incentive will not affect marginal  returns 
on saving  for some households.  Rather,  for those households,  the incen- 
tive will generate  only an income  effect, which should  reduce  their  over- 
all level of saving. 
The effect of saving incentives on public saving, holding  other gov- 
ernment  policies constant, is generally  negative  in the short  run  because 
contributions  are typically  tax deductible.  Thus, to raise national  saving 
in the absence  of other  policy changes, a saving  incentive  plan  must  raise 
private  saving  by more  than  the associated tax loss to the government. 
4.  See table 1 and Economic Report of the President 1994, table B-27. 
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In this paper, we examine  the effects of saving incentives on private 
and  national  saving  using  both empirical  and simulation  analyses. In the 
next section, we describe and analyze the main  features  of current  sav- 
ing incentive  plans  and  review trends  in aggregate  saving  and  the growth 
of saving  incentive  plans. Then, we present  new evidence on the effects 
of 401(k)  plans. Our  results  are  consistent  with the view that  401(k)  plans 
have not stimulated  private  saving  or wealth. We also present  evidence 
that IRAs, 401(k)  plans, and other retirement  saving  plans are, to some 
extent, substitutes in households' portfolios. In the third section, we 
present  new evidence on the effects of IRAs. The evidence suggests  that 
a small proportion  of IRA contributions  has represented  new private 
saving. However, coupled with the revenue losses  created by tax- 
deductible contributions, our results indicate that saving incentives 
have had little, if any, positive effect on national  saving. In the fourth 
section, we analyze saving  incentives in the context of a stochastic, life- 
cycle simulation  model of saving. Our  simulation  results are consistent 
with the empirical  findings  for the short  and medium  terms  (0-30 years). 
They also suggest  that  over longer  horizons, saving  incentives can raise 
the national  saving  rate. 
An Overview of Saving Incentives 
A wide variety  of saving  incentive  options are  currently  available.  In- 
dividual  retirement  accounts  were established  in 1974  for workers  with- 
out pensions and featured  tax-deductible  contributions  up to an annual 
limit, tax-free  accrual  of interest, and penalties  for early withdrawal  of 
funds.  In 1981,  eligibility  was extended  to all workers  and  the limits  were 
raised  to their  current  levels. For a single worker,  the annual  limit  is the 
lesser of either  earnings  or $2,000.  The presence  of a nonworking  spouse 
raises  the limit  by $250.  In a two-worker  household,  the limit  is the lesser 
of earnings  or $2,000  for each worker, so the maximum  combined  limit 
is $4,000. 
From 1982  to 1986, eligibility  was universal  and contributions  were 
tax deductible.  The Tax Reform  Act of 1986  then restricted  the deduct- 
ibility  provisions. For households with a retirement  plan, deductibility 
is now phased  out at adjusted  gross income levels between $40,000  and 
$50,000  forjoint filers  and between $25,000  and $35,000  for single filers. 
The act did not restrict  IRA eligibility  or the tax-free  accrual  of interest. 88  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Deductible  contributions  are taxed when withdrawn,  and  nondeduct- 
ible contributions  are not. In either case, returns  on contributions  are 
untaxed until withdrawn,  at which point they are subject to income 
taxes. Withdrawals  can be made at any time but are subject  to an addi- 
tional 10 percent penalty if the account holder is younger than 59.5.6 
IRA contributions  may be financed  with loans, the interest  on which 
is deductible  as investment interest.7  However, IRA assets cannot be 
used as collateral  for a loan. IRA funds can be invested in virtually  any 
type of financial  asset but not directly  in physical  assets. 
Keogh plans and simplified  employee pensions (SEPs) are similar  to 
tax-deductible  IRAs, except that they apply to the self-employed and 
typically  have higher  contribution  limits.8 
Established  in 1978, 401(k) plans are employment-based  saving in- 
centives. Important  clarifying  regulations  were issued in 1981.9  Like 
IRAs, 401(k) plans feature tax-deductible  contributions, tax-free ac- 
crual of interest, annual contribution  limits, and restrictions  on with- 
drawals. However, 401(k)  plans differ from IRAs in several important 
respects. First, 401(k)  plans are available  only to employees of firms  or 
other organizations  that choose to sponsor the plans.10  Second, 401(k) 
contributions  are made through  regular  payroll deductions, while IRA 
contributions  can be made on an irregular  basis. Third,  employers  may 
make tax-deductible  contributions  into the plan.  I' These contributions 
may be unconditional  or may depend  on employee contributions.  Most 
firms  with 401(k)s  provide  employer  contributions,  often matching  em- 
ployee contributions  at rates ranging  from  25 percent  to 100  percent, up 
6. The  penalty  does not apply  in  the event  of permanent  disability  or  death.  Individuals 
may  initiate  penalty-free  annuity  distributions  from  IRAs  at any age. 
7. Restrictions  against  deducting  interest  on loans used to make tax-exempt  invest- 
ments  (such  as municipal  bonds)  do not apply  because  the return  on IRAs  is tax deferred, 
rather  than  tax exempt. 
8. Keoghs  and  SEPs may  also be set up  for employees  of small  businesses. 
9. Andrews  (1992). 
10. Strictly  speaking,  401(k)  plans,  as authorized  by section  401(k)  of the Internal  Rev- 
enue  Code,  are  only  available  to employees  of for-profit  firms  that  offer  the plans.  Sections 
403(b)  and  457  authorize  salary-reduction  plans  for  employees  of nonprofit  institutions  and 
state and local governments,  respectively. Federal  government  employees may partici- 
pate in thrift saving plans. These plans are similar  to 401(k) plans in most respects. 
Throughout  this paper,  we refer  to all of these as 401(k)  plans. 
11. 401(k)  plans differ  from other defined  contribution  pension plans  in that the em- 
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to 5 or 6 percent  of salary.'2  Fourth,  annual  contribution  limits  to 401(k) 
plans are governed by several factors. The Internal  Revenue Service 
(IRS)  limit  on employee contributions  is $9,240  in 1994.13  However, em- 
ployers often impose a limit  of 10  to 15  percent  of salary.14  More  gener- 
ally, under the Employee Retirement  Income Security Act the com- 
bined  employer  and employee contributions,  summing  401(k)  plans  and 
other  defined  contribution  plans, cannot  exceed the lesser of 25 percent 
of salary or $30,000. Highly compensated employees may face even 
tighter limits  required by  complicated nondiscrimination  require- 
ments.'5  Fifth, investment  options  for 401(k)s  are determined  by the em- 
ployer  and  hence are  typically  more  limited  than  with  an IRA. The assets 
in 401  (k)s often must  be allocated  among  the employer's  stock, a guaran- 
teed investment contract, or specific equity, bond, or money-market 
mutual  funds. Sixth, borrowing  from  a 401(k)  is allowed  in some plans.16 
The loan is generally  secured by funds in the account.17 Seventh, with- 
drawal  provisions differ  from those for IRAs. In some plans, penalty- 
free withdrawals  are permitted  in cases of documented  financial  hard- 
ship.18  Withdrawals  upon  employee separation  from  a firm  face a 10  per- 
cent penalty (plus income tax) unless the funds are rolled over into an- 
12. In survey results  reported  in U.S. General  Accounting  Office  (1988a),  38 percent 
of plans  provided  only matching  contributions,  24  percent  provided  only unconditional  (or 
discretionary)  contributions,  13  percent  provided  both, and  25 percent  provided  neither. 
13. In 1982,  the limit  was $45,475,  the same  as for  all  employer-based  defined  contribu- 
tion pension  plans. The limit  was reduced  to $30,000  starting  in 1983.  In the 1986  tax re- 
form, the limit  was reduced  to $7,000  (1987  dollars)  and indexed  for inflation  (Andrews, 
1992). 
14. About  two-thirds  of employers  have employee  contribution  limits  between  9 and 
16  percent  (U.S. General  Accounting  Office, 1988a).  Kusko, Poterba,  and Wilcox  (1994) 
analyze  401(k)  participation  and contribution  behavior  in a single firm  with a limit  of 10 
percent  of salary.  In 1990,  23 percent  of participants  were constrained  by this limit,  while 
only 1  percent  were constrained  by the IRS limit. 
15. In 1994,  the IRS  defined  highly  compensated  employees  as those with 1993  salaries 
above $64,245.  Some company  owners and officers  may also be considered  highly  com- 
pensated,  regardless  of salary.  Papke  (1992)  provides  an excellent discussion  of the non- 
discrimination provisions. 
16. Survey evidence suggests that borrowing  is permitted  in two-thirds  or more of 
401(k)  plans  (U.S. General  Accounting  Office, 1988a;  Buck  Consultants,  1989;  Hewitt  As- 
sociates, 1993). 
17. If the loan is secured  by elective 401(k)  contributions,  the interest  paid  is not tax 
deductible.  However,  if the employer  permits,  the loan  may  be secured  by an employee's 
house, in which  case the interest  paid  is tax deductible,  as with  a home  equity  loan. 
18. U.S. General  Accounting  Office  (1988a,  1988b). 90  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
other 401(k)  or IRA or converted to an annuity, or unless the account 
holder  is over age 59.5, retired  and over age 55, or disabled.  Otherwise, 
withdrawals  are not allowed. 
Some  Simple Analytics  of Saving  Incentive  Plans 
Tax-free  accrual  of interest  can create significantly  higher  rates of re- 
turn.  The tax deductibility  of contributions  to a saving  incentive  account 
may also provide a tax advantage.  Let r be the interest rate, T0 the tax 
rate at time period 0, T1 the tax rate that applies between time period  0 
and  time  period  T, and  TT the tax rate  that  applies  to withdrawals  made  at 
time T.  The after-tax  balance  (B1)  in period  Tper  dollar  of pretax  income 
placed  in a conventional  saving  account in time 0 is 
(1)  BI =  (1  -  To)[1  +  r(1  -  T )]T. 
In a front-loaded  saving  incentive  plan, such as 401(k)s,  the contribu- 
tion is tax deductible,  but the contribution  and any investment  earnings 
are taxed when withdrawn.  The after-tax  balance (B2) in period T per 
dollar  of pretax  income  contributed  to a front-loaded  saving  incentive in 
time 0 is19 
(2)  B2 = (1 -  TT)(1  +  r)T. 
The difference  D equals (B2 -  B1) and  is the increased  private  return  to 
a saver from a front-loaded  saving incentive relative to a conventional 
saving  account, per dollar  of pretax  income. If the amount  placed in the 
saving  incentive account  would have been saved even in the absence of 
this tax-preferred  plan, D is also forgone  revenue to the government.  D 
is positive (except when all tax rates are zero or all tax rates are one), 
rises with r and T, and, as shown in figure  1, is a concave function  Of  T.20 
In a back-loaded  saving  incentive  plan, the contribution  is not tax de- 
ductible,  but neither  the original  contribution  nor  the earnings  are taxed 
on withdrawal.  The after-tax  balance  (B3)  in period  Tper  dollar  of pretax 
income  contributed  to a back-loaded  saving  incentive in time 0 is 
(3)  B3 =  (1  -  T0) (1  +  I-)T. 
19.  For a 40 1(k) plan with an employer matching contribution rate of in, B2 =  (1  -  TT) 
(1 +  m)(1  +  -j)T 
20.  If the tax rate effective  at the time of withdrawal from a saving incentive  account 
is less than the tax rate in effect when the contribution is made, the tax savings would be 
even larger than in figure 1. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  91 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  in which the return is calculated  as B2 from equation  2 minus Bi  from equation  1. 
The holding period,  T, is set equal to 30, and the interest rate, r, is set equal to 0.08. 
Referring  to equations  2 and 3, if T0  equals  TT, the after-tax  balances of 
front-loaded  and back-loaded  plans are equal  (B3 =  B2), so the upfront 
tax deductibility  of contributions  confers no tax advantage.21 
If contributions  are made  during  working  years when people face rel- 
atively high tax rates, and withdrawals  are made after retirement  when 
people face lower tax rates, there is a potential  tax advantage  to front- 
loaded  plans  Of  0  -  TT per dollar  contributed.  Tax changes, such as the 
1986  tax reform, that flatten  the profile  of marginal  tax rates decrease 
this potential  tax advantage.  A steep lifetime income profile  or policy 
changes that increase future tax rates could cause T7 to exceed T0 and 
make  upfront  deductibility  a liability  rather  than  an advantage.22 
Since the Tax Reform  Act of 1986,  some higher-income  families  have 
not been allowed to make tax-deductible  IRA contributions  but can 
nevertheless make nondeductible  contributions.  These nondeductible 
IRAs are different  from  back-loaded  IRAs since the return  on contribu- 
21. Even in this case, a taxpayer  may still prefer  the upfront  tax deduction  if uncer- 
tainty about  future  income creates a demand  for precautionary  saving (see Engen and 
Gale, 1993). 
22. For  further  discussion  of these issues, see Burman,  Cordes,  and  Ozanne  (1990). 92  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
tions (but  not the original  contribution)  are taxed at the end of the hold- 
ing  period.  The after-tax  balance  (B4) in period T  per dollar  of pretax  in- 
come contributed  to a nondeductible  IRA in time 0 is 
(4)  B4 =  (1  -  TO)[(1  -  TT)(1  +  r)T  +  TT]. 
The tax advantages  of a nondeductible  IRA are smaller  than for front- 
loaded  or back-loaded  IRAs (B4 < B3, B4 < B2), as long as tax rates  and 
interest  rates are positive. However, a nondeductible  IRA still provides 
a higher after-tax  balance than a conventional saving account (B4  > 
B 1).23 
Early  withdrawal  penalties  make saving incentive funds illiquid.  Ac- 
count holders  who plan to make  early withdrawals  may still wish to put 
funds in designated  accounts because after a period of time the higher 
effective interest  rate  will more  than  offset the penalty. In a front-loaded 
IRA, the penalty is assessed on both principal  and earnings.  The after- 
tax after-penalty  balance (B5) in period T per dollar of pretax income 
contributed  to a front-loaded  IRA in time 0 is 
(5)  B5  =  (1  TT -  p)  (  +  r)T, 
which is equivalent  to B2 except it includes  the penalty  p. 
The advantage  of contributing  to a saving incentive plan relative to 
conventional  saving depends  on the holding  period. The holding  period 
that makes the benefits of tax-free accrual  outweigh the costs of early 
withdrawal  rises with  p, falls with r, and is convex in the tax rate. With 
p equal  to 0.10, this holding  period  is about  five years or more  for a wide 
range  of parameters  .24 
23.  For example,  if T =  30, r =  0.08, and tax rates are constant  at T  =  0.40, then a 
dollar  in pretax  income  will yield  an after-tax  balance  of B I = $2.45  in a conventional  sav- 
ing account,  B2 = B3 = $6.04  in a front-loaded  or back-loaded  IRA, and  B4 = $3.86  in a 
nondeductible  IRA. 
24. For example,  with a base case of p  =  0. 1, T  =  0.4, and r = 0.08, the breakeven 
holding  period,  T*, is 7 years. Raising  r to 0.10 reduces T*  to 5 years, while reducing  r to 
0.05 raises T*  to 10  years. From  the base case, raising  the penalty  to 0.20 raises T*  to 14 
years. From  the base case, reducing  T to 0.2 raises T*  to 9 years, but  raising  T to 0.7 raises 
T*  to 8 years. 
For a nondeductible  IRA, the after-tax  balance,  if the early withdrawal  penalty  is in- 
curred,  is equal  to (1 -  T0) [(1 -  TT  -  p)  (1 +  -)T  +  (TT  +  p)]. Note that  the nondeductible 
contribution  is not subject  to either  tax or penalty  when withdrawn  early, although  the 
earnings  are  subject  to both  tax and  penalty.  With  the base case of p =  0.10,  T = 0.4 (taxes 
are  constant),  and  r = 0.08, T* is 12  years. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and Johin  KarlI  Scholz  93 
Matching  contributions  by employers  in 401(k)  plans are a part  of to- 
tal employee compensation.  If employers adjust  wages for the average 
amount  of matching  contributions  (for  the firm  as a whole or within  sub- 
groups),25  a worker  that contributes  the average  amount  has no income 
effect from  the employer's  matching.  However, there is still a substitu- 
tion effect since an additional  dollar  contributed  would  receive a match- 
ing contribution  that is not completely offset by a reduction  in wages. 
Above-average  401(k)  contributors  would  be subsidized  by below-aver- 
age 401(k)  contributors. 
Borrowing  to finance contributions  to a saving incentive account is 
profitable  if the after-tax  return  on the contribution  exceeds the after- 
tax cost of borrowing.26  If rs  and  rb are the returns  on contributions  and 
borrowing,  debt-financed  contributions  are profitable  when27 
(6)  (1  -  TT -  p)  (1  +  rs)T  >  [  +  b(1  -  1)]T. 
This condition  is often difficult  to achieve in practice  because rs  is typi- 
cally less than rb.28 
However, the employer matching  rate for 401(k) plans changes the 
condition  for profitable  debt-financed  contributions  to 
(7)  (1 -  TT  -  p)  (1 +  n)  (I  +  rs)T>  [1  +  rb  (l  -T)]T, 
where m is the employer matching  rate. If T is 0.4 (tax rates are con- 
stant), p is 0.1, rS is 0.10,  Tis 15, and the match rate is 0.5, debt financing 
is profitable  with  rb as high  as 13.1  percent. If the match  rate is zero, as, 
for example,  in an IRA, borrowing  is only profitable  if the borrowing  rate 
is below 8.3 percent. These differences suggest that the possibility of 
borrowing  to finance  contributions  is a more important  issue for 401(k) 
plans  than  for other saving  incentives. 
25.  Full adjustment of wages for the cost  of fringe benefits is consistent  with the evi- 
dence provided by Gruber and Krueger (1991) for workers' compensation,  Gruber (1994) 
for mandated maternity benefits,  and some  of the evidence  presented  in Montgomery, 
Shaw, and Benedict (1992) for defined benefit pensions. 
26.  See Gale and Scholz  (1994) and Kotlikoff (1990) for discussions  of the possibility 
of borrowing to finance IRA contributions. 
27.  We assume that interest payments on the borrowed funds are tax deductible,  as is 
the case, for example, with home equity loans. 
28.  With  r, = 0.08 and sb  =  0.10, constant tax rates, T  =  0.4, and a penalty of p =  0.10, 
it would take a 38-year holding period for the tax advantages of an IRA to overcome  the 
early withdrawal penalty and borrowing costs (assuming that the interest payments are tax 
deductible). 94  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Table 1.  Saving Incentive Contributions, 1980-90 a 
Billions  of nominal dollars,  except  as noted 
Total 
contributions 
Keogh  and  Total  (percent 
Year  IRA  SEP  401(k)  contribiutionsb  of  GDP) 
1980  3.4  2.0  ...  5.4  0.20 
1981  4.8  2.0  ...  6.8  0.22 
1982  28.3  2.5  3.9c  34.7  1.10 
1983  32.1  2.9  8.7c  43.7  1.28 
1984  35.4  4.1  16.3  55.7  1.48 
1985  38.2  5.2  24.3  67.7  1.68 
1986  37.8  6.2  29.2  73.2  1.71 
1987  14.1  6.2  33.2  53.4  1.18 
1988  11.9  6.6  39.4  57.9  1.18 
1989  11.0  6.3  46.1  63.4  1.21 
1990  9.9  6.8  49.0  65.7  1.19 
Sources:  U.S.  Internal Revenue  Service  (various  issues)  and  U.S.  Pension  and Welfare Benefits  Administration 
(1993). 
a.  The data do not include rollovers  or nondeductible  contributions  and do not account  for withdrawals. 
b.  May not add because  of rounding. 
c.  Authors'  estimates. 
Saving Incentives  and Aggregate  Measures  of Personal  Saving 
Table  1 and figure 2 show the evolution  of IRA, 401(k), and Keogh 
contributions  from  1980  to  1990.29  Contributions  to  401(k)s  grew 
throughout the decade and totaled $49 billion in 1990, or 0.9 percent of 
gross domestic product. IRA contributions grew dramatically following 
universal eligibility in 1982 and stayed high through 1986. In 1987, the 
restricted deductibility  and other features  of the  1986 tax reform took 
effect.  Deductible  IRA contributions fell 63 percent in 1987 and contin- 
ued to fall thereafter. By 1990, nominal IRA contributions were 26 per- 
cent of their 1986 value. Keogh and SEP contributions have been much 
smaller, but tripled from 1980 to 1986 and then rose slowly through 1990. 
Overall, nominal contributions to all these accounts grew from about $5 
billion in 1980 to $73 billion in 1986, fell to $53 billion in 1987, and rose 
again to about $66 billion in 1990. Contributions rose from 0.2 percent of 
GDP in 1980 to 1.7 percent in 1986. They fell to  1.2 percent of GDP in 
1987 and remained roughly at that level through 1990. 
29. The data  do not include  rollovers  and  nondeductible  contributions  and  do not ac- 
count  for withdrawals.  Data  on 401(k)  contributions  were unavailable  beyond 1990  at the 
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Figure 2.  401(k), IRA, Keogh, and SEP Contributions,  1980-90 
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Sources:  IRA and Keogh-SEP  data are from U.S.  Internal Revenue  Service  (various issues);  401(k) data for 1984- 
1990 are from U.S.  Department of Labor (1993). 
a.  401(k) data for 1982 and 1983 are estimated. 
These  patterns can be compared with the evolution  of several  mea- 
sures of aggregate personal saving.  The National  Income  and Product 
Accounts  (NIPA)  measure  personal  saving as the difference  between 
personal disposable  income  and personal  spending.  The flow of funds 
accounts (FFA) of the Federal Reserve provide an alternative measure, 
which is the sum of the household  sector's  net acquisitions  of financial 
assets and net investments  in tangible assets less the net change in liabili- 
ties.  A third measure is the flow of funds calculated  on a national ac- 
counts basis (FFA-NIPA).  This measure removes  consumer  durables, 
government  insurance  and pension  reserves,  and saving by corporate 
farms from the flow of funds measure.  It thus employs  the national ac- 
counts concept for saving but uses data from the flow of funds.30 
Figure 3 plots each of these measures and contributions to saving in- 
centives as a percent of GDP from 1980 to 1990. Major shifts in the ratio 
of saving incentive  contributions  to  GDP occurred  only  twice.  From 
1981 to 1982, contributions rose by 0.9 percentage point of GDP, follow- 
30. Holloway  (1989)  and  Wilson  and  others  (1989)  provide  extensive  discussions  of the 
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Figure 3.  Personal Saving Rates and Contributions to Saving Incentives,  1980-90 
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Sources:  IRA and Keogh-SEP  data are from U.S.  Internal Revenue  Service  (various issues).  401(k) data for 1984- 
90 are from U.S.  Department of Labor (1993). 401(k) data for 1982 and 1983 are estimated.  Personal  saving data are 
from the Econiomic Report  of thie Presidenit 1994,  table B-27,  and the  Board of Governors  of  the Federal  Reserve 
System,  flow of funds accounts. 
a.  Flow of funds is calculated on a national accounts  basis by removing consumer  durables, government  insurance 
and pension  reserves,  and saving by corporate farms from the flow of funds measure. 
ing the establishment  of universal eligibility for IRAs.  During this pe- 
riod, the national accounts  and flow of funds saving rates were flat, but 
the FFA-NIPA  rate rose by 0.6 percentage point. In the year following 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, contributions to saving incentives  as a per- 
cent of GDP fell by 0.5 percentage  point.  At the same time,  saving in 
other forms fell by even  larger amounts,  so that the national accounts 
rate fell by 1.2 percentage points,  the flow of funds rate fell by 2.8 per- 
centage  points,  and the FFA-NIPA  rate fell by 2.2 percentage  points. 
Taking the decade as a whole,  contributions to saving incentives  rose by 
1.0 percentage point of GDP, but the national accounts  and FFA-NIPA 
rates were lower in 1990 than in 1980, while the flow of funds rate was 
about the same. 
It is possible that personal saving in the 1980s could have fallen even 
further in the absence of saving incentive plans. Nevertheless,  it is diffi- 
cult to conclude  from the aggregate data that changes  in saving incen- 
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New Evidence on 401(k) Plans and Private Wealth 
This section presents new evidence  on the effects  of 401(k) plans on 
private wealth using information from the Survey  of Income  and Pro- 
gram  Participation  (SIPP).  The  SIPP  is  a  nationally  representative 
household  survev,  conducted  by the Bureau of the Census  and com- 
posed  of  a series  of overlapping  panels.  Households  are interviewed 
several times over a period of about two and a half years. Every "wave" 
of the survey  collects  core  data on income,  demographics,  and other 
items.  Periodic  modules  collect  detailed  information  on  specialized 
topics. 
We use data from topical modules with information on 401(k)s. The 
1984 SIPP wave  4 was undertaken between  September and December 
1984. We refer to this as 1984 data. The 1985 SIPP wave 7 and the 1986 
SIPP wave  4 surveys  occurred  between  January and April  1987. Be- 
cause  the  relevant  variables  in these  two  samples  have  very  similar 
means and medians  and the  samples  otherwise  look  very  similar, we 
have combined them to form our 1987 data. Interviews for the 1990 SIPP 
wave 4 occurred between February and May 1991; we refer to this infor- 
mation as  1991 data. Each topical module  contains  information about 
workers'  401(k) eligibility and participation.3"  The  1987 and 1991 data 
also contain information on 401(k) balances. 
We focus on families in which the reference person is 25-64 years old, 
in which at least one person is employed,  and in which no one is self- 
employed.32 Table 2 provides  information on 401(k) eligibility and par- 
31. As noted  above, we treat  403(b)  and  457  plans  and  federal  thrift  saving  plans  as the 
equivalent  of 401(k)  plans. Skip patterns  in the SIPP  indicate  that 401(k)  questions  were 
not asked  of workers  who said (i) their  employer  or union  did not offer a retirement  plan, 
(ii) they did not know if their  employer  or union  offered  a retirement  plan, (iii)  they were 
not included  in the retirement  plan, or (iv) they did not know if they were included  in the 
retirement  plan.  Hence, eligibility  rates  could  be underreported  if workers  were  not aware 
of the  availability  of plans,  and  eligibility  and  participation  could  be underreported  if work- 
ers did  not think  of 401(k)  plans  as retirement  plans. Calculations  from  the 1991  SIPP  data 
reveal 17.2  million  401(k)  participants  (Yakoboski  and  Boyce, 1993),  while  the 1990  Form 
5500  reports  filed  by pension  plans  count 19.5  million  active  participants  (U.S. Pension  and 
Welfare  Benefits  Administration,  1993).  These differences  may  be due to the skip  patterns 
noted above, different  definitions  of active participants  in the two samples, or other 
factors. 
32. We focus on this group  for several reasons. 401(k)  plans are employment  based 
and not available  to the self-employed.  For people aged 65 and older, issues concerning 98  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1994 




Sample  catego,ya  Eligibilityb  Participationc  families 
All families 
1984  14.7  8.5  57.8 
1987  21.9  13.7  62.7 
1991  36.4  25.4  69.8 
Age  of reference 
person  in 1991 sample 
25-34  31.9  23.3  73.2 
35-44  40.7  27.2  66.8 
45-54  39.4  27.5  69.8 
55-64  32.4  23.0  70.9 
Income  in 1991 sample 
Less  than 10,000  10.3  7.1  69.1 
10,001 to 20,000  18.8  12.7  67.4 
20,001 to 30,000  28.2  16.2  57.5 
30,001 to 40,000  37.9  26.2  69.3 
40,001 to 50,000  42.8  30.6  71.6 
50,001 to 75,000  52.6  37.1  70.5 
More than 75,000  54.1  44.5  82.3 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  data  from  the  Survey  of  Income  and Program Participation  (SIPP)  as 
described  in the text. 
a.  Sample  sizes  are 9,433 in 1984, 10,926 in 1987, and 10,105 in 1991. All figures are weighted to reflect population 
totals. 
b.  A family is considered  eligible  if at least one member of the family is eligible for a 401(k). 
c.  A family is considered  a participant if at least one member of the family has a positive  401(k) balance. 
ticipation in the various years.  A family is defined as eligible if anyone 
in the family is eligible for a 401(k) plan. Because  the SIPP waves  men- 
tioned above do not provide data on 401(k) contributions, a family is de- 
fined as a participant if at least one member has a positive  401(k) bal- 
ance. Both eligibility and participation rates have grown rapidly. Overall 
participation rates almost tripled from 8.5 percent in 1984 to 25.4 percent 
in 1991, mainly because  of a rise in eligibility rates but also because  of 
an increase in participation conditional on eligibility. In 1991, 401(k) eli- 
gibility was somewhat more common for families headed by a person be- 
retirement  behavior  and  saving  by the elderly  substantially  complicate  the analysis. SIPP 
questions  about  401(k)s  are  asked  only to people  25 and  older.  The reference  person  is the 
person  in whose name  the family's home is rented  or owned. If  jointly owned or rented, 
either  spouse  may  appear  as the reference  person. Eric  M. Engen, William  G. Gale, and  John Kat1  Scholz  99 
tween the ages of 35 and 54 and eligibility rates rose with family 
income.33 
Comparing 401(k) Participants  and Nonparticipants 
Table 3 presents data on families that did and did not participate  in 
401(k)  plans.34  The table shows that, at any given point in time, 401(k) 
participants  typically have higher  overall wealth and higher  non-401(k) 
wealth than nonparticipants.  For example, in 1991, median financial 
assets for participants  were $19,550,35  more  than  eight  times the median 
level of financial  assets for all nonparticipants,  which were $2,249.36  In 
1991,  the median  participant  had  about  2.7 times the net worth  of the me- 
dian  nonparticipant  .37 
The difference  in wealth  between participants  and nonparticipants  at 
a given point in time cannot  be taken  as evidence that  401(k)  plans raise 
saving. Part  of the difference  is due to differences  in observable  charac- 
teristics. For example, the table shows that 401(k)  participants  tend to 
33. Similar  patterns  hold in 1984  and 1987.  Contribution  rates on a per worker  basis 
follow similar  patterns  in the 1988  Employee  Benefit  Supplement  of the Current  Popula- 
tion Survey  (Andrews,  1992). 
34. Income  and  wealth  measures  are in real  terms  (1991  dollars),  using  the seasonally 
adjusted  CPI  for urban  households,  which  was 135.0  in February  1991  and 111.9  in Febru- 
ary 1987.  These dates  approximate  the midpoints  of the periods  during  which  the 1987  and 
1991  SIPP  surveys  were undertaken. 
35. This figure  is much higher  than comparable  figures  in Poterba,  Venti, and Wise 
(1993,  table 3. la) because their "families  with 401(k)s"  do not include  families  that have 
401(k)  plans  and  IRAs, whereas  our  definition  includes  all families  that  have a 401(k). 
36. Financial  assets are defined  as the sum  of checking  accounts, U.S. saving  bonds, 
other interest-earning  accounts in banks and other financial  institutions,  other interest- 
earning  assets (such  as bonds  held  personally),  stocks  and  mutual  funds,  and  IRA, Keogh, 
and 401(k)  balances. 
37. Net worth  is defined  to include  financial  assets plus equity in houses, other real 
estate, businesses  and  automobiles,  and  less unsecured  debt. 
As George  Perry  has pointed  out to us, households  may "double  count"  assets in sur- 
vey data.  For  example,  an IRA  with  $5,000  in equities  might  be reported  as both  $5,000  in 
stocks  and  $5,000  in IRA  balances,  so that  we would  calculate  financial  assets of $10,000. 
$10,000.  We do not believe this problem  is important  for the SIPP. First, questioners  are 
very aware  of the issue. Second, in constructing  the financial  assets measure,  the SIPP 
specifically  adds  together  IRAs and  other  assets. Third,  in the 1991  SIPP,  over 60 percent 
of IRA  holders  have IRA  and  401(k)  balances  exceeding  their  other  financial  assets or re- 
port  that  they have certain  types of assets (such as stocks) in their  IRA but not outside  of 
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Table 3.  Median Characteristics of 401(k) Participants and Nonparticipantsa 
1991 dollars, except  as noted 
Change, 
Family  characteristic  1984  1987  1991  1987-91 
Participants 
401(k) balancesb  .  .  .  4,826  6,000  1,174 
Financial assetsb  .  .  .  21,474  19,550  -  1,924 
Financial assets  other than 
401(k) balances  10,918  12,575  7,848  -4,727 
Net  financial assetsb  .  .  .  12,426  10,847  -  1,579 
Net  financial assets 
other than 401(k) balances  3,686  3,728  1,100  -  2,628 
Net  worthb  .  .  .  80,469  58,358  -  22,111 
Net  worth other than 
401(k) balances  75,141  71,632  46,045  -25,587 
Defined  benefit pension 
coverage  (percent)  70.2  66.5  63.5  -3.0 
Age (years)  42  42  41  - 1 
Income  50,287  51,014  45,699  -  5,315 
Education  (years)  14  14  14  0 
Sample size  810  1,543  2,517  ... 
Nonparticipants 
Financial assets  2,338  2,328  2,249  -79 
Net  financial assets  -  103  0  0  0 
Net  worth  31,148  26,624  21,355  -  5,269 
Defined benefit pension 
coverage  (percent)  46.9  42.5  34.5  -8.0 
Age (years)  38  39  40  1 
Income  34,011  33,286  31,242  -  2,044 
Education  (years)  12  12  12  0 
Sample size  8,623  9,383  7,588 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data from the SIPP. 
a.  Table reports median values,  except  for pension  coverage  and sample size. 
b.  Data on 401(k) balances  are unavailable for  1984. 
be slightly older and have more education  and substantially  higher in- 
comes  than nonparticipants.  However,  an important part of the differ- 
ences in wealth holdings in a given year can be explained by heterogene- 
ity: different households  have different propensities  to save,  even after 
controlling for observable factors. 
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an important role in saving is now widely  recognized.38 Heterogeneity 
implies that families with high propensities to save will make up a dispro- 
portionate  share of those  that participate in voluntary plans like IRAs 
and 401(k)s.  Hence,  observing in cross-sectional  data that participants 
have higher wealth than nonparticipants, even after controlling for other 
factors,  can lead to misleading inferences  about the effects  of saving in- 
centives,  because  unobserved  determinants  of saving  may differ sys- 
tematically between the groups. 
Table 3 can also be used  to compare the assets  of participants and 
nonparticipants over time.39 Although participants' median real 401(k) 
balances  grew  by  $1,174 from  1987 to  1991, their median  real finan- 
cial assets  (including 401(k) balances) fell by $1,924. Median real finan- 
cial assets for nonparticipants fell by less than $100.40 
However,  financial assets  may be too  narrow a wealth measure for 
analysis of 401(k) plans. As discussed  above,  employer matching of em- 
ployee contributions creates opportunities for financing 401  (k) contribu- 
tions with debt rather than new saving. To allow for this, we define net 
financial assets as financial assets less nonmortgage debt. Table 3 shows 
that from 1987 to  1991, median real net financial assets  fell for partici- 
pants and were constant for nonparticipants. 
38. See Gale and Scholz (1994)  or Poterba,  Venti, and Wise (1994).  Heterogeneity  in 
unobserved  determinants  of saving,  or tastes for saving,  can be demonstrated  by running 
cross-sectional  regressions  of non-401(k)  wealth  on observable  characteristics  and  an  indi- 
cator  for whether  a family  participates  in a 401(k)  plan.  If the coefficient  on the  401(k)  indi- 
cator is positive, it implies  that, controlling  for observable  characteristics,  families  that 
save more  in 401(k)  plans  also save more  in non-401(k)  forms. The coefficient  is positive 
and  economically  and statistically  significant  in regressions  using  each of the 1984, 1987, 
and 1991  SIPP  samples  for  non-401  (k)  financial  assets, non-401  (k)  net  financial  assets, non- 
401(k)  net worth,  and  defined  benefit  pension  coverage. Hence, participants  tend to save 
more in all forms than nonparticipants,  even after controlling  for observable  character- 
istics. 
39. It is important  that  these comparisons  be made  in real  rather  than  nominal  terms. 
Because the level of assets in any year is much higher  for participants  than nonpartici- 
pants,  an  equal  percentage  change  in asset levels (say, because  of inflation)  translates  into 
a larger  arithmetic  change  in nominal  assets for participants.  Hence, changes  in  real  assets 
will  generally  be smaller  than  changes  in nominal  assets, and  can even be in the opposite 
direction.  For  example,  for 401(k)  participants,  nominal  financial  assets rose from 1987  to 
1991,  even though  real  financial  assets fell. 
40. Interpreting  trends  in these figures  would be more difficult  if there had been ex- 
traordinarily  high  or low rates  of return  on existing  wealth  during  this  period.  But  this  does 
not seem to have occurred.  For example, the Standard  & Poor's 500 rose from  280.9 in 
February  1987  to 362.3 in February  1991,  approximately  the dates of the SIPP surveys. 
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It may also be useful to consider  broader  measures  of wealth. Medi- 
ans of financial  assets and  net financial  assets are small  relative  to medi- 
ans of overall net worth. Therefore, while most households may not 
have much  to substitute  away from  in terms  of net financial  assets, they 
may have other forms of wealth that can be adjusted. Moreover, the 
debt-financed  arbitrage  opportunities  are  even more  lucrative  if financed 
by property-backed  debt, the interest  on which is tax deductible.  Table 
3 shows that net worth  declined  more  for participants  than  for nonparti- 
cipants  from 1987  to 1991. 
These data  present  relevant  background  information,  but descriptive 
tabulations  clearly cannot determine  whether 401(k)s increase private 
wealth. For example,  it can be shown  that  changes  in observable  charac- 
teristics  can explain  all of the reduction  in financial  assets and net finan- 
cial assets, and most of the fall in net worth for 401(k) participants. 
Stronger  evidence on the effects of 401  (k)  plans  requires  two items:  con- 
trolling  for changes  in the many  factors  (including  income, age, and  edu- 
cation) that might  influence  observed levels of wealth in the cross-sec- 
tions and finding  an appropriate  way to identify the effects of 401(k) 
plans. We discuss our identification  strategy  below. 
Comparing  Two Types of  "Savers" 
Our strategy is to compare two groups: (i) 401(k) participants  and 
(ii) IRA  participants  who are  not eligible  for  401  (k)  plans. An IRA  partic- 
ipant is defined as a family with a positive IRA balance.41 There is no 
overlap  between these two groups.  The logic of this comparison  is two- 
fold. First, families in each group, by choosing to participate  in volun- 
tary saving  plans, have indicated  that they are "savers."  Second, 401(k) 
participants  had expanded opportunities  to use saving incentives be- 
tween 1986  and 1991  while IRA participants  not eligible  for 401(k)  plans 
had  sharply  curtailed  opportunities.  Not surprisingly,  between 1986  and 
1991,  401(k)  contributions  grew rapidly,  while IRA contributions  plum- 
meted. These changes in the structure  and use of saving  incentives pro- 
vide a way of testing  the effects of such plans on private  wealth. 
The basic test is that if 401(k) plans stimulate  private saving, then, 
controlling  for other factors, wealth measures for 401(k) participants 
should  have risen  from 1987  to 1991  relative  to wealth  measures  for IRA 
41. The SIPP  does not contain  information  on IRA  contributions,  only on balances. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  103 
Table 4.  Median Characteristics of IRA Participants Not Eligible for 401(k) Plans a 
1991 dollars,  except  as noted 
Change, 
Characteristic  1984  1987  1991  1987-91 
IRA balances  5,418  8,083  8,200  117 
Financial assets  20,551  23,525  27,600  4,075 
Financial assets  less  IRA  12,845  12,426  12,999  573 
Net  financial assets  13,139  15,683  20,000  4,317 
Net  financial assets  less  IRA  6,194  5,911  6,300  389 
Net  worth  98,944  98,550  98,253  -  279 
Net  worth less  IRA  92,726  90,060  83,703  -6,357 
Defined benefit pension 
coverage  (percent)  48.8  45.8  41.0  -4.8 
Age (years)  49  46  46  0 
Income  47,034  47,323  44,151  -  3,172 
Education  (years)  13  14  14  0 
Sample size  1,795  2,024  1,257  ... 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data from the SIPP. 
a.  An IRA participant is defined as a family with a positive  IRA balance.  Table reports median values,  except  for 
pension  coverage  and sample size. 
participants  not eligible for 401(k)  plans.42  The test assumes that, con- 
trolling  for observable  characteristics,  the saving  behavior  of 401(k)  par- 
ticipants  in a world  without  401  (k)s  would  be similar  to the saving  behav- 
ior of IRA participants  who are not eligible  for 401(k)  plans. 
Table 4 provides data on IRA participants  not eligible for 401(k) 
plans. Median  real IRA balances for this group rose by only $117 be- 
tween 1987 and 1991. Hence, 401(k) balances rose for 401(k) parti- 
cipants (as shown in table 3), but IRA balances were roughly  constant 
for IRA  participants  not eligible  for 401  (k)  plans. Table  4 also shows that 
IRA participants  not eligible  for 401(k)  plans had increases  in median  fi- 
nancial assets and had small increases in financial assets excluding 
IRAs. In 1987  and 1991, IRA participants  not eligible for 401(k)s were 
older  than  401(k)  participants,  had slightly  lower income, had the same 
median educational attainment, and had somewhat higher levels of 
assets and  wealth. 
42. The 1987  SIPP  data  were  collected  from  January  to April  1987,  and  the survey  asks 
for  IRA  and  401(k)  balances  at the end  of the month  preceding  the interview.  Because  con- 
tributions  to 1986  IRAs could be made until April 15, 1987,  the 1987  data refer  to asset 
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TESTING  THE  EFFECTS  OF 401(K)  PLANS.  Toimplementthetestde- 
scribed above, we use families from the 1987 and 1991 SIPP samples that 
either  (i) had a 401(k)  plan or (ii) had an IRA and were not eligible  for a 
401(k).43  We specify regressions  of the following  form: 
(8)  W = X,8 +  y  IN91  +  8 PART  +  a. [(IN91) (PART)] +  E. 
In this specification,  J3,  -y,  8, and  (x  are parameters  to be estimated,  and  E 
is a residual  assumed to be independently  and normally  distributed.  W 
is a measure of wealth, discussed below. X is a vector of variables 
thought  to influence  wealth accumulation,  including  age, age-squared, 
family  income, family  income-squared,  an  interaction  term  between  age 
and  income, family  size, indicators  for educational  attainment  (12  years, 
13-15 years,  and 16 years or more), defined benefit pension  coverage, 
marital  status, the presence  of two earners,  occupational  classifications, 
and  the race  and  gender  of the reference  person. Standard  life-cycle con- 
siderations  suggest  that saving is influenced  by age, income, and demo- 
graphic factors, including  family size and marital status. Education, 
pension coverage, and occupation  are often thought  to influence  saving 
behavior.  IN91 is an indicator  that  the observation  is in the 1991  sample 
and captures general differences in wealth between 1987 and 1991. 
PART  is an indicator  that  at least one member  of the family  participates 
in a 401(k)  plan;  it captures  average  differences  in wealth  between  401  (k) 
participants  and IRA contributors  not eligible for 401(k)s that are not 
captured  by other variables. 
The key independent  variable  is the interaction  term  (IN91)(PART), 
which measures  the amount  by which wealth increased  for 401(k)  parti- 
cipants  relative  to IRA holders  not eligible  for 401  (k)s  from 1987  to 1991, 
after  controlling  for family  characteristics  (through  X), general  changes 
between 1987  and 1991  (through  IN91), and  general  differences  in wealth 
between the two groups (through  PART). If 401(k) plans raise private 
wealth,  the coefficient  o- should  be positive and economically  and statis- 
tically significant. 
This equation  is estimated  for a variety  of different  wealth measures. 
We report  results  for real  financial  assets and  real  net financial  assets. In 
each case, we remove IRA balances from the wealth measures of IRA 
participants  not eligible for 401(k) plans.44  This adjustment  biases the 
43. Data  from 1984  are  excluded  because  there  is no information  on 401(k)  balances. 
44. Thus, the dependent  variables  are total or net financial  assets for 401(k)  partici- 
pants  (including  their  401(k)  and IRA balances)  and total or net non-IRA  financial  assets 
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Table 5.  Median Regression Explaining Net Financial Assets  a 
Standard 
Independent  variableb  Coefficient  errorc  t-statistic 
Age  -  0.9776  0.2684  -  3.64 
Age-squared  1.1738  0.3726  3.15 
Income  -  0.5410  0.1177  -  4.59 
Income-squared  0.2351  0.0924  2.54 
Age-income  interaction  1.5993  0.2115  7.56 
12 years of education  0.0213  0.0094  2.24 
13-15 years of education  0.0197  0.0085  2.30 
16 years or more of education  0.0767  0.0119  6.44 
Defined benefit pension  coverage  0.0046  0.0052  0.88 
Married  0.0272  0.0141  1.92 
Male  0.0057  0.0072  0.79 
White  0.0502  0.0088  5.69 
Two earners  -  0.0679  0.0119  -  5.68 
Family size  -  0.1813  0.0330  -  5.49 
Family member with 401(k) (PART)  0.0850  0.0101  8.39 
1991 sample dummy (IN91)  0.0129  0.0088  1.46 
Interaction term [(IN91) (PART)]  -0.0158  0.0126  -  1.24 
Constant  0.1063  0.0449  2.36 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  using data from the SIPP. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  net  financial assets  measured  in  1991 dollars.  Occupational  dummies  are omitted 
from the table.  Variables are measured in the following  units: net financial assets  divided by  100,000, age divided by 
100, age-squared divided by 10,000, income divided by  100,000, income-squared  divided by  1010,  age-income  divided 
by  107, and family size  divided by  10. Income  and assets  are expressed  in  1991 dollars. 
b.  The sample  pools  1987 and  1991 families  that either (i) have a 401(k) plan or (ii) have an IRA but not eligible 
for a 401(k) plan. The sample size  is 7,341. 
c.  Standard errors are estimated  with bootstrap  methods. 
tests in favor of finding  that 401(k) plans raise saving but is done to 
ensure  that any increase  in the comparison  group's  wealth is not the re- 
sult of IRAs. This issue arises because some families roll over pension 
balances  into IRAs. These should  not be counted as increases  in wealth 
but would be counted as such in the SIPP, because questions  are asked 
directly  about  IRA balances  but not about  balances  in defined  contribu- 
tion pension  plans  other  than  401(k)s.45 
Table  5 provides  estimates of the median  regression  for net financial 
assets.46  Controlling  for other factors and taking account of the qua- 
45. We discuss below the results  of adding  IRAs back into the asset measures  for the 
comparison  group.  For analyses  and data on rollovers, see Chang  (1993)  and Fernandez 
(1992). 
46. Because  median  regressions  reduce  the effect of outliers  they are useful  in anayz- 
ing  wealth  data,  which  are  typically  highly  skewed. Appendix  table  Al provides  summary 
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Table 6.  Effects of 401(k) Participation on Private Wealth Accumulationa 
Quantile  regression 
25th  75th  Ordinaty 
Dependent  variable  percentile  Median  percentile  least squares 
Financial assets  -  810  279  -  131  -  3,856 
(1.67)  (0.21)  (0.05)  (0.99) 
Net  financial assets  -1,310  -1,576  -3,409  -2,146 
(1.33)  (1.24)  (1.19)  (0.50) 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  using data from the SIPP. 
a.  The table provides  estimates  of the coefficient  on the interaction term (IN91)(PART) in 1991 dollars in a pooled 
sample  of families  that either  (i) participated  in a 401(k) or (ii) participated  in an  IRA but were  not  eligible  for a 
401(k). Quantile regression standard errors are estimated with bootstrap methods,  t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
dratic  and  interactive  terms,  the coefficients  imply  that  the median  of net 
financial  assets rises with age, income, and, in general, education; is 
higher  for married  couples than  for singles;  and  is lower  for families  with 
two earners  and for larger  families. On average, participants  in 401(k)s 
have higher  levels of net financial  assets, controlling  for other  factors. 
The key coefficient  is that  on the interaction  term  (IN91)(PART). This 
coefficient  should  be positive and significant  if 401  (k) plans  raise private 
saving. Instead, it is negative and insignificant,  indicating  that the net 
financial  assets of 401(k)  participants  did not rise relative to the net fi- 
nancial  assets of IRA  holders  not eligible  for 40  1(k)  plans, controlling  for 
other factors. This result occurs even though median real 401(k) bal- 
ances among  401(k)  participants  rose by more than $1,100  over this pe- 
riod. The implication  is that contributions  to 401(k)  plans did not raise 
private saving relative to what it would have been in the absence of 
401(k)s. 
Similar estimates occur for a variety of additional specifications. 
Table 6 reports  the coefficients on the interaction  term for the median 
regression,  the 25th  and 75th  quantile  regressions,  and  an ordinary  least 
squares  (OLS)  regression  for financial  assets and net financial  assets. In 
one case, the interaction  term is positive: median  financial  assets grew 
by $279  more  for 40  1(k)  participants  than  for IRA participants  not eligi- 
ble for 401(k)s. This figure is estimated imprecisely (the t-statistic is 
0.27) but represents  about 24 percent of the $1,174 increase in median 
401(k)  balances  for 401(k)  participants. 
From  this result, it is possible to develop a point estimate  for the pro- 
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ing. We estimate an average tax rate of 22 percent for 401(k) partici- 
pants.47  This would suggest that 2 percent of 401(k) contributions 
represent  increases  in national  saving. 
In all other cases, controlling  for other factors, asset measures for 
401(k)  participants  grew less than for IRA contributors  not eligible for 
401  (k)s  by a statistically  insignificant  amount.  Results  from  other  regres- 
sions that use net worth as the dependent  variable  or include IRA bal- 
ances in the asset measure of IRA participants  not eligible for 401(k) 
plans  generate  results  even less favorable  for 401  (k) plans. 
In each of the quantile regressions, the effects of 401(k) plans on 
wealth are successively more negative as the definition  of the wealth 
variable  is widened from narrow  measures, such as financial  assets, to 
broader  ones, such as net financial  assets or net worth.48  This suggests 
that  families  may be able to substitute  a variety of assets for 401(k)  bal- 
ances and suggests  the importance  of examining  measures  of wealth  that 
are sufficiently  broad  to allow for adjustments  in portfolios. 
It also suggests that the non-401(k)  wealth of 401(k) participants 
should have fallen  relative to that of IRA participants  not eligible for 
401(k)s.  To examine  this proposition,  we reestimated  the median  regres- 
sions in table 6, excluding  401(k)  balances  from the wealth measures  of 
401(k)  participants.  If 401(k)s  and other financial  assets are substitutes, 
the coefficient  on the interaction  term  (IN91) (PART) should  be negative 
and significant  in this specification.  The results are consistent with this 
hypothesis. When the dependent  variable  is financial  assets (excluding 
401(k)  balances),  the coefficient  on the interaction  term  is - $2,333  (with 
a t-statistic  of 2.87);  when the dependent  variable  is net financial  assets, 
the coefficient on the interaction  term is - $2,985 (with a t-statistic of 
3.53). 
These results  refer  only to private  saving, while our  original  criterion 
for whether saving incentives worked also focused on national  saving. 
Clearly,  if 401(k)  plans do not raise private  saving, they reduce national 
saving  in the absence of any other  policy change. 
47. The  average  marginal  tax rate  in 1988  was 22  percent  for  IRA  participants-anyone 
who had contributed  to an IRA between 1979  and 1988-using the IRS-Michigan  Tax 
Panel,  described  later  in this paper.  Relevant  characteristics,  such  as income,  family  size, 
percent  married,  and  homeownership,  are  very similar  for  401(k)  participants  and  IRA  par- 
ticipants  in the 1987  SIPP. 
48. That  this relation  does not hold for the ordinary  least squares  (mean)  regression 
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DISCUSSION.  The tests above are based on two key factors:  changes 
in the opportunities  for and  use of saving  incentives  for different  groups 
of families,  and  the sample  choice of families  such that  one group  of sav- 
ers can be compared with another. We discuss each factor further 
below. 
Concerning  the shift  in opportunities,  a potential  caveat is that  the In- 
ternal  Revenue Service limit  on employee 401(k)  contributions  fell from 
$30,000  in 1986  to $7,000  in 1987  (and  was then indexed  for inflation).  If 
a large  portion  of 401(k)  participants  were contributing  more  than  $7,000 
a year before 1986, the new limit could affect our results. However, it 
seems that  very few people gave amounts  exceeding $7,000. In the 1987 
SIPP, 50 percent of participants  had accumulated  401(k) balances of 
$4,000 or less, 75 percent had balances of $10,395  or less, and only 10 
percent  had balances of more than $29,000.  Andrea  Kusko, James Pot- 
erba,  and  David Wilcox show that  only about 1  percent  of 401  (k) partici- 
pants  in a medium-sized  manufacturing  firm  in 1990  were constrained  by 
the IRS limit.49  Leslie Papke  presents  data  from  Form  5500  reports  filed 
by pension  plans  indicating  that  less than 1  percent  of contributors  made 
employee contributions  of $5,000 or more in 1987.50  Hence, the lower 
IRS limit  is unlikely  to have affected  the median  regressions. 
A second issue concerns our choice of comparison  groups. At least 
three  issues arise in comparing  401(k)  participants  and IRA participants 
not eligible  for 401(k)s.51  Do the groups  start  out with unequal  propensi- 
ties to save? Does the propensity  to save of the 401(k)  participant  group 
fall over time? Does the propensity  to save of the IRA group  rise over 
time?  If the answer  to all three  questions  is no, our  choice of comparison 
groups  does not lead to systematic  biases in the analysis. Each of these 
questions lends itself to empirical examination, which we  describe 
below. 
First, do the two groups  start  out with similar  underlying  propensities 
to save? If 401(k)  participants  have systematically  lower propensities  to 
save, our  test might  be biased against  finding  a favorable  effect of 401  (k) 
plans on private saving. One might argue  that it is "easy" to save in a 
49. Kusko, Poterba,  and  Wilcox  (1994). 
50. Papke  (1992). 
51. We  thank  Doug  Bernheim,  Joel Slemrod,  and  Jon  Skinner,  among  others,  for stim- 
ulating  our  thoughts  on this topic. As discussed  below, related  issues arise  in the compari- 
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40  1(k)  plan:  employers  set up the plan, provide  for automatic  payroll  de- 
ductions, and often provide high rates of matching  contributions.  One 
may not need to be much  of a "saver"  to participate.  In contrast,  to con- 
tribute  to an IRA, one must set up an account and arrange  to make  con- 
tributions  to it. These considerations suggest that 401(k) participants 
may have systematically  less intense tastes for saving on average than 
IRA  participants  not eligible  for 401  (k)  plans. However, non-401  (k)  pen- 
sion coverage is higher  for 401(k)  participants  than  for IRA participants 
not eligible  for 401(k)  plans, as shown in tables 3 and 4. If workers  with 
strong  desires to save self-select into firms  that offer pensions or 401(k) 
plans, then 401(k)  participants  may on average  have higher  propensities 
to save than  IRA participants  not eligible  for 40  1(k)  plans. 
We examine  initial  propensities  to save by estimating  median  regres- 
sions, using all 401(k)  participants  and IRA participants  not eligible  for 
401(k)  plans in the 1987  SIPP  data. The dependent  variable  is a measure 
of assets; the independent  variables  include all of the X variables  and a 
dummy  variable  for whether  the household  was a 401(k)  participant.  If, 
controlling  for other  factors, the 401(k)  group  has a smaller  overall  pro- 
pensity to save, the coefficient  on the dummy  variable  indicating  401(k) 
participation  should be negative. Our  estimates indicate that when the 
dependent  variable  is financial  assets (net financial  assets), the coeffi- 
cient on 401(k) participation  is $972 ($1,986) with a t-statistic of 1.46 
(1.64).  Thus, there  is no evidence in these regressions  that  401(k)  partici- 
pants have smaller  propensities  to save via total or net financial  assets 
than  IRA participants  not eligible  for 401(k)  plans.52 
The second issue is whether  the propensity  to save for 401(k)  partici- 
pants  fell. If average  tastes for saving  among  401  (k)  participants  fell from 
1987  to 1991,  our tests may be biased against  finding  a positive effect of 
401(k)  plans on saving. This possibility  is based on the large  increase in 
participation  and eligibility between 1987 and 1991, and the idea that 
there  is heterogeneity  in propensities  to save. For example, suppose  that 
there  are "serious"  savers and  "occasional"  savers and  that  at the begin- 
ning of the 401(k) program  all of the serious savers enrolled. If an in- 
creasing  number  of occasional savers participate  over time, the average 
taste for saving  among  participants  would  fall. 
52. The  dependent  variables  in these regressions  include  the IRA  balances  of IRA  par- 
ticipants  not eligible  for 401(k)  plans. Obviously,  excluding  IRA  balances  would  raise  the 
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But this simple scenario may omit important  factors. Many 401(k) 
plans are cashed in upon employee separation  from the firm.  Thus, an 
alternative  scenario  is that over time, more  and more serious savers en- 
rolled (and stayed enrolled) in a 401(k) as the plans proliferated.  New 
occasional  savers established  401(k)  accounts, but  other  occasional sav- 
ers cashed in their  401(k)  plans and hence departed  from the sample  of 
401(k)  participants.53  The direction  of potential  shifts  in tastes for saving 
is not obvious. Moreover, as shown in table 3, median  401(k)  balances 
among  participants  rose from 1987  to 1991;  given the large  expansion  in 
401(k) participation  from 1987 to 1991, one might have expected bal- 
ances to have fallen if the sample were becoming more diluted over 
time. 
To examine  these ideas, we estimate median  regressions,  pooling  all 
401(k)  participants  in the 1987  and 1991  SIPP  data. The dependent  vari- 
able is a measure  of assets; the independent  variables  include all of the 
X variables  and  a dummy  variable  for whether  the family  was in the 1991 
sample. If, controlling  for other factors, the 401(k)  sample  is becoming 
diluted  with families  that have low propensities  to save, then the coeffi- 
cient on the 1991  indicator  should  be negative. But when the dependent 
variable  is financial  assets (net financial  assets), the coefficient on the 
1991 dummy variable is $1,638 ($267) with a t-statistic of 2.31 (0.38). 
Thus, for 1987  to 1991  there is no evidence of a reduction  in the propen- 
sity of 401(k)  participants  to accumulate  total or net financial  assets. 
The third  issue is whether  characteristics  of IRA participants  not eli- 
gible  for 401(k)  plans changed  so as to raise their  average  tastes for sav- 
ing between 1987  and 1991.  If so, our tests would  be biased against  find- 
ing a positive effect of 401(k)s on saving. The concern is that, since 
contributions  to IRAs decreased sharply  after 1986,  only serious savers 
may still have had IRAs in 1991, whereas both serious and occasional 
savers had IRAs in 1987. 
To address  this conjecture,  we estimate  median  regressions,  this time 
pooling  all IRA participants  not eligible  for 401(k)  plans in the 1987  and 
1991  SIPP data. The dependent  variable  is a measure  of assets that ex- 
cludes IRA balances  for the reasons given above and for comparability 
53. Although  most amounts  received through  lump  sum distributions  are rolled  over 
into some form  of saving,  broadly  defined,  a substantial  proportion  of the recipients  con- 
sume  all or part  of the funds. See Chang  (1993)  and  Fernandez  (1992). Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  111 
with  the regressions  in tables 5 and  6. The independent  variables  include 
all of the X variables  and a dummy  variable  for whether  the family was 
in the 1991  sample. Controlling  for other factors, if the overall taste for 
saving  was rising  in this group  between 1987  and 1991,  the coefficient  on 
the 1991  indicator  should be positive and significant.  When the depen- 
dent variable  is non-IRA  financial  assets (non-IRA  net financial  assets), 
the coefficient on the 1991  indicator  is $1,209 ($1,060)  with a t-statistic 
of 1.33  (1.16). Thus, for financial  assets, the increase  in the taste for sav- 
ing is smaller  for this group  than it is for 401(k)  participants  and is not 
statistically  significant.  For net financial  assets, the increase  in the taste 
for saving  is larger  than  it is for 401(k)  participants  but again  is not statis- 
tically significant.  These three sets of results provide no evidence that 
the samples  we have chosen are biased toward  finding  that  401(k)  plans 
do not raise total or net financial  assets.54 
However, our  tests contain  two omissions that  may  bias the results  in 
favor of finding  that 401(k)  plans raise  private saving. First, we ignore 
the distinction  between pre- and posttax asset balances. A 401(k)  bal- 
ance at any point  in time represents  a pretax  value; one cannot  consume 
the entire balance because income taxes and perhaps  penalties are due 
upon withdrawal.  In contrast, one may consume the entire  balance  of a 
taxable  asset. Hence, at a point in time, a family with all of its portfolio 
in fully taxable assets has higher  current  available  wealth than a family 
with  an equal  asset balance  but all of its portfolio  in a 40  1(k)  plan, but  the 
SIPP  would record  them as having  equal wealth. Moreover,  if tax rates 
change  by relatively  small  amounts,  as they did  from 1987  to 1991,  com- 
parisons  of increases over time in fully taxable  assets and pretax  401(k) 
balances over time will tend to overstate the increase in wealth arising 
from  40  1(k)  plans.55 
Second, a variety of estimates suggest that about one-third  or more 
54. The  tests implicitly  assume  that  the underlying  relationship  in 1987  between  assets 
and  observable  family  characteristics  accurately  reflects  the relationship  in 1991  as well. 
55. Footnote 19 implies that, ignoring  any penalties, the after-tax  balance after T 
years, resulting  from a $1 contribution  to a 401(k) plan with a zero match rate, is 
(1 -  r)  (1 +  r)T.  The value reported  in the SIPP, which asks about  the current  balance, 
would  be (1 +  r)T.  Hence, if the reported  value of 401(k)  balances  rose by an amount,  Z, 
from  one survey  to the next, the increase  in after-tax  balances  (assuming  tax rates were 
constant)  would  be only (1 -  r)Z.  Our  tests do not adjust  401(k)  balances  downward  to 
account  for  this  effect. Similar  problems  arise  for  IRAs,  but  our  tests remove  IRA  balances 
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of 401(k)  plans  represent  conversions of previously  existing pensions.56 
This presents several potential problems for analyses using the SIPP 
data, because the SIPP  provides  information  on 401(k)  balances  but not 
on balances  in other  pension  plans. Consider  two observationally  equiv- 
alent  families  each with  equal  amounts  of taxable  assets. One  family  also 
has $10,000  in a 40  1(k)  while the other family has the same amount  in a 
defined  contribution  plan. The SIPP data would show the 401(k)  family 
to have higher  wealth.  Moreover,  as more  pension  plans  were converted 
to 401(k)s  between 1984  and 1991,  the successive cross-sections of the 
SIPP  would  show increases  in reported  assets associated  with  becoming 
a 401  (k) participant,  even though  a real  increase  may not have occurred. 
Comparisons  Using  Other Grouips 
The tests above are based on comparing  two groups of savers who 
experienced  different  changes  in their  opportunities  to use saving  incen- 
tive plans. There is obviously no single "correct"  choice of comparison 
groups,  however, so this subsection  examines alternative  comparisons. 
The underlying  question in all of these comparisons  is what would 
have happened  to the assets of 401(k)  contributors  if they had not been 
eligible to  make 401(k) contributions. The difference between this 
counterfactual  scenario and what actually happened is the "effect of 
401(k)s  on household  saving." 
Addressing this counterfactual  comparison requires some sort of 
model. One approach  is to develop a structural  econometric model of 
household saving behavior.57  An alternative  is to make less structured 
comparisons,  controlling  for a variety of factors. We have chosen the 
latter  approach,  which assumes that, after  controlling  for other charac- 
teristics, the saving  of IRA participants  not eligible  for 401  (k)s would  be 
equivalent  to the saving  of 401(k)  participants  in the absence of 401(k)s. 
56. Andrews  (1992)  reports  that 15,689  of the 45,054  401(k)  plans  in existence in 1987 
reported  being established  before 1984  even though  there were only 1,703  actual  401(k) 
plans  in  existence  in 1984.  Most  of the discrepancy  is thought  to be due  to preexisting  plans 
reconstituted  as 401(k)  plans.  Papke,  Petersen,  and  Poterba  (1993,  table  3.1) report  that  45 
percent  of the firms  they surveyed,  representing  37 percent  of the participants  covered  by 
the plans,  reported  that  a 401  (k)  plan  replaced  a previously  existing  pension  plan.  In a 1989 
survey  by Buck  Consultants,  28  percent  of 401(k)  plans  surveyed  had  been  converted  from 
thrift  or profit-sharing  plans, and 7 percent were converted  from defined  benefit  plans 
(Buck  Consultants,  1989,  p. 4). 
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Comparisons  using a less structured  approach  must be made with 
care. An important  cost of this approach  is that at least two criteria  are 
needed for the comparisons  to be informative.  First, the type of house- 
hold  within  each comparison  group  should  remain  similar  over time. For 
example, we show above that the sample  of 401(k)  participants  did not 
become diluted over time with families with low tastes for saving and 
that the sample  of IRA participants  not eligible  for 401(k)  plans did not 
become concentrated  with families  with high  tastes for saving. Second, 
the two groups  should not be too different  at a point in time. For exam- 
ple, we show above that  401  (k)  participants  and  IRA  participants  not eli- 
gible for 401(k)  plans  have similar  tastes for saving  in 1987. 
The second criterion  arises because in a less structured  approach,  it 
is extremely  difficult  to control  for all of the variables  that affect wealth 
accumulation,  and groups  in very different  circumstances  may be influ- 
enced differently  by omitted variables. For example, in the late 1980s, 
at least two important  events might  have affected  disparate  groups  in dif- 
ferent ways. First, Jerry  Hausman  and Poterba  show that the Tax Re- 
form  Act of 1986  had substantially  different  effects at the top end of the 
income distribution  than  at its middle.58  Second, the stock market  crash 
in 1987  likely had  different  effects on households  at opposite ends of the 
income and  wealth distribution. 
COMPARISONS  BASED  ON  PARTICIPATION.  An alternative  way  to 
examine the effects of 401(k)s on wealth is to compare families with 
401(k)s  but without  IRAs to families  without  401(k)s.59  This comparison 
is one of those presented by Poterba, Steven Venti, and David Wise, 
who use a different  methodology  than we do to examine the effects of 
401(k)  plans on household saving.60  If one assumes that the saving be- 
havior of 401(k) participants  without IRAs in the absence of 401(k)s 
would be similar  to the saving behavior  of households without  401(k)s, 
controlling  for other  characteristics,  the effects of 401(k)s  on household 
saving  can be estimated  using  a specification  similar  to that  in table  5. To 
do so, we include all families from the 1987  and 1991  SIPPs that either 
58.  Hausman and Poterba (1987). 
59.  Not  surprisingly, the median values of economic  characteristics  of families with 
401(k) plans but without IRAs are generally between  those  of all 401(k) participants and 
those of nonparticipants. The median real 401(k) balances for families with 401(k)s but not 
IRAs rose by $1,234 from 1987 to 1991. 
60.  Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1992, 1993, and 1994). 114  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
(i) had a 401(k)  but not an IRA or (ii) did not have a 401(k).  This specifi- 
cation drops  from  the sample  those households that have both a 401(k) 
and an IRA.61 The independent  variables  include the same X variables 
as above, an IN91 indicator,  a PART indicator,  and the (IN91) (PART) 
interaction  term. As before, the effect of 401(k)  plans on wealth should 
appear  in the term  (IN91) (PART). 
These regressions show that, controlling  for other factors, median 
real  financial  assets of families  with 401(k)s  but not IRAs increased  by a 
point estimate of $445 relative to that of families without 401(k)  plans 
between 1987  and 1991.  For net financial  assets the point estimate was 
$401.  These figures  represent  36 percent  and  32 percent  of the $1,234  in- 
crease in median  401(k)  balances  for families  with 401(k)s  but not IRAs. 
Using an average tax rate of 22 percent for 401(k) participants  would 
suggest that between 14 percent and 10  percent of 401(k)  contributions 
represent  net increases in national  saving  in the short  run.62 
We note, however, that the point estimates are insignificantly  differ- 
ent from zero and do not address  the possible upward  biases that arise 
from failing  to distinguish  between pre- and posttax asset balances and 
from ignoring  the prevalence  of 401(k)  plans that represent  rollovers of 
previously existing plans. Moreover, when net worth is the dependent 
variable,  the coefficient  on the interaction  term  is negative. Finally, us- 
ing  these comparison  groups  implicitly  assumes  that  the saving  behavior 
of 401(k) participants,  to whom we have referred  earlier as "savers," 
would, in the absence of 401(k)  plans, be the same as nonparticipants, 
controlling  for observable  characteristics.63 
61. Among  401(k)  participants,  46 percent  had  IRAs in 1987  and 35 percent  had  IRAs 
in 1991. 
62. Ordinary  least squares  regressions  also generate  positive but statistically  insig- 
nificant  coefficients on the interaction  term. The point estimate is that mean financial 
assets of families  with  401(k)s  but  not IRAs  increased  by $1,114  relative  to that  of families 
without  401(k)  plans between 1987  and 1991. For net financial  assets the increase was 
$2,418.  These should  be compared  with  an increase  in mean  401(k)  assets of $3,125. 
63. To examine  differences  in initial  propensities  to save, we ran  median  regressions 
using  all families  in the 1987  SIPP  that  either  (i) had  a 401(k)  but not an IRA or (ii) did not 
have  a 401(k).  The dependent  variable  was financial  assets, and  the independent  variables 
were the same  Xs as above and  an indicator  variable  for having  a 401(k)  plan.  The coeffi- 
cient on the indicator  variable  was about  $3,700  and  estimated  precisely.  By comparison, 
the median  level of financial  assets in the 1987  SIPP sample  was less than  $3,000,  and  the 
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In similar  tests comparing  families  with 401(k)s  but not IRAs to IRA 
participants  not eligible for 401(k)s, the coefficient on the interaction 
term is $317 when the dependent variable is financial  assets and $43 
when the dependent  variable  is net financial  assets. Neither  is estimated 
precisely. These figures represent 26 percent and 3.5 percent of the 
$1,234  increase in median  401(k)  balances for families with 401(k)s  but 
not IRAs. Adjusting  for the tax loss, this comparison  also suggests that 
401(k)s  have had little, if any, effect on national  saving. 
Another  test would compare  families  with an IRA but not a 401(k)  to 
families  without  an IRA. These two groups,  however, appear  to be very 
different  with respect to initial  propensities  to save and with respect to 
wealth.64  Hence, we believe it is unlikely that differences in tastes for 
saving or differential  changes in the economic environment  facing the 
two groups  (such as the 1986  tax reform  and  the stock market  crash)  can 
be adequately  captured  using the modeling approach  above. Another 
comparison  would involve families with both an IRA and a 401(k)  and 
families  with neither.  Again, however, we believe that these groups  are 
too disparate  for the comparison  to be informative.65 
COMPARISONS  BASED  ON  ELIGIBILITY.  From an analytical per- 
spective, a potentially  advantageous  aspect of 401(k)  plans is that-un- 
like IRAs-they  are not universally  available.  If 401(k)  eligibility  is dis- 
tributed independently of  underlying propensities to  save,  then 
differences  in eligibility  across families  could be used to identify  the ef- 
fects of 401(k)  plans on saving. In this subsection, we examine  the rela- 
tion between 401(k)  eligibility  and  propensities  to save. 
Table 7 presents information  on households by 401(k)  eligibility  sta- 
tus in the SIPP. Median  non-401(k)  financial  assets and non-401(k)  net 
worth are several times higher  for eligibles than noneligibles. In 1991, 
64. To examine  these differences,  we ran  median  regressions  using  all families  in the 
1987  SIPP  that  either  (i) had  an IRA  but  not a 401(k)  or (ii)  did  not have  an IRA.  The  depen- 
dent variable  was financial  assets, and the independent  variables  were the same Xs as 
above  and  an  indicator  variable  for  having  an  IRA.  The  coefficient  on the indicator  variable 
was about  $16,000  and  estimated  precisely. 
65. We ran median  regressions  using all families  in the 1987  SIPP that either  (i) had 
both  an IRA  and  a 401(k)  or (ii) had  neither.  The dependent  variable  was financial  assets, 
and the independent  variables  were the same Xs as above and an indicator  variable  for 
having  both saving  incentive  plans. The coefficient  on the indicator  variable  was about 
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Table 7.  Median Characteristics of 401(k)-Eligible and Noneligible Families a 
1991 dollars, except  as noted 
Family  characteristic  1984  1987  1991 
Eligible families 
401(k) balancesb  1,206  2,000 
Financial assetsb  13,422  13,456 
Financial assets  other than 401(k) balances  7,026  8,445  6,652 
Net  financial assetsb  .  .  .  5,248  6,305 
Net  financial assets  other than 401(k) balances  1,130  1,745  556 
Net  worthb  .  .  .  62,795  51,339 
Net  worth other than 401(k) balances  61,573  58,632  42,900 
Defined benefit pension  coverage  (percent)  73.6  69.5  63.5 
Age (years)  40  40  41 
Income  46,242  48,137  43,605 
Education  (years)  14  14  14 
Sample size  1,410  2,433  3,613 
Noneligible  families 
Financial assets  2,236  2,051  2,000 
Net  financial assets  -  89  0  0 
Net  worth  30,299  25,576  19,250 
Defined benefit pension  coverage  (percent)  44.6  39.2  28.0 
Age  (years)  39  39  39 
Income  33,467  32,320  30,000 
Education  (years)  12  12  12 
Sample size  8,023  8,493  6,492 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data from the SIPP. 
a.  Table reports median values,  except  for pension  coverage  and sample size. 
b.  Data on 401(k) balances  are unavailable for 1984. 
401(k)-eligible  households were 35.5 percentage  points more likely to 
participate  in a defined  benefit  pension  than  noneligible  families.66  Some 
of these differences  are due to differences  in observable  characteristics: 
eligibles have higher  median  income and more years of education.  The 
key issue is whether, controlling  for other factors, 401(k)-eligible  fami- 
lies tend to have greater  propensities  to save than  noneligible  families. 
Table 8 addresses this issue. The four panels show estimates of the 
effects of eligibility  on various measures of wealth that exclude 401(k) 
66.  The probability of having a defined benefit plan and being vested  is about 20 to 25 
percentage points higher for eligibles than noneligibles in the three survey years. Including 
data on reported participation in defined contribution plans raises these differences,  but it 
is unclear whether respondents  included a 401(k) plan as a defined contribution plan in 
answering the survey, so we exclude data on these plans. 401(k) eligibles are also about 10 
percentage points more likely to have employer-provided  health insurance. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  117 
Table 8.  Effects of 401(k) Eligibility on Non-401(k) Wealth 
Controlling  Controlling  for 
for  income and 
Measure  Year  income only  other  factorsa 
Probability of having a defined 
benefit pensionb  1984  0.26  0.24 
(16.5)  (15.2) 
1987  0.26  0.25 
(21.1)  (19.8) 
1991  0.33  0.31 
(31.3)  (28.7) 
Median level  of non-401(k) 
financial assetsc  1984  737  346 
(3.22)  (1.98) 
1987  992  773 
(3.81)  (4.96) 
1991  215  280 
(1.28)  (2.07) 
Median level  of non-401(k) 
net financial assetsc  1984  372  173 
(1.64)  (0.65) 
1987  521  768 
(2.73)  (3.07) 
1991  -307  -48 
(1.71)  (0.23) 
Median level  of 
non-401(k) net worthc  1984  4,668  2,500 
(2.36)  (1.99) 
1987  2,149  3,291 
(1.58)  (3.20) 
1991  -  848  1,478 
(0.71)  (1.75) 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  using data from the SIPP.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
a.  The other factors  are the explanatory  variables  in X, as described  in the text. 
b.  In the first panel,  the  entry represents  the  marginal increase  in the  probability of being  covered  by  a defined 
benefit pension plan associated  with being eligible for a 401(k), controlling for other factors. The marginal probabilities 
are calculated  from the coefficients  of a probit equation  (see  Greene,  1990, p. 664). 
c.  The entry represents  the coefficient  on being eligible  in a median regression  of non-401(k) wealth on eligibility 
status  and  other  factors.  For  these  panels,  the  median  regression  standard  errors  are  estimated  with  bootstrap 
methods. 
balances. For each measure  and each sample year, two cross-sectional 
equations are estimated. The first controls for a constant, family in- 
come, and 401(k)  eligibility. The second controls for all of the X vari- 
ables  in table  5 and  for eligibility.67  If, controlling  for other  factors, eligi- 
67. The only exception  is that  the probits  for pension  coverage  do not include  pension 
coverage  as an independent  variable,  for obvious  reasons. 118  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
bility is positively correlated  with measures  of non-401(k)  wealth, then 
it is difficult  to see how eligibility  can be uncorrelated  with  tastes for sav- 
ing. In that case, exploiting  variations  in eligibility  will not be a useful 
way to measure  the effects of 401(k)  plans on saving. 
The first  panel shows that  401(k)-eligible  families  are between 24 and 
31 percentage  points more  likely to be covered by a defined  benefit  pen- 
sion plan  than  are ineligible  families, controlling  for other  factors. Most 
of the difference  in coverage rates reported  in table 7 can be explained 
solely by the eligibility  term  in table  8. The second panel  of table  8 shows 
the effects of eligibility  on median  levels of non-401(k)  financial  assets. 
Eligibility  is typically statistically  significant,  and the estimated  effects 
are  large  relative  to the median  financial  assets of noneligibles.  The third 
and fourth panels show smaller effects of eligibility on net financial 
assets and  larger  effects on overall  net worth  (again,  excluding  401(k)s). 
Table 8 thus shows that 401(k)-eligible  families save more in non- 
401(k) assets than  observationally  equivalent  noneligible  families, even 
after  controlling  for other  factors.  The results  show that  401  (k)  eligibility 
is positively correlated  with an underlying  taste for saving  and with un- 
observed determinants  of saving behavior, and in most cases this rela- 
tionship  is economically  and statistically  significant.68  Moreover,  the re- 
sults may understate  the positive correlation  between tastes for saving 
and  401(k)  eligibility.  The appropriate  way to measure  differences  in the 
saving  propensities  of eligibles  and  noneligibles  is to examine  the actual 
wealth  of noneligibles  and  the wealth  of eligibles  in the absence of 401(k) 
plans. The test in table 8 assumes that  all 401(k)  saving  is new saving, so 
that no adjustment  is made for 401(k)  wealth. If, however, x percent  of 
401(k)  saving is thought  not to be new saving, then x percent of 401(k) 
balances  should  be added  to the wealth  measured  for eligibles  in table 8. 
This would obviously raise the coefficient on eligibility in the regres- 
sions. 
The implication  is that using  variations  in 401(k)  eligibility  to identify 
the effects of 401(k)  plans on saving will overstate those effects.69  The 
68. The equations  that  control  only for income  provide  particularly  strong  evidence  of 
this proposition.  Eligible  families  are about  the same age as noneligibles  but have higher 
income and education,  implying  that they have higher  permanent  income than noneligi- 
bles. Controlling  for current  income,  someone  with  higher  permanent  income  should  have 
lower  wealth, yet eligibles  have higher  wealth,  even ignoring  401(k)  balances. 
69. One  could  try  to use instrumental  variables  to examine  the effect of 401(k)  eligibil- 
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finding  that  401(k)  eligibility  is positively correlated  with tastes for sav- 
ing is consistent with theoretical  models of pensions70  and with survey 
evidence concerning  why 401(k)  plans are created.71 
Substitution  among  401(k) Plans,  IRAs,  and Pensions 
Our  results  are consistent with the view that  401(k)  plans  do not raise 
private  wealth.  This implies  that  contributions  to 401(k)s  are  financed  by 
some combination  of saving  that  would  have been done anyway, shifting 
of other  assets, or increasing  debt. In particular,  funds  that  would  other- 
wise have been placed in IRAs or private pensions are one possible 
source of 401(k)  contributions.  In this subsection, we examine the ex- 
tent to which IRAs or private pensions act as substitutes  for 401(k)s, 
with particular  emphasis on the relationship  between IRAs and 401(k) 
plans. 
IRAs and 401(k)  plans are unlikely to be perfect substitutes. 401(k) 
plans are tied to the work  place, while IRAs are not. 401(k)s  have differ- 
ent matching  rates, contribution  limits, hardship  criteria, loan provi- 
sions, and  asset allocation  choices. 401(k)  contributions  tend  to be regu- 
not of saving. But probit regressions  with industry dummies,  region of the country,  year 
dummies,  union status, occupation,  and firm size explained very little of the variation in 
eligibility, and it is difficult to find other possible instruments. Given the econometric  prob- 
lems with using a poor first-stage instrument, we do not believe this approach would gener- 
ate reliable results.  See Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1993); Nelson  and Startz (1990); and 
Staiger and Stock (1993). Skinner (1994) proposes an alternative way to address this issue. 
70.  Theoretical  models  suggest  that pensions  exist  where workers  demand them or 
that workers who demand pensions will be attracted to firms that offer them (Allen, Clark, 
and McDermed,  1993). In either case, it seems reasonable to believe that pension coverage 
will be positively  correlated with tastes  for saving.  Ippolito (1993) provides  a model ex- 
plaining the rapid growth of 401(k) plans in terms of their ability to help firms attract more 
productive workers.  These  workers will typically  have lower discount  rates as well (for 
example,  they may value future income  more and hence  work harder to achieve  promo- 
tion) but are difficult for the firm to identify. 401(k) plans help firms identify such workers 
because 401(k)s can be cashed in upon leaving the firm. High-discount  rate workers find it 
relatively more desirable to leave the firm and cash in the 401(k). One implication is that 
workers that remain with a firm that offers a 401(k) plan will tend to have low discount 
rates: that is, they will have higher propensities to save. 
71.  A 1989 report by Buck Consultants,  summarizing information obtained from 424 
responding companies,  representing a broad range of firm sizes,  geographical locations, 
and industry types,  reveals that "perceived employee  interest" was the second-most-fre- 
quently stated reason that a firm installed a 401(k) plan and was noted by 63.5 percent of 
respondents (Buck Consultants,  1989, p. 4). 120  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
lar  salary  deductions;  IRAs can be funded  anytime.  For  example,  people 
may want to put some money into a 401(k)  but then keep the flexibility 
of contributing  to an IRA at a later date in the tax year, depending  on 
their  income and  expenses. 
Nevertheless, IRAs and 401(k)s could be good substitutes  for some 
people (particularly  those who hold both 401(k)s  and IRAs). The plans 
represent  alternative  ways to save for retirement,  and  401(k)s  should  be 
particularly  attractive  for high-income  households after removing the 
tax deductibility  of IRA contributions  in 1986. Moreover, a variety of 
papers  show that households often shift the composition  of their assets 
and  liabilities  in response  to tax changes,72  even if they do not change  the 
overall  level of wealth. Similar  statements  apply  to pensions and 401(k) 
plans. 
PREVIOUS  RESEARCH.  Other  researchers  have uncovered  some evi- 
dence of substitution.  James  Eisner  uses data  from  the 1986  SIPP  to esti- 
mate  the probability  of 401  (k) participation  (conditional  on eligibility).73 
He finds that, evaluated  at sample  means and controlling  for other fac- 
tors, having  a defined  benefit  plan reduces a worker's 401(k)  participa- 
tion rate by 28 percentage  points, while having a defined contribution 
plan reduces the participation  rate by 10 percentage  points. Andrews, 
using  the Employee  Benefits  Supplement  of the 1988  Current  Population 
Survey, also finds that participation  in a preexisting pension plan re- 
duces the probability  of participating  in a 401  (k) plan, conditional  on eli- 
gibility  and  other  factors.74 
Another  way to test for substitutability  is to exploit the removal  of the 
tax deductibility  of IRA contributions  for some higher-income  families 
in the 1986  tax reform.  If households  find  IRAs and  401(k)s  to be substi- 
tutes, then, controlling  for other factors, (i) the overall decline in the 
probability  of giving  to an IRA after 1986  should  be higher  for 401(k)  eli- 
gibles than noneligibles;  (ii) there should be little difference in the de- 
cline in IRA  contributions  for 40  1(k)  eligibles  and  noneligibles  among  in- 
come groups  whose IRA tax status did not change;  and (iii) the decline 
in IRA participation  should  be larger  for 401  (k) eligibles  than  for noneli- 
72.  See, for example,  Feenberg and Poterba (1993), Feldstein  (1976, 1993), Manches- 
ter and Poterba (1989), Scholz (1994), Skinner and Feenberg (1990), and Slemrod (1992a). 
73.  Eisner(1993). 
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gibles among income groups who lost deductibility  of IRA contribu- 
tions. 
Poterba,  Venti, and Wise present  evidence related  to this issue using 
data  from  the Employee Benefits Supplement  of the 1983  and 1988  Cur- 
rent  Population  Surveys.75  Their  results are broadly  consistent with the 
patterns  noted above. First, during  1982-87, the decline in IRA partici- 
pation was 10.7 percentage points for 401(k) eligibles compared  with 
7 percentage points for those not eligible. Second, for low-income 
groups, whose IRA tax status was not affected, the decline in IRA par- 
ticipation  rates was about  the same for 401(k)  eligibles  and  noneligibles. 
Third,  for families with incomes above $75,000, the IRA participation 
rate dropped substantially  more for 401(k) eligibles than for noneligi- 
bles. In this group, the IRA participation  rate fell by 57 percentage 
points  for eligibles  compared  with 27 percentage  points  for noneligibles. 
Poterba,  Venti, and Wise use the same data  to estimate  the probabil- 
ity of contributing  to an IRA before and after 1986  as a function  of year, 
income class, and 401(k)  eligibility.76  The point estimates suggest that 
the fall in IRA contribution  rates  from 1982  to 1987  was larger  for 40  1(k) 
eligibles than for noneligibles  in all income categories above $40,000. 
The direction  of this effect is consistent with the presence of substitu- 
tion, and the coefficient is statistically significant  for families with in- 
comes above $75,000  but not for families  with incomes between $40,000 
and $75,000. 
NEW  EVIDENCE  ON  SUBSTITUTABILITY.  We now turn to a new 
test, using  the SIPP  data  described  above. The intuition  behind  our test 
is that  if 401(k)s  and  IRAs are substitutes,  401(k)-eligible  families  whose 
IRA deductibility  was restricted in 1986 should have funneled more 
money into 401(k) plans between 1987 and 1991  than eligible families 
whose deductibility  was not removed, controlling  for other  factors. 
To measure  this effect, we pool the 1987  and 1991  samples  of 401(k)- 
eligible  households from the SIPP and estimate a tobit model with real 
401(k)  balances as the dependent  variable. The independent  variables 
are  the Xs used above, with non-401(k)  net worth  added  as an additional 
term.77  Also included  is a dummy  variable  for being  in the 1991  sample, 
75.  Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1992). 
76.  Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, table 6). 
77.  Results are very similar if the non-401(k) net worth term is omitted. 122  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Table 9.  Tobit Estimates of 401(k) Balances  a 
Standard 
Independent  variable  Coefficientb  error  t-statistic 
Age  579.70  249.66  2.32 
Age-squared  -4.39  2.92  -  1.50 
Income  0.16  0.06  2.69 
Income-squared  -  240.46  232.76  -  1.03 
Age-income  interaction  177.51  108.33  1.63 
Non-401(k) net worth  0.02  0.00  8.49 
12 years of education  970.89  1,118.78  0.86 
13-15 years of education  1,803.67  1,179.46  1.52 
16 years or more of education  3,300.42  1,176.64  2.80 
Defined benefit pension  coverage  -  3,048.59  603.58  -  5.05 
Married  1,531.91  1,081.87  1.41 
Male  969.04  786.32  1.23 
White  5,873.44  935.96  6.27 
Two  earners  -  1,612.15  750.98  -  2.14 
Family  size  -  1,325.96  261.26  -  5.07 
1991 sample dummy (IN91)  4,256.59  877.50  4.85 
Tax change  -2,014.07  1,204.47  -  1.67 
Interaction term [(IN91) (tax change)]  2,537.89  1,173.2  2.16 
Constant  -  30,504.20  5,431.57  -  5.61 
Standard error of regression  20,636.64  237.94 
Source:  Authors'  estimates  from a tobit model using data from SIPP. 
a.  The dependent  variable is real 401(k) balances  (1991 dollars). Occupational dummies are omitted from the table. 
Assets  and  income  are expressed  in  1991 dollars.  Variables  are measured  in the  following  units:  income-squared 
divided by  109, and age-income  interaction divided  by  105. 
b.  The  sample  pools  1987 and  1991 families  that  are eligible  for  a  401(k)  plan.  Sample  size  is  6,046.  The  log 
likelihood  is  -47,511.479. 
a dummy  for having  the tax deductibility  of IRA contributions  removed 
in 1986  (this is called tax change),78 and  an interaction  term  between the 
two dummies.  The interaction  term  shows the effects on 1991  401(k)  bal- 
ances of having tax deductibility  removed, after controlling  for family 
characteristics,  general  differences  between the 1987  and 1991  samples, 
and general  differences  between the affected group and the rest of the 
sample. 
Table 9 shows the results. Balances in 401(k) accounts rise with in- 
come, age, non-401(k)  net worth, and education.  The coefficient  on the 
interaction  term is $2,538 and statistically significant  at conventional 
78.  This variable equals one if the family is single, had real income above $35,000, and 
had a pension, or if the family is married, had real income above $50,000, and had a pen- 
sion. These conditions  were satisfied by 46 percent of eligibles in 1987 and 39 percent in 
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levels. Thus, among  401(k)-eligible  families, the prohibition  against  de- 
ducting  IRA contributions  raised  40  1(k)  balances, even after  controlling 
for other family characteristics  such as income, pension coverage, and 
non-401(k)  net worth. These results imply that there is substitution  be- 
tween 401(k)  plans  and IRAs. 
One can gauge the importance  of substitution  in at least two ways. 
First, the average  real  401(k)  balance  among  participants  (eligibles)  rose 
by about  $4,900  ($4,300)  between 1987  and 1991  for the group  for whom 
the tax deductibility  of IRA contributions  was removed. Hence, the re- 
moval of deductibility  can account for half or more of the increase in 
401  (k)  balances  in  this  group.  Second, calculations  using  aggregate  401  (k) 
balances in the 1987  and 1991  SIPP and the coefficients and sample in 
table 9 suggest that the removal of IRA deductibility  could account 
for up to 17  percent of the increase in 401(k)  balances over this period. 
Table 9 also provides evidence on the substitutability  between de- 
fined  benefit  pension  plans  and  40  1(k)  balances. Having  a defined  benefit 
pension  reduces 401(k)  balances  by about  $3,000  and is statistically  sig- 
nificant  at conventional  levels. This implies  that  there  is substitution  be- 
tween 401(k) plans and defined benefit pension plans. Thus, several 
analyses, using a variety of different  tests, show evidence of substitut- 
ability  between IRAs and  401(k)s  and  between pensions and  401(k)s. 
New Evidence on IRAs and Household Saving 
Previous research has generated  a variety of results concerning  the 
effects of IRAs on saving.79  Glenn  Hubbard,  using cross-sectional  data, 
finds that IRA contributors  have higher  ratios of net worth to income 
than  noncontributors,  controlling  for household characteristics.80  Dan- 
iel Feenberg  and Jonathan  Skinner  use interest and dividend  data  from 
the IRS-Michigan  Tax Panel, which is described  below, to infer  that, in 
each of several ranges of initial taxable wealth, taxpayers with IRAs 
raised  their  taxable  financial  assets by more  than  those without  IRAs  be- 
tween 1980  and 1984.81  However, tabulations  from the tax panel also 
79.  In addition to the papers mentioned  below,  other analyses  of IRAs  include An- 
drews and Bradford (1988), Collins and Wyckoff (1988), Feldstein (1992), Galper and Byce 
(1986),  Gravelle  (1991),  Huizinga  (1991),  O'Neil  and  Thompson  (1987),  and  Skinner 
(1992). 
80.  Hubbard (1984). 
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show that incomes of IRA contributors  are considerably  higher than 
those of noncontributors,  controlling  for initial  taxable wealth, so that 
contributors  also consume  more  than  noncontributors  with  the same ini- 
tial taxable  wealth. In any case, it is unclear  whether  these papers  pro- 
vide evidence that IRAs increase saving or merely reflect the presence 
of heterogeneity  in saving  behavior. 
Douglas  Joines and  James  Manegold  present  regressions  from  the tax 
panel data that suggest that reductions in consumption financed less 
than 1 percent  of IRA contributions  for the full sample  and 30.5 percent 
of contributions  for households with imputed taxable wealth below 
$25,000.82 
Venti  and  Wise estimate  formal  models  of IRAs  and  saving  using  vari- 
ous data  sets. They find  that  between 3 and  20 percent  of the IRA  contri- 
butions  that  would  have accompanied  increases in the IRA contribution 
limit would be financed  by reductions  in other saving. They conclude 
that  little substitution  of IRAs and  other  saving  occurs and  that  contribu- 
tions to IRAs represent  substantial  net saving  increases.83 
Gale and Scholz develop a dynamic  model of IRAs and saving  based 
on utility  maximization  in the presence  of uncertainty.84  Estimates  of the 
model  using  data  from  the 1983-86  Survey  of Consumer  Finances  imply 
that  2 percent  or less of the increased  IRA  contributions  that  would  have 
resulted  from limit increases would represent  net additions  to national 
saving. Gale and Scholz also show that  IRA holders  generally,  and  con- 
tributors  who are at the limit particularly,  have substantial  amounts  of 
taxable  assets to shift into IRAs. 
Tax Panel  Data  on IRAs and Saving 
The data  for our analysis  of IRAs come from  the 1979-88  IRS-Michi- 
gan Tax Panel and include  almost all items on taxpayers' 1040  forms as 
well as many  items from  supplemental  schedules.85  Because we analyze 
IRA contributors  over time, we follow Feenberg  and Skinner  as well as 
Joines and Manegold  in restricting  the sample  to taxpayers  that appear 
82.  Joines and Manegold (1991). 
83.  Venti and Wise (1986, 1987, 1990, and 1991). 
84.  Gale and Scholz (1994). 
85.  The sampling procedures and data are described in Slemrod (1988,1990),  Christian 
and Frischmann (1989), and Joines and Manegold (1991). Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  125 
in the data in every year, which is 5,315 tax filing  units in the ten-year 
panel.86 
As emphasized  by Joines and Manegold,  a strength  of this data set is 
that it provides repeated  observations  of taxpayers' IRA contributions 
over a period of statutory  variation  in IRA eligibility  and limits. Panel 
data and variation  in statutory  limits allow us to examine the effects of 
IRAs on the saving  of the same  households  over time. Previous  research 
using  cross-sectional  data  sets has inferred  the effects of IRAs  from  vari- 
ations in contribution  limits across households at a given point in time. 
These variations, arising solely from differences in marital  status and 
earnings,  may  be correlated  with saving  behavior,  which  complicates  in- 
ferences about  the effects of IRAs. 
The potential  limitations  of the data  are  threefold.  First, because data 
on asset balances  are not available,  we cannot  calculate  saving  directly. 
Instead,  following  previous  researchers,  we infer  asset balances  by capi- 
talizing  reported  taxable  interest  and  dividend  receipts  using  average  in- 
terest rates and dividend yields for the appropriate  year.87  This intro- 
duces measurement  error  and may bias estimates to the extent that the 
measurement  error  is correlated  with other characteristics  included  in 
the regression analysis.88  To reduce measurement  error, we average 
data  over periods  when statutory  IRA provisions  are constant. Second, 
tax returns  do not provide  information  on several household  character- 
istics, such as age and education, that may affect saving.89  To mitigate 
this problem, we estimate models that eliminate  time-invariant  house- 
hold characteristics.  Third, there is nonrandom  attrition  from the bal- 
anced panel.90  We have not examined  the role that attrition  plays in our 
analysis. 
Table 10 provides information  on selected characteristics  of taxpay- 
ers from 1979  to 1986. The first row shows that mean and median  real 
86. Feenberg  and  Skinner  (1989)  and  Joines  and  Manegold  (1991). 
87. Scholz (1992, p. 281) finds  that no systematic  biases are induced  when dividend 
yields  are capitalized  to infer  equity  holdings  in his study  of dividend  clienteles  using  the 
1983  Survey  of Consumer  Finances. 
88. Capitalizing  taxable interest and dividend  payments  will understate  wealth for 
very high-income  taxpayers,  as they hold a disproportionate  share  of their  wealth  in tax- 
exempt  bonds  (Feenberg  and Poterba,  1991).  The direction  of bias created  in the regres- 
sions is uncertain. 
89. Age exemptions  on the tax return  indicate  only whether  the taxpayer  or spouse is 
older  than  65. 
90. Christian  and  Frischmann  (1989). 126  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
Table 10.  Selected Characteristics of IRA Contributors and Other Taxpayers,  1979-88 
1986 dollars,  except  as noted 
IRA  Non-  All 
Characteristic  contributors  contributors  taxpayers 
Average  income,  1979-88a 
Mean  46,230  24,164  31,682 
Median  38,487  20,635  26,132 
Average  taxable  wealth,  1979-81b 
Mean  31,016  22,729  25,552 
Median  5,789  261  1,110 
Average  non-IRA saving,  197981c 
Mean  2,224  541  1,114 
Median  107  0  0 
Average  non-IRA saving,  1982-86c 
Mean  5,340  3,430  4,081 
Median  854  34  125 
Average  years  of IRA contributions,  1982-86 
Mean  3.2  0  1.1 
Median  3  0  0 
Average  IRA contriblutions, 1982-86 
Mean  1,680  0  572 
Median  1,418  0  0 
Average  nonmortgage  liabilities,  1979-81d 
Mean  6,294  3,221  4,268 
Median  1,368  0  0 
Average  nonmortgage  liabilities,  1982-86d 
Mean  8,690  4,569  5,973 
Median  3,725  126  1,395 
Number of taxpayers  1,811  3,504  5,315 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data from the IRS-Michigan Tax Panel data set,  and the Ecotionozic  Report of 
tlhe Presidenit 1993, tables  B-69 and B-91, for Aaa bond yield and average  dividend  yield,  respectively. 
a.  Average  income  is adjusted gross  income  plus IRA contributions  averaged from  1979 to  1988. 
b.  Average  taxable  wealth  is the  average  value  of capitalized  interest  and dividends  from  1979 to  1981. Taxable 
wealth  is constructed  by capitalizing  reported dividends  by the average  dividend  yield and interest  receipts  by the 
Aaa bond yield. 
c.  Average  non-IRA (gross) saving from year x to year X is defined as taxable wealth in year x' +  I minus taxable 
wealth in year x divided by (y  +  I  -  x). 
d.  Average  nonmortgage  liabilities  are  calculated  by  capitalizing  personal  interest  and  investment  interest 
deductions. 
average  income, or, following  Slemrod,  time-exposure  income, is higher 
for IRA contributors  than it is for taxpayers  who did not contribute  to 
IRAs.9'  Contributors  also had greater  wealth before 1982 and, as dis- 
cussed above, save more than noncontributors  in all forms. However, 
contributors'  debt also increased  more  rapidly,  which is consistent with 
91. Slemrod  (1992b). Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  127 
Table 11.  Comparison of Saving by Continuing and New IRA Contributors  a 
1986 dollars 
Average  Average 
saving,  saving,  Difference 
1979-81  1982-86  over time 
Continuing IRA contributorb  2,071  8,877  6,806 
(1,461)  (3,649)  (2,188) 
New  IRA contributorc  2,532  6,560  4,028 
(85)  (2,185)  (2,100) 
Group difference  -461  2,317 
(1,376)  (1,464) 
Difference  in difference  ...  ...  -  2,778 
(-  88) 
Never  contributedd  513  3,390  2,877 
(0)  (33)  (33) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from the IRS-Michigan Tax Panel data set. 
a.  Medians are shown  in parentheses.  Gross  saving in year t is defined as the difference  in taxable wealth in year 
t  +  I and year t plus IRA conributions  in year t. Continuing IRA contributors  are those  that contributed  to  IRAs 
prior to  1982. New  IRA contributors are those  that did not contribute prior to the period of universal eligibility  but 
contributed at least one year between  1982 and 1986. The remaining group is those  taxpayers  who never contributed 
to an IRA. 
b.  Sample size  is 348. 
c.  Sample size  is  1,515. 
d.  Sample size  is 3,452. 
some IRA contributions being financed by borrowing. Large differences 
in means and medians in each row reflect a skewed wealth distribution. 
Accordingly,  we present both mean and median regressions below. 
Did IRAs Increase  Household  Saving? 
Our first test of the effects of IRAs on household saving relies on intu- 
ition discussed  in Joines and Manegold, who note that if IRAs stimulate 
saving, then those who were made newly eligible for IRAs in 1982 should 
have increased their saving relative to their saving prior to IRA eligibil- 
ity. Because  the change in saving before and after 1981 was presumably 
also affected by changes  in interest rates, tax rates, and other factors, 
Joines and Manegold suggest  a "difference in difference" approach: if 
IRAs stimulate saving, the difference in saving by new contributors be- 
fore and after the 1981 tax reform should exceed  the difference in saving 
by those that were always eligible. 
Table 11 shows  that the mean and median saving of continuing con- 
tributors were $461 lower and $1,376 higher, respectively,  than that of 
new contributors for 1979-81. When eligibility was made universal, new 128  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
contributors raised their mean saving by $4,028 and their median saving 
by $2,100. These increases,  however,  were smaller than the $6,806 and 
$2,188 increases for continuing contributors. Mean and median saving, 
therefore, rose $2,778 and $88 less for new contributors than for continu- 
ing contributors.  These  results provide  no support for the proposition 
that universal IRA eligibility stimulated saving among new contributors. 
There are some  caveats,  however.  First, the standard errors in the 
regression analog to table 11 are large.92  Second,  the "control group" for 
the  analysis-continuing  contributors-was  not  covered  by  an  em- 
ployer-provided  pension plan from 1979 to 1981. Because  pension cov- 
erage may be correlated with saving behavior, the comparison of contin- 
uing  and  new  contributors  may  not  yield  accurate  estimates  of  the 
effects of IRAs on saving. In short, heterogeneity  complicates the analy- 
sis of IRAs and saving.93 
The tax panel allows us to account for heterogeneity  in a more flexible 
way than in previous work (other than Joines and Manegold).94 Because 
the data follow  the same taxpayers  over time, we estimate  models that 
eliminate  the effects  of time-invariant characteristics  that are not ob- 
served in the data, such as education or taste for saving. In addition, the 
data span three periods of statutory variation in the limits on deductible 
IRA  contributions,  which  helps  us to  identify  the effects  of the limit 
changes on household saving. Before 1982, only workers not covered by 
employer-provided  pensions were eligible for IRAs. From 1982 to 1986, 
all workers  could  make deductible  IRA contributions.  Following  the 
1986 tax reform, married (single) workers with incomes  above  $40,000 
92. A regression  of saving  in 1979-81  and 1982-86  on a constant,  a dummy  variable  for 
the 1982-86  period,  a dummy  variable  for being  a new contributor,  and  the interaction  of 
the two dummy  variables  yields the "difference  in difference"  estimate  of the saving ef- 
fects of IRAs. The standard  error  of the OLS regression  is 2,272, the standard  error  of the 
median  regression  is 161.  Difference-in-difference  estimates  that  incorporate  a number  of 
additional  household  characteristics  yield nearly  identical  results  on the key interaction 
term. 
93. Gale and Scholz (1994)  and Venti and Wise (1988),  among  others, show that tax- 
payers  who save tend to save in all forms. For example,  in table 11, new contributors  in- 
creased  mean saving by $1,151  more than noncontributors,  but this comparison  reveals 
little about  the effects of IRAs because, as shown in table 10, noncontributors  had  lower 
incomes, had fewer assets and liabilities,  and saved less in all forms than contributors. 
Thus, drawing  inferences  about  IRAs by comparing  the saving  of new IRA contributors 
and  noncontributors  would  be inappropriate. 
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($25,000)  had  IRA deductibility  curtailed  if they were covered by an em- 
ployer-provided  pension. We aggregate  the data into three periods cor- 
responding  to these periods  of statutory  IRA variation. 
Our  baseline  model is a standard  fixed-effects  regression: 
Sit  =  Oti +  f3Zit +  eit, 
where Sit  is gross saving and oxi  is the individual-specific  effect that is 
taken to be constant across all periods, t, and is specific to the cross- 
sectional  unit  i. Zit is a vector of time-varying  household  characteristics 
and eit  is an independently  and normally  distributed  random  error  term. 
Gross saving in period t is defined  as taxable wealth (the capitalized 
sum of interest and dividend receipts) in period t +  1 minus taxable 
wealth in period  t plus IRA contributions  in period t. A number  of vari- 
ables are included in Z. Deductible personal and investment interest 
payments are capitalized  to impute a measure of liabilities  for house- 
holds that  itemize.95  We expect that  higher  levels of personal  and  invest- 
ment interest expense will be positively correlated  with gross saving. 
We also include  dummy  variables  that show whether  the taxpayer  used 
the home mortgage  interest deduction.  To the extent that homeowners 
are  older  than  renters,  the expected sign  of the variable  is positive (recall 
we do not observe age in the tax panel).  Gary  Englehardt  suggests, how- 
ever, that households may save rapidly to meet the downpayment 
constraint on a house, and, upon purchase, consumption increases 
sharply.96  This suggests that for some taxpayers  gross saving might  be 
negatively  correlated  with owning  a home. 
Adjusted gross income (AGI) and AGI-squared  are also included. 
The level of saving should be positively correlated  with AGI. In cross- 
sectional work, it is difficult to independently  identify the effects of 
taxes and income because tax rates are determined  by income and de- 
mographic  characteristics.  The tax panel, however, spans a period of 
large  statutory  changes  in marginal  tax rates, which helps us distinguish 
tax from income effects. The marginal  tax rate, which reduces the net 
95. We  use the Baa  corporate  bond  rate  from  table  B-69  in the  Economic Report of the 
President 1993 to calculate  liabilities.  In 1987,  65 percent  of personal  interest  was deduct- 
ible;  in 1988,  the number  was 40 percent.  Mortgage  debt  could  also be used for investment 
purposes,  but  because  we have  no way of including  housing  wealth  in the definition  of sav- 
ing,  we exclude  mortgage  interest  from  our  measure  of liabilities. 
96. Englehardt  (1991). 130  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
return  to saving, should  be negatively  correlated  with saving. Interpre- 
tation  is still problematic,  however, as tax rates are endogenous  to sav- 
ing decisions and, in some circumstances,  high marginal  tax rates may 
increase  the incentive  to save.97 
We include  the number  of child  exemptions  claimed  on the tax return 
and dummy  variables  for those filing  a single return  or claiming  an age 
exemption. Conditioning  on other factors, we normally  expect families 
with more  child exemptions  to save less, but, because we do not condi- 
tion on age, the number  of children  may pick up life-cycle patterns  of 
saving  and  be positively correlated  with saving. All else being  equal, we 
expect single taxpayers  to save more than married  taxpayers, while el- 
derly  taxpayers  presumably  save less. 
We assume  the IRA contribution  limit  was $1,500  for single  taxpayers 
who contributed  to an IRA  before 1982,  $3,000  for a married  couple who 
contributed,98  and $0 for everyone else. From 1982  to 1986, single tax- 
payers could contribute  $2,000, couples with one earner  could contrib- 
ute $2,250, and a two-worker  household could contribute  the lesser of 
actual earnings  or $2,000  for each worker.  The 1986  tax reform  limited 
deductible  contributions  based on the taxpayer's income, so the limits 
on deductible  contributions  are assumed to be unchanged  for married 
(single)  taxpayers  with incomes  below $40,000  ($25,000),  are  phased  out 
over the next $10,000  interval,  and are $0 for all other  taxpayers.  We re- 
strict the sample to taxpayers  who contributed  to an IRA at least once 
during  the period  spanned  by the data, because it is difficult  to interpret 
the limit  variable  for taxpayers  who do not contribute  to IRAs.99  Appen- 
dix table A2 gives sample  statistics  for these variables. 
We estimate the model in first-differenced  form.  100  The first  panel of 
97. Slemrod  (1992a,  p. 254). 
98. Both spouses could make  the maximum  contribution  ($1,500)  if each had  income 
above $1,500.  We do not know the earnings  of the lower-earning  spouse before 1982  and 
after  1986,  so we assume  that  couples  are  eligible  to make  the maximum  contribution. 
99. Restricting  the sample  to IRA  contributors  raises  sample  selection  issues. Treating 
selection  in a panel  model  is complicated,  however  (see Hsiao, 1986,  pp. 198-202).  We do 
not address  this complication  here. 
100. Differencing  eliminates  the fixed  effect and makes  it computationally  simpler  to 
estimate  quantiles.  We deviate  from  the strict  representation  of the model  by including  a 
constant  term  in the estimated  specification  and, in the two-observation  model  (the  differ- 
ence of three  periods),  a dummy  variable  for  the second  difference. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  131 
Table 12.  Mean and Median Regression of Changes in Gross Saving on Changes in IRA 
Limits,  1979-87 
Regression type and  Standard 
independent  variablea  Coefficient  error  t-statistic 
OLS estimatesb 
Liabilities  0.04  0.15  0.239 
Home  owner  -  1,955.56  7,643.39  -0.256 
Adjusted gross income  (AGI)  0.63  0.08  7.705 
AGI-squaredc  -16.10  1.97  -8.190 
Number of children  -  1,255.81  3,854.19  -0.326 
Single  15,417.26  11,369.36  1.356 
Age exemption  18,901.28  11,486.91  1.645 
IRA limit  0.20  1.45  0.140 
Marginal tax rate  -742.99  332.39  -2.235 
Second  period dummy  -  12,194.29  7,233.53  -  1.686 
Constant  832.81  5,308.89  0.157 
Median regression  estimatesd 
Liabilities  0.01  0.01  1.039 
Home  owner  -  629.26  223.50  -  2.815 
Adjusted gross  income  (AGI)  0.01  0.03  0.289 
AGI-squaredc  -  2.26  29.40  -0.077 
Number of children  -  271.00  127.24  -  2.130 
Single  778.37  475.56  1.637 
Age exemption  -  1,744.25  1,127.62  -  1.547 
IRA limit  0.31  0.07  4.246 
Marginal tax rate  31.39  31.83  0.986 
Second  period dummy  -  1,842.74  209.40  -  8.800 
Constant  1,088.05  286.78  3.794 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  using data from the IRS-Michigan Tax Panel data set. 
a.  All variables are first differenced. 
b.  The estimates  are from a first-differenced fixed-effects  model.  The sample  size  for the regression  is 3,880,  and 
the regression  has an R2 of 0.0189. 
c.  Adjusted gross  income-squared  is divided  by  108. 
d.  The estimates  are from a first-differenced fixed-effects  model.  The sample  size  for the regression  is 3,880,  and 
the pseudo-R2 is 0.0178.  (The pseudo-R2 is defined as the sum of the weighted deviations  about the estimated  median 
divided by the sum of the weighted  deviations  about the raw median,  all subtracted from one.)  Standard errors are 
estimated with bootstrap methods. 
table 12 presents the mean (OLS) regression estimates of the fixed- 
effects model. The coefficient estimates generally have the expected 
signs. Saving is positively related  to AGI, though at a decreasing  rate, 
and  marginal  tax rates  are  negatively  related  to saving.  None of the other 
coefficients  is precisely estimated.  The coefficient  on the primary  vari- 132  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
able of interest, the limit variable, is 0.20, which suggests that a $1 in- 
crease in the IRA limit increases gross saving by 20 cents. This effect, 
however, is estimated  very imprecisely. 
The second panel shows median regression estimates. Most of the 
signs of the coefficients  are similar  to the OLS specification,  though  the 
age exemption variable  becomes negative, as we originally  expected, 
and the marginal  tax variable  becomes positive, which is unexpected. 
The coefficient  on the limit  variable  increases  to 0.31 and  is precisely  es- 
timated.101  This suggests that at the medians of the observed distribu- 
tions, 31 percent of IRA contributions  represent  increases in gross pri- 
vate  saving. To  gauge the  effect  on  national saving requires an 
adjustment  for the loss in tax revenue owing to the deductibility  of IRA 
contributions. Accurate long-run calculations of the revenue loss of 
IRAs are complicated,  as they require  knowledge  of current  and future 
tax rates and information  on the source and tax treatment  of the funds 
used to finance the IRA. Short-run  calculations are more straightfor- 
ward.  The mean  and  median  marginal  tax rate  for IRA contributors  was 
27 percent during 1979-87. This suggests that about 4 percent of IRA 
contributions  represented  increases in national  saving  during  1982-86. 
There may  be problems  with treating  the 1986  tax changes  in IRA de- 
ductibility  in a symmetric  fashion with the extension of universal  IRA 
eligibility.  First, in 1986  only high-income  taxpayers  with pensions had 
deductibility  restricted;  all taxpayers  remained  eligible to make contri- 
butions. Second, one of the advantages  of collapsing  the data into pe- 
riods  corresponding  to the tax treatment  of IRAs is the presumption  that 
averaging  measures of taxable wealth reduces the measurement  error 
associated with the wealth imputations.  The last period in the sample, 
however, is composed of only one year. For these reasons, we estimate 
the model in difference  form using data from the 1979-81  and 1982-86 
periods in table 13.  102 
101. We bootstrap  the standard  errors  for the median  regression  because  we are con- 
cerned  about  heteroscedasticity. 
102. This specification  differs  from Joines and Manegold  (1991)  in several respects. 
We use two additional  years of data (1985  and 1986).  Their specification  includes  time- 
exposure  income  and  average  taxable  wealth  in 1979-81.  Both  these period-invariant  char- 
acteristics  difference  out in a fixed-effects  regression,  so we include only time-varying 
characteristics.  Last, we estimate  the model  with  both  mean  and  median  regressions. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  133 
Table 13.  Mean and Median Regression of Changes in Gross Saving on Changes in IRA 
Limits,  1979-86 
Regression  type and  Standard 
independent  variablea  Coefficient  error  t-statistic 
OLS estimatesb 
Liabilities  0.13  0.07  1.885 
Home  owner  -  202.02  3,173.88  -0.064 
Adjusted gross  income  (AGI)  0.15  0.06  2.709 
AGI-squaredc  18.70  1.92  9.743 
Number of children  -  2,007.96  1,450.15  -  1.385 
Single  4,467.63  4,132.56  1.081 
Age exemption  -9,879.60  5,136.18  -  1.924 
IRA limit  -0.71  0.72  -  0.993 
Marginal tax rate  -448.57  158.05  -  2.838 
Constant  4,260.58  2,221.61  1.918 
Median regression  estimatesd 
Liabilities  -0.04  0.02  -  2.109 
Home  owner  -1,464.03  413.10  -  3.544 
Adjusted gross  income  (AGI)  0.13  0.05  2.396 
AGI-squaredc  20.40  7.86  2.602 
Number of children  -  626.17  118.28  -  5.294 
Single  1,533.62  464.88  3.299 
Age exemption  -2,283.86  2,258.78  -1.011 
IRA limit  0.09  0.13  0.682 
Marginal tax rate  -  186.66  64.76  -2.883 
Constant  1,158.70  344.32  3.365 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  using data from the  IRS-Michigan Tax Panel data set. 
a.  All variables are first differenced. 
b.  The estimates  are from a first-differenced fixed-effects  model.  The sample size  for the regression  is  1,940, and 
the regression  has an R2 of 0.0565. 
c.  Adjusted gross  income-squared  is divided by  107. 
d.  The estimates  are from a first-differenced fixed-effects  model.  The sample size  for the regression  is  1,940, and 
the pseudo-R2 is 0.026.  (The pseudo-R2 is defined as the sum of the weighted  deviations  about the estimated  median 
divided by the sum of the weighted  deviations  about the raw median,  all subtracted from one.)  Standard errors are 
estimated  with bootstrap  methods. 
Table  13 shows  that dropping the last period raises the explanatory 
power of the ordinary least  squares regression.  The coefficient  on the 
changes in IRA limits is  -  0.71 but is estimated imprecisely.  In the me- 
dian regressions,  the coefficient on IRA limit changes is 0.086 and is also 
imprecisely estimated.103 
103. The  dependent  variable  in the regression  is calculated  by capitalizing  interest  and 
dividend  income.  Interest  and  dividends  are  also included  in the measure  of AGI.  If we use 
AGI less interest  and dividend  income instead  of AGI, the effects of IRAs on saving  are 
smaller  in each of the specifications  in tables 12  and 13. 134  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
Additional Issues  with IRAs and Saving 
The regression  results  above suggest  that  only a small  portion  of IRA 
contributions,  if any, represented  increases in national saving during 
1982-86.  This result  is consistent with the full-sample  findings  of Joines 
and  Manegold,  using a different  extract  from  the same data source, and 
with  those of Gale  and  Scholz, who use the 1983-86  Survey  of Consumer 
Finances and a different  empirical  approach.104  Venti and Wise, how- 
ever, find that IRA contributions  are largely new saving and that in- 
creases in limits  would significantly  increase  household  saving.  105  Venti 
and Wise and Richard  Thaler suggest that standard  economic theory 
cannot  explain  the effects of IRAs on household saving  and propose in- 
terpretations  of the Venti  and  Wise results  that  emphasize  psychological 
factors and the promotion  of IRAs.106 In this subsection, we discuss 
three aspects of these issues. 
The first  was raised  by Feenberg  and Skinner,  who report  that  39 per- 
cent of all IRA contributors  in 1985  were "falsely constrained,"  which 
they define  as a taxpayer  who contributed  exactly $2,000  but  was eligible 
to contribute  more.107  This result has been used as evidence of a wide- 
spread  misunderstanding  of the contribution  limits that taxpayers  face. 
Venti and Wise, for example, acknowledge  that while transaction  costs 
associated with opening  a spousal account may explain  a portion  of this 
behavior, "it is likely that the promotion,  in which the amount  $2,000 
figured  prominently,  played  a key role."  108 
After examining  data  from  the tax panel, however, it is clear that no- 
where near  40 percent  of all IRA contributors  are "falsely  constrained." 
For example, using  the 1985  tax panel  cross-section, we find  that 19  per- 
cent of all IRA contributors  contributed  exactly $2,000  when they could 
could have contributed  more.  109 
In table 14, we examine  patterns  of "false  constraints"  during  the pe- 
104. Joines  and  Manegold  (1991)  and  Gale  and  Scholz (1994). 
105. Venti  and  Wise (1986, 1987,  1990,  and 1991). 
106. Venti  and  Wise (1992)  and  Thaler  (1994). 
107. Feenberg  and  Skinner  (1989). 
108. Venti  and  Wise (1992,  p. 33). 
109. In private  correspondence,  Jonathan  Skinner  reports  that programming  errors 
were found  in the original  calculations. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  135 
Table 14.  Distribution of IRA Contribution Amounts,  1982-86 
Number of contributors 
Number of taxpayers 
Taxpayers Taxpayers  Taxpayers  Taxpayers 
with  with  with  with 
$2,000  $2,250  $2,251-$3,999  $4,000 
Contribution  limit  limit  limit  limit  Total 
$2,000 (not at limit)  ...  410  64  401  875 
Other nonlimit contribution  296  250  79  647  1,272 
Limit contribution  964  1,210  161  1,368  3,703 
Total  1,260  1,870  304  2,416  5,850 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Michigan-IRS Tax Panel data set. 
riod  of universal  IRA  eligibility.  "0  The unit  of observation  is annual  IRA 
contributions.  That is, if a taxpayer  contributed  to an IRA three times 
between 1982  and 1986, he or she appears  as three observations  in the 
table. Table 14 shows that in our sample there were 875 IRA contribu- 
tions of exactly $2,000 that could have been more. This represents 15 
percent  of all contributors  and 19  percent  of the 4,590 contributors  who 
faced limits above $2,000. To place bounds on the possible importance 
of false constraints,  we made  two additional  calculations. 
First, we found that 156  of the 875 contributions  were preceded  by a 
contribution  larger  than $2,000 by the same taxpayer.  These taxpayers 
obviously were aware that larger  contributions  were allowed. Thus, at 
the very most,  12.3 percent (719/5,850) of all contributors and 15.7 per- 
cent (719/4,590)  of married  taxpayers (all of whom have limits above 
$2,000)  were falsely constrained. 
Second, a plausible  assumption  is that married  taxpayers  who were 
eligible for less than a $4,000 limit and contributed  $2,000 did so pur- 
posefully.111  Transaction costs  presumably play a large role in ex- 
plaining  why couples do not open a spousal IRA of less than $2,000. 
110. Taxpayers  that are (i) single, (ii) married  but filing separately,  (iii) unmarried 
heads  of household,  or (iv) surviving  spouses are given a $2,000  contribution  limit. Tax- 
payers  filing  joint returns  where  the second-earner  credit  exceeded $100  in 1982  or $200  in 
1983-86  are  given  a contribution  limit  of $4,000.  (The  two-earner  deduction  increased  from 
5 percent  in 1982  to 10 percent  in 1983-86.)  All other  joint filers  are given a limit of the 
larger  of either  $2,250  or $2,000  plus the earnings  of the lower-earning  spouse. 
111. Of these taxpayers,  86 percent  (410/474)  were eligible  for an additional  contribu- 
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There  are costs to opening  and  keeping  separate  accounts, closing such 
accounts, and  understanding  the rules governing  spousal IRA contribu- 
tions.112  If we assume  that  the only taxpayers  who are  falsely constrained 
are those that (i) contribute  $2,000, (ii) have a $4,000 limit, and (iii) did 
not contribute  more  than  $2,000  to an IRA  in any previous  year, then  5.7 
percent  of all IRA contributors  and 7.2 percent  of married  contributors 
were falsely constrained. These findings  cast significant  doubt on the 
quantitative  importance  of "false  constraints"  in IRA decisionmaking. 
The second claim is that a bunching  of IRA contributions  occurs im- 
mediately  preceding  April 15, the last day on which deductible  IRA con- 
tributions  can be made  for the previous  tax year.  1"3 But the forgone  ben- 
efits of waiting  until  the end of the tax year are small, and, because IRA 
balances are illiquid, it may be perfectly reasonable  for households to 
postpone locking up funds until they have enough information  to make 
an appropriate  decision. 
The third issue focuses on investor behavior following the Tax Re- 
form Act of 1986. James Long suggests that IRA contributions  fell by 
more  than  would  have been predicted  given the changes in deductibility 
rules.  1"4  Venti and Wise write, "This  'overreaction'  is at least in part  at- 
tributable  to widespread  misunderstanding  of the legislation  (often re- 
ported  at the time to have eliminated  IRAs)  and  to the marked  decline in 
the promotion  of IRAs." 5 If misinformation  caused the overreaction 
following the 1986 tax reform, it is surprising  that IRA contributions 
have not rebounded.  Brokerage  firms  and  other  marketers  of IRAs have 
every incentive  to reduce  taxpayer  confusion, yet contributions  to IRAs 
have  fallen  in each year following  the act (see table 1). 
There are several other possibilities  for the decline in IRA contribu- 
tions that  have received less attention  in the literature.  First, lower mar- 
ginal  tax rates  after 1986  reduced  the benefits  of tax-free  interest  accrual. 
Second, restricted deductibility  and the compression of marginal  tax 
rates reduced the tax benefits further. Both effects should reduce the 
112.  Burman, Cordes, and Ozanne (1990) provide an excellent  discussion  of the false 
constraints  issue.  They note the fact that couples  are composed  of two decisionmakers 
whose objectives  are interrelated but not necessarily  identical, which may lead to married 
couples purposefully choosing  to contribute exactly  $2,000. 
113.  Summers (1986). 
114.  Long (1990). 
115.  Venti and Wise (1992, p. 34). Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  137 
number  of contributors.  Third,  the increased  availability  of 401(k)  plans 
and other tax-preferred  saving options may have lessened the desire to 
contribute to  IRAs."16 Fourth, to the extent that IRAs are funded 
through  transfers  of existing assets or new saving that would have oc- 
curred  anyway, contributions  may have declined  even in the absence of 
the 1986  tax reform. We leave the difficult  project  of disentangling  the 
role of these and  other  explanations  to future  research.  Finally, we note 
that none of the suggested psychological factors-false  constraints, 
bunching  of contributions,  or reaction  to the 1986  tax reform-has  any 
specific  implications  for whether  IRAs raise saving. 
Saving Incentives in a Stochastic Life-Cycle Simulation Model 
In this section, we examine saving incentives in the context of a sto- 
chastic life-cycle simulation model. The simulation  model presented 
here utilizes estimates  of behavioral  and  economic characteristics  to de- 
velop quantitative  and testable predictions  for saving behavior and its 
response to government  policies. These predictions  can then be com- 
pared  with data  to check the model. The model can also help determine 
whether  certain  interpretations  of the data  are appropriate.  The simula- 
tions demonstrate  that many observed empirical  patterns concerning 
IRAs, 401(k) plans, and saving can be generated by a well-specified 
model  of utility  maximization. 
Simulation  analysis  is particularly  helpful  for analyzing  policies when 
data  are  limited.  For example,  401(k)s  and  IRAs have been implemented 
for only relatively short periods of time. Simulations  can distinguish 
short-term  and long-term  effects of saving incentives, while empirical 
analysis  is currently  limited  by data  capturing  only short-term  effects. 
Model Description 
Conventional  life-cycle models assume certainty  regarding  future  in- 
come and other factors, so saving is primarily  for retirement.  Some re- 
116.  Contributions to variable annuities appear to have grown rapidly since  1986, but 
reliable data are difficult to find. 138  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
cent research  has stressed "buffer  stock" saving where people save to 
offset uncertain  shocks to income."17  The model in this paper incorpo- 
rates  both motives  for saving  by extending  the standard  life-cycle frame- 
work to include stochastic earnings  and uncertain  lifespan. Individuals 
save for retirement  and  as a precaution  against  downturns  in future  earn- 
ings and the possibility of outliving one's assets once retired."18  The 
model  consists of five parts:  (i) consumers'  preferences,  (ii) consumers' 
budget  constraints,  (iii) the stochastic economic environment,  (iv) gov- 
ernment  finance,  and (v) the overlapping  generations  framework."  19 
People enter the model at age 21 and face an age-varying  probability 
of dying. The maximum  lifespan  is 90 years. In each period, individuals 
maximize  expected lifetime  utility  by making  consumption  and  portfolio 
choices. 120  There  are  two portfolio  options:  a tax-preferred  saving  incen- 
tive asset or a conventional, fully taxed asset. The following assump- 
tions make  the model more  tractable  while still capturing  important  ele- 
ments of household saving decisions. Labor supply and retirement 
decisions are assumed  to be exogenous. Utility is assumed  to be separa- 
ble over time, and, within  a time period, separable  among  consumption, 
leisure, and an exogenously provided government good. The utility 
function for consumption  is assumed to exhibit constant relative risk 
aversion (constant intertemporal  elasticity of substitution),  which im- 
plies that uncertain  future  income leads to precautionary  saving. Using 
household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and 
the Consumer  Expenditure  Survey, Engen estimates an intertemporal 
elasticity  of substitution  of 0.33 and  a time  preference  rate  of 0.  04, which 
are used here to specify household-level  preference  parameters.  121 
Consumption  and portfolio choices are subject to a lifetime budget 
117. See Carroll  (1992)  and  Deaton  (1991). 
118. Hubbard,  Skinner,  and  Zeldes (1993a,  1988b)  also develop a model  with precau- 
tionary  saving against  uncertain  lifespan  and uncertain  income and includes  retirement 
saving.  Their  model  adds  uncertain  health  expenditures  and  a government-provided  mini- 
mum  consumption  level. 
119. The basic structure  of the model  is described  in Engen  (1993b,  1993c)  and  Engen 
and  Gale  (1993).  A technical  appendix  that  describes  this model  in detail  is available  from 
the authors  upon  request. 
120. There  is no intentional  bequest  motive in the model. All bequests  are accidental 
and arise  from  assets held at the unexpected  time of death. In each period,  bequests are 
distributed  equally  to each member  of the generation  that  is 45 years  old. 
121. Engen  (1993a). Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  139 
constraint, net asset constraints,'22  uncertain  future earnings, and un- 
certain  lifespan.  123 Consumption  can be financed  by after-tax  labor  earn- 
ings before retirement;  by partially  indexed, earnings-based  annuity  in- 
come from social security  and private  pensions after  retirement;  and  by 
assets in saving incentive accounts or conventional  forms. Both of the 
latter  types of assets earn  the same nonstochastic  pretax  rate of return. 
The return  on conventional  assets is fully taxed. Contributions  to saving 
incentive accounts are tax deductible  and constrained  by annual  limits. 
Contributions  and  investment  earnings  are not taxed until  withdrawn.  A 
penalty is  imposed on funds withdrawn before the account holder 
reaches age 60.124 
Household  earnings  are  modeled  as the sum  of a certain  and  an uncer- 
tain component. The certain component is a mean age-earnings  path 
based on estimates by Engen of a log earnings  regression using panel 
data  on earnings  and  other  characteristics  for employed  heads of house- 
hold between the ages of 21 and  65 from  the PSID. Estimates  were made 
separately  for three groups  with different  levels of educational  achieve- 
ment. Age-earnings  profiles  for college graduates  rise more steeply and 
peak later  than  for other groups.  The stochastic process for earnings  in- 
novations  is modeled  as an AR(1)  process using  data  from  the IRS-Mich- 
igan  Tax Panel.  125 
The government runs a balanced budget in the initial steady-state 
equilibrium.  All revenues  go toward  purchasing  a government-provided 
good that  is allocated  equally  to all individuals  and  is constant  over time. 
There is a progressive  income tax structure,  similar  to the U.S. system 
in 1989,  with tax brackets  of 15, 28, and 33 percent. Individuals  are al- 
lowed a personal  exemption and the standard  deduction, as well as de- 
122.  In the model, saving incentive accounts and conventional  asset balances are con- 
strained to be nonnegative.  This is a tighter constraint than requiring net worth to be non- 
negative, but Engen and Gale (1993) show that these constraints are realistic for IRAs. The 
constraints rule out uncollateralized  loans and financing saving incentive  accounts  with a 
negative position in conventional  assets,  but they do not restrict collateralizing  debt, re- 
shuffling of existing assets  into a saving incentive  account,  or borrowing against existing 
assets and placing the funds in a saving incentive  account. 
123. There is assumed to be no private market for purchasing insurance against risky 
income or private annuities (except pensions) to insure against uncertain lifespans. 
124.  Some features  of actual saving incentive  plans,  such as the loan provisions  of 
some 401(k) plans, are not modeled here. 
125.  Engen (1993b). 140  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
ductions  for IRA  or 401  (k)  contributions.  There  is a 20 percent  estate tax 
on accidental  bequests in the model. 
Because the model  does not have a closed-form  solution, and  the ana- 
lytical  solution  would  be intractable,  we use a numerical  method  to solve 
individuals' consumption-saving  problem. Earnings innovations for 
each individual  over the life cycle are simulated  with a random  number 
generator.  Individuals  each receive different  earnings  shocks and thus 
end up with different  realized  earnings,  consumption,  and saving. Cal- 
culating  means  or medians  for each age gives representative  profiles  for 
consumption,  saving, wealth, and earnings.  The model sets 25 percent 
of the population  in each age cohort as high  school dropouts,  50 percent 
as high  school graduates,  and  25 percent  as college graduates,  which ap- 
proximates the observed distribution  of educational attainment. Co- 
horts of different  ages are incorporated  into an overlapping  generations 
framework  that accounts for mortality  and annual  population  growth  of 
1  percent  in order  to calculate  aggregate  saving  and  assets. The model is 
not general  equilibrium  because gross wages and  gross returns  to capital 
are held constant  when the capital  stock changes in response to govern- 
ment  policy. 
Comparing the Model's  Implications  with Empirical Patterns 
To help assess the usefulness of the model, we consider  the extent to 
which the model can match  empirical  patterns  of consumption,  saving, 
and  wealth.  126 At the aggregate  level, the model  allocates approximately 
75 percent  of gross income to labor  and 25 percent  to capital. Aggregate 
tax revenue (and government  spending)  is approximately  one-third  of 
output.  The aggregate  saving  rate is almost 6 percent. Asset-income ra- 
tios are approximately  3.6. These figures are broadly consistent with 
U.S. historical  experience. 
At the individual  level, the model generates  hump-shaped  consump- 
tion-age  profiles.  Consumption  tracks  income  more  closely in this model 
than in certainty  models, and simulated  consumption  is more sensitive 
to income shocks in this model than in a certainty  equivalence model. 
All of these are well-documented  features  of actual  consumption  data. 
126.  Engen (1993b) and Engen and Gale (1993) document the comparisons  mentioned 
below. Engen (1993b) also shows that the comparisons  analyzed in that paper are not sen- 
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The model generates life-cycle wealth profiles that are consistent 
with estimated profiles from microdata  for much of the population. 
However, the model does not reflect the fact that some households 
never accumulate  significant  amounts  of assets.  127 For individuals  aged 
25-65, the model  generates  mean  holdings  of about  $119,000  and  median 
asset holdings  of $77,000.  In the 1986  SCF, mean  assets are  $11  1,000  and 
median  assets are $41,000,  for the 25-65 age group. Saving  rates gener- 
ally increase  with age before leveling off before retirement. 
An important  parameter  for interpreting  the effects of taxes on saving 
is the after-tax  interest  rate elasticity of saving.  128 The implied  (uncom- 
pensated)  saving  elasticity  in the model  is between 0.15 and  0.35, consis- 
tent with empirical  estimates, which  generally  fall between zero and  0.4. 
In a previous study of IRAs using a related model, Engen and Gale 
report  the following  comparisons  between simulated  and empirical  pat- 
terns  for IRA saving.  129  First, like the data,  the model  shows IRA  partici- 
pation rising with age and income. Second, the model overstates the 
overall probability  of holding an IRA, relative to 1986 SCF data, by 
about 10  percentage  points. But IRAs are  the only retirement  tax shelter 
in the model, and  the proportion  of households  that  hold an  IRA, Keogh, 
or 401(k)  in 1986  SCF data  is virtually  the same  as the proportion  holding 
an IRA in the model. Third, the percentage of IRA contributors  who 
contribute  at the limit  in the model  is very similar  to that  observed in the 
data. Fourth,  the probability  of a taxpayer  making  an IRA contribution 
in one year conditional  on having  contributed  in the previous  year is ap- 
proximately  the same as that calculated  from  the data. 
Long-Run Effects  of Saving  Incentives 
We now turn  to calculating  the long-term  effects of saving  incentives 
on private  and  national  saving. IRAs are modeled  as having  tax-deduct- 
ible contributions,  a limit of either $2,000 or $4,000, and an early with- 
drawal  penalty  of 10  percent. 401(k)  plans are modeled  as having  a limit 
of $9,000.  The withdrawal  penalty  is set either at 10  percent  or 100  per- 
127.  See Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1993a, 1993b). 
128.  Engen (1993c). 
129. Engen and Gale (1993). 142  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
cent.  '30 Employers  are assumed  to match  employee contributions  at the 
rate of 50 percent up to the first 5 percent of salary and to provide no 
unconditional  contributions.  Two alternative  assumptions  about wage 
offsets resulting  from employer matching  contributions  are employed. 
In the first scenario, wages are offset on an individual basis; each 
worker's wages are reduced by the amount  of the employer match  for 
that employee. This essentially removes any income or substitution  ef- 
fects of the employer  match. In the second and probably  more realistic 
scenario,  wages are  offset on an average  basis; each worker's  wages are 
offset by the average  employer  match. Thus, a worker  making  the aver- 
age 401(k)  contribution  ends up with no inframarginal  (or income)  effect 
from  the matching  contribution,  yet a marginal  substitution  effect is still 
operative.  Workers  making  above-average  401(k)  contributions  will not 
have their individual  wages fully offset and, in fact, are subsidized by 
workers  making  below-average  contributions,  whose wages are  reduced 
by more  than  the employer  match  that  they receive. 
In the results  reported  below, the government  is not required  to run  a 
balanced  budget  after  the implementation  of a saving incentive plan. In 
other words, spending  on the government-provided  good is held con- 
stant  so that  the revenue shortfall  from  the tax deductibility  of contribu- 
tions to saving  incentives  creates a budget  deficit.  However, we also dis- 
cuss the effects of simultaneously  introducing  a saving incentive and 
either  reducing  government  spending  or raising  other  tax revenues so as 
to keep the budget  in balance. 
Table 15 reports  the long-run  effects of these saving incentive plans 
on various  measures  of saving  and  wealth. The long run  is defined  as the 
length  of time necessary  for everyone in the model  to have had  access to 
saving incentives for their entire life. It takes 70 years in this model to 
reach  the long-run  equilibrium.  The first  two rows show that  IRAs have 
a relatively  small  effect on long-run  saving and wealth. The level of na- 
tional  saving  increases  by about  3 to 5 percent.  With  an initial  saving  rate 
of 5.9 percent, changes of this magnitude  lead to a new saving rate (not 
shown in table 15)  of about  6.2 percent, at most. This is also reflected  in 
the asset-to-income  ratio,  which is 3.6 in the steady state without  saving 
130.  As described above,  early withdrawals from 401(k)s are subject to a 10 percent 
penalty if allowed,  but are only allowed  in certain situations,  so the effective  penalty is 
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Table 15.  Long-Run Effects of Saving Incentives 
Percent,  except  as noted 
Asset-  Conitriblutions 
income  Participation  that are  Increase  in 
Saving  incentive  (ratio)a  rateb  net saving  national  saving 
IRAc 
$2,000 annual limit  3.69  56.6  22.0  3.3 
$4,000 annual limit  3.76  56.6  30.0  5.4 
401(k)d 
Wage offset per individual 
10 percent penalty 
on early withdrawal  4.11  56.6  50.1  15.0 
100 percent penalty on 
early withdrawal  3.80  45.1  86.3  7.9 
Wage offset  on average 
10 percent  penalty on 
early withdrawal  4.19  63.4  51.0  17.2 
100 percent penalty on 
early withdrawal  3.89  52.2  87.4  9.1 
Source:  Authors'  simulations  as described  in the text. 
a.  Initial (before  saving incentives)  asset-to-income  ratio is 3.61,  and saving  rate is 0.059. 
b.  Participation of population aged 21-65. 
c.  Penalty for early withdrawal is  10 percent of the interest and principal. 
d.  Annual contribution limit is $9,000. 
incentives and 3.7 or 3.8 in the steady state with IRAs, depending  on 
whether the contribution  limit is $2,000 or $4,000, respectively. In the 
long-run  equilibrium,  over half of households headed by individuals 
aged  21-65 choose to hold  IRAs, and  between 22 and  30 percent  of funds 
contributed  in the 70th year following the introduction  of IRAs and in 
future  years represent  new national  saving. 
The bottom  two panels  show that  401  (k)  plans, as modeled  here, have 
stronger  positive effects than  IRAs on long-run  national  saving.  This oc- 
curs for two reasons. First, the higher contribution  limit means that 
more savers face increased  rates of return  on saving  at the margin.  Sec- 
ond, when employer matching contributions are assumed to reduce 
wages on an average  basis, the income effect of the employer  matching 
contributions  is removed  but the substitution  effect remains,  providing 
a positive stimulus  to saving. 
With  401(k)s,  the two lower panels show that long-term  national  sav- 
ing rises by between 8 and 17  percent, so the saving  rate increases  from 144  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
5.9 percent  to a range  of 6.4 to 6.9 percent (not shown in table 15). The 
asset-to-income  ratio  rises from  3.6 to between 3.8 and 4.2. When  early 
withdrawals  from  a 401  (k) account  are  prohibited,  effectively raising  the 
penalty  to 100  percent,  the proportion  of 401(k)  contributions  that  repre- 
sent new saving  increases substantially.  Nevertheless, far  fewer contri- 
butions  are made,'3'  so the effect on national  saving  with no early with- 
drawals  is about half as big as the effect with a 10 percent penalty on 
early  withdrawals. 
When employers reduce wages on an average basis, the effects of 
401(k)  plans are slightly larger  than when employers reduce wages on 
an individual  basis. The former  removes only the income effect of the 
employer  match,  while  the latter  removes  both the income  effect and  the 
substitution  effect. Since the substitution  effect raises saving, removing 
it via the individual  wage offset reduces the effects of 401(k)s  on saving. 
In the long run, both IRAs and 401(k) plans can stimulate  national 
saving.  These results  are  robust  to reasonable  changes  in model  parame- 
ters.132  However, the increase in the saving rate is small relative to re- 
cent declines in national  saving. 
Table 15 shows the results of saving incentives 70 years after they 
have been implemented. However, as Alan Auerbach and Laurence 
Kotlikoff, Kenneth Judd, and others have shown, the transitional  ef- 
fects of changes  in the taxation  of all capital  income can be in a different 
direction than the long-term  effects.'33  Engen and Gale note that this 
phenomenon  is even more  likely to occur for targeted  saving  incentives 
because of the possibility of asset substitution  to finance saving incen- 
tive contributions.'34 
Short-Run and  Transitional Effects  of Saving  Incentives 
To model the short-run  and transitional  effects of saving incentives, 
we assume  that  the implementation  of such  plans  is completely  unantici- 
131.  In the new long-run equilibrium, 401(k) plans with 10 percent penalties would ac- 
count for about 30-35  percent  of  saving,  while 401(k) plans with  100 percent  penalties 
would account for only about 10 percent of saving. By comparison,  IRAs would be about 
15 to 18 percent of saving. 
132.  For further sensitivity  analysis of the long-run effects of IRAs and other tax poli- 
cies,  see Engen and Gale (1993) and Engen (1993c). 
133.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Judd (1985). 
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Figure 4.  Aggregate Asset-to-Income Ratio with an IRA Program Introduced at Time 
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Source:  Authors'  simulations  as described  in the text.  The annual contribution  limit is $4,000 and the penalty for 
early withdrawal assessed  on both earnings and principal is  10 percent. 
pated but permanent.  The transitions  show the effects of saving incen- 
tives after  each year of their  implementation. 
Figure  4 shows the transitional  effects for IRAs with a $4,000  contri- 
bution  limit. The figure  plots the ratios  of national  and  private  wealth to 
income, with the difference  between them  being  the ratio  of government 
debt to income (when private  wealth exceeds national  wealth). Follow- 
ing the implementation  of the IRA program,  private saving falls to a 
small  degree. The private  asset-to-income  ratio  falls slowly but steadily 
from 3.6 in year 0 to 3.5 in years 14 to 18. It does not return  to its pre- 
IRA  value until  year 36. In the short  run, of course, national  saving  falls 
by more  than  private  saving, because of the deductibility  of IRA contri- 
butions. The government  asset-to-income  ratio starts at zero in year 0, 
falls for the next 20 years, and then rises steadily until almost returning 
to zero by year 70. Hence, the national  asset-to-income  ratio  falls from 
the start  and  does not regain  its initial  value of 3.6 until  year 49. 
The intuition  behind  these numbers  is straightforward.  Government 
revenue  falls as the initial  shifting  of assets to saving  incentive accounts 
reduces  the tax base; this occurs because contributions  reduce taxable 146  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
income and because asset income generated in saving incentive ac- 
counts is no longer  taxed. Initially  there are many more tax-deductible 
contributions  than  taxable  withdrawals.  Over  time, those who reach  re- 
tirement  age begin to withdraw  funds, which raises government  reve- 
nues in later  years. 
The intuition  behind  the initial  drop and subsequent  recovery in pri- 
vate saving is perhaps more interesting.  Before IRAs are established, 
households  hold all of their assets in taxable  forms. The opportunity  to 
shift some of those funds into tax-deferred  accounts is valuable, even 
if it means tying up the funds in an illiquid  account. Hence, substantial 
amounts  of funds are shifted in the years immediately  following  the in- 
troduction  of a saving incentive. Over time, however, as households 
shift some of their  portfolios, they may run  out of funds to shift'35  or be- 
come less likely  to give up additional  liquidity  in exchange  for tax prefer- 
ences. Hence, the extent of shifting  falls, and more of the contributions 
represent new saving. Recall that the model generates a positive, but 
small, interest  elasticity of saving. This is a persistent impetus  in favor 
of IRAs raising  private  saving, but its effect is swamped  in the first  dec- 
ades of the program  by the shifting  of already  existing assets into tax- 
preferred  accounts. Over  time, the backlog  of initial  assets to be shifted 
falls, more  households  find  that  saving  incentives  affect the marginal  de- 
cision to save, and the results of the small  but positive saving  elasticity 
can be seen more  clearly.136 
Figure 5 shows the transitional  effects when 401(k)s are instituted, 
with the assumption  that employer  matching  contributions  offset wages 
on an individual  basis. The results  are  qualitatively  the same  as those for 
IRAs.'37  The higher  limit  causes a larger  short-run  drop  in personal  sav- 
ing because more asset shifting  occurs earlier. Even so, the transition 
takes a long time. It takes 22 years for the private  asset-to-income  ratio 
to  return to  its original level  and 35 years for the national asset- 
to-income  ratio  to return  to its original  level. 
In  the transitional  results  presented  in figures  4 and  5, the government 
is allowed to run a deficit when revenues fall as a consequence of insti- 
135. This scenario has been put forth by Feldstein and Feenberg (1983). 
136.  Results with a limit of $2,000 are qualitatively similar, except  that, since the limit 
is lower, the initial asset-shifting  phase takes longer, and the positive  effects  on national 
saving are ultimately smaller (table 15). 
137.  Results using the individual offsets  and a 100 percent penalty, and using the aver- 
age offsets and either the 10 percent or 100 percent penalty, are qualitatively similar. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  147 




4.1  - 
---- 
4.0  ,_-/ 
3.9  - 
3.8  - 
3.7  Private  , 





0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70 
Years 
Source:  Authors'  simulations  as described  in the text.  The annual contribution  limit is $9,000, and the penalty for 
early withdrawal assessed  on both earnings and principal is  10 percent.  Wages are offset  for employer  contributions 
on an individual basis. 
tuting a saving incentive program.  These results can provide informa- 
tion on the transitional  effects on saving of the government  running  a 
balanced  budget instead. If budget  balance were achieved by reducing 
spending  on the government-provided  good, there  would  be no effect on 
private  consumption  and saving  decisions since the government  good is 
assumed to be separable  in individual  utility functions. Therefore,  pri- 
vate asset accumulation  would not change, but the government  deficit 
would  disappear.  As a consequence, national  saving  would simply  track 
the time path  for private  saving  in figures  4 and  5. Both national  and  pri- 
vate saving  would  fall in the early  years of the saving  incentive  program 
and  would  increase  only in the long run. 
Alternatively,  if budget  balance  were achieved by raising  all income 
tax rates, the deficit  would  again  disappear.  However, raising  all income 
taxes would have the likely effect of reducing  the level of private sav- 
ing.138  Thus, the level of private  asset accumulation  shown in the figures 
138.  Note the positive  elasticity  of saving with respect to the after-tax return embed- 
ded in the model. Also,  see Engen (1993c). 148  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
provides  an upper  bound  for the level of national  and  private  saving  that 
would  occur. 
Allowing  for general  equilibrium  effects would dampen  both the ini- 
tial decline and  the subsequent  increase  in the asset-to-income  ratio. As 
the capital stock fell in the initial  phase of the transition,  interest rates 
would start  to rise, which would offset some of the decline in saving. As 
the positive effects of saving incentive programs  became evident in the 
longer term, interest rates would start to fall as the capital stock rises, 
which would diminish  the long-run  increase in saving. Thus, the partial 
equilibrium  results tend to overstate both the short-term  losses and the 
long-run  gains from saving incentive programs.  However, the partial 
equilibrium  changes  in the capital  stock are small,  especially  in the initial 
phase of the transition,  so that the differences  between general  equilib- 
rium  and  partial  equilibrium  results  would be meager. 
Additional  Points 
The results in figures  4 and 5 are consistent with the empirical  results 
presented  earlier.  Available  data  on saving  incentives are limited  to the 
initial  phase of the transition.  Universal eligibility  for IRAs was estab- 
lished in 1982, the same year that the number  of 401(k)  plans began to 
grow rapidly.  Hence, the data sources used above represent  saving in- 
formation  from  only the first  nine years of these programs.  At that stage 
of the transitions  in the simulations,  the effects of saving incentives on 
private  saving  are essentially zero and the effects on national  saving  are 
negative. 
One concern with using this model to study saving  behavior  is that it 
is clear that not all economic agents optimize along the lines presented 
above. This should  come as no surprise.  All economic models  are  neces- 
sarily  false in that they involve extracting  the most important  elements 
of a situation  and omitting  others. Nonetheless, the model reproduces 
accurately  many aspects of real world economic behavior. Moreover, 
economic models are used to ensure that statements  are internally  con- 
sistent. In the case of saving incentives, intuition  suggests that when a 
saving incentive program  is first introduced,  people will shift taxable 
assets into tax-preferred  assets.  '39 After a time, this effect will diminish 
and a greater  percentage  of the contributions  will represent  net saving. 
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The extent of this shifting  and the time it takes depend critically  on the 
parameters  of households'  preferences  and opportunities  (for example, 
time preference rates, earnings uncertainty, mortality risk, and tax 
rates). The model  allows us to quantify  these effects in a way that  is con- 
sistent with what is known about  these parameters. 
It is clear that the model does not accurately  capture  the saving be- 
havior of all households, and most notably misspecifies important  as- 
pects of how low-income, low-wealth households make saving deci- 
sions. For some issues, this would be a critical  flaw.'40  For the analysis 
of voluntary  saving  incentives, it is probably  not. Participants  in saving 
incentives typically  have many  times the financial  wealth of nonpartici- 
pants (as shown in table 3), and low-wealth  households that do partici- 
pate contribute  less than  other  participants.  As documented  above, the 
model is able to capture many features of IRA contribution  behavior. 
Moreover, the model implies that the contributions of low-income 
households are predominantly  new saving.141  Thus, to the extent that 
the model overstates contributions  by this group, it overstates the posi- 
tive effects of saving  incentives on saving. 
Conclusion 
Over  the past 20 years, the United States has experimented  with a va- 
riety of tax-deferred  saving incentive plans. Although  the plans are in- 
tended to raise the saving rate, they are designed so that a contributor 
does not need to have positive saving  to exploit the tax advantages.  Be- 
cause they are capped  by annual  limits, the subsidies  do not provide  in- 
centives to save at the margin  for some households. Moreover, the tax 
deductibility  of contributions  reduces short-run  public  saving. 
The  aggregate  data  show no correlation  between  contributions  to sav- 
ing incentive  plans and a variety  of measures  of personal  saving. Using 
survey  data, we generate  a test of the effects of saving  incentives by us- 
ing two groups  that  can each be described  as "savers"  and  by exploiting 
the simultaneous  expansion  of 401(k)  opportunities  and the contraction 
140.  For example,  Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1993a, 1993b) show that the behav- 
ior of low-income  people can be modeled much more accurately if one imposes  a govern- 
ment-provided, means-tested  consumption floor. 
141.  Engen and Gale (1993). 150  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
of IRA incentives that occurred  after 1986.  If 401(k)  contributions  are, 
at least in part,  new saving, and  our  comparison  group  is a good one, the 
wealth of 401(k)  participants  should have risen relative to that of IRA 
participants  not eligible  for 401  (k) plans from 1987  to 1991.  A variety  of 
specifications showed no economically or statistically significant  in- 
crease in wealth  for 401(k)  participants  relative to IRA participants  not 
eligible for 401(k) plans. Further, the results show that non-401(k) 
wealth fell for 401(k)  participants  relative to the wealth of IRA partici- 
pants not eligible for 401(k)s. We also show that these two groups are 
similar in important  respects. Finally, we show that the results hold 
when other  groups  are compared  and  when different  asset measures  are 
used as well. Thus, the regression  results are consistent with the view 
that  401(k)  plans  have not raised  private  saving. Clearly,  if they have not 
raised  private  saving, 401  (k) plans have not raised  national  saving. 
Tests using the tax panel revealed little evidence that IRAs substan- 
tially raised  private  saving. After accounting  for the decline in tax reve- 
nues, the estimates  imply  little, if any, positive effect on national  saving. 
We also presented  new evidence that false constraints  are substantially 
less important  than previous evidence suggests and that there appears 
to be substitution  between IRAs and  401  (k)  plans and  between pensions 
and  401(k)  plans. 
These findings  are consistent with an analysis of saving  incentives in 
a stochastic, life-cycle simulation model. Model results indicate that 
saving  incentive  plans  reduce  private  and  national  saving  in the short  run 
(0-20 years)  because of substantial  shifting  of assets or saving  that  would 
have occurred  anyway from taxable into tax-preferred  accounts. Over 
much longer  periods, the simulation  model indicates that saving incen- 
tives are capable  of raising  national  saving  and  wealth. 
APPENDIX  A 
Sample Statistics for  Saving Regressions 
THIS  APPENDIX presents  more detailed  summary  statistics  for several  of 
the regressions discussed in the main text. Table Al  provides back- 
ground  data  for table 5 in the main  text. Table A2 does the same for ta- 
bles 12  and 13  in the main  text. Table Al.  Sample Statistics for the Regression in Table 5a 
Standard 
Variable  Meai  deviation  Median  Minlimulm Maximuim 
Net  financial assetsb  35,710  96,950  14,454  -  1,855,480  2,356,381 
Age (years)  44  10.6  43  25  64 
Age-squared  0.203  0.095  0.185  0.063  0.410 
Incomeb  53,672  30,032  47,637  -  4,695  294,510 
Income-squaredb  0.378  0.482  0.227  0  8.674 
Age-income  interactionb  0.239  0.156  0.202  -0.027  1.708 
12 years of education  0.314  0.464  ..  .  0  1 
13-15 years of education  0.217  0.412  . .  .  0  1 
16 years or more of education  0.384  0.486  .  .  .  0  1 
Defined benefit pension  0.540  0.498  . ..  0  1 
Married  0.707  0.455  ...  0  1 
Male  0.759  0.427  ...  0  1 
White  0.923  0.267  ...  0  1 
Two  earners  0.436  0.495  . .  .  0  1 
Family  size  2.75  1.37  3  1  11 
Family member with 401(k) (PART)  0.553  0.497  . ..  0  1 
1991 sample dummy (IN91)  0.514  0.499  . .  .  0  1 
Interaction variable [(IN91)  (PART)]  0.343  0.475  .  .  .  0  1 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  data  from  the SIPP. 
a. The sample  pools 1987  and 1991  families  that  either  (i) have  a 401(k)  plan  or (ii) have  an IRA  but  are not eligible 
for a 401(k)  plan.  The sample  size is 7,341. 
b.  1991  dollars. 
Table A2.  Sample Statistics for the Regressions in Tables 12 and 13a 
Standard 
Table and variable  Meai  deviation  Median  Minimumni  Maximumni 
Table  12b 
Savingc  576  144,934  450  -2,042,087  6,392,784 
Liabilitiesc  2,447  15,626  0  -  159,662  249,346 
Average gross  income  (AGI)c  4,700  78,576  1,763  -485,835  4,446,515 
AGI-squaredc  0.61ld  31.8d  0.00473d  6  1,980d 
Number of children  -0.132  0.622  0  -3.8  4 
Single  -0.019  0.217  0  -1  1 
Age exemption  0.053  0.206  0  -1  1 
IRA limitc  713  2,552  1,470  -4,248  4,248 
Marginal tax rate  -3.82  7.67  -3.53  -45.2  30.8 
Table 13b 
Savingc  4,528  40,447  1,844  -  548,577  735,448 
Liabilitiesc  2,372  12,773  227  -  113,210  212,146 
Average gross  income  (AGI)c  1,181  22,505  812  -431,783  258,629 
AGI-squaredc  0.0508d  0.0496d  0.00397d  6  18.6d 
Number of children  -0.129  0.650  0  -3  4 
Single  -  0.039  0.237  0  -1  1 
Age exemption  0.053  0.184  0  -0.333  1 
IRA limitc  2,667  1,298  2,389  -1,865  4,248 
Marginal tax rate  -  2.62  7.49  -  2.40  -  41.8  30.8 
Source:  Authors' calculations  using data from the IRS-Michigan Tax Panel data set. 
a.  Table entries  refer to the first-differenced values  of the variables. 
b.  Sample size  for table  12 is 3,880; sample  size  for table  13 is  1,940. 
c.  1986 dollars. 
d.  Divided by  1010. Comments 
and Discussion 
B. Douglas Bernheim: The paper by Eric Engen, William  Gale, and 
Karl Scholz launches a frontal  assault on the notion that tax incentives 
stimulate  significant  new saving.  The authors  deserve credit  for devising 
some novel and clever analytical  innovations  that shed new light on an 
old question. I congratulate  them on a thorough  and careful  analysis of 
the available  data. 
I confess to having my own reservations about previous studies of 
saving incentives, including  (but not limited  to) those that purported  to 
establish  the existence of large  beneficial  effects. I have always  regarded 
the existing evidence, such as that  by James  Poterba,  Steven Venti, and 
David Wise, as interesting  and suggestive but not conclusive, and cer- 
tainly  open to other  interpretations.  ' Unfortunately,  reading  this paper, 
I feel much the same way, despite the authors'  laudable  efforts. As far 
as I am concerned, the  jury on saving  incentives is still out. This is not, 
however, because I am entirely  agnostic  about  our ability  to answer  this 
question  through  empirical  analysis.  Rather,  I question  whether  the type 
of data that have been analyzed to date can ever provide a reliable  an- 
swer to the central  policy question. 
The paper  by Engen, Gale, and Scholz is divided  into three sections. 
The first section is an analysis of 401(k)s based on the SIPP data. The 
second section examines  the effect of IRAs using  the IRS-Michigan  Tax 
Panel.  The third  section investigates  the effects of tax incentives  in a life- 
cycle simulation  model. I will discuss each in turn. 
Evidence from  the SIPP  on 401(k)s 
Using data  from  the SIPP, the authors  attempt  to determine  whether 
participation  in a 401(k)  affects total saving. They are correct in noting 
1.  Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1992, 1994). 
152 Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  153 
that one cannot infer  the effect of 401(k)s  by comparing  the behavior  of 
participants  and nonparticipants,  since those with strong preferences 
for saving  will choose both to participate  and  to save more. This point is 
widely acknowledged  in the literature  on saving  incentives. The central 
questions with respect to sample selection are whether  it is possible to 
control  for sample selection in a way that yields convincing  results and 
whether  Engen, Gale, and Scholz accomplish  this objective. 
Like Poterba, Venti, and Wise, the authors  examine data on assets 
obtained  from  a series of cross-sectional  data  sets. The surveys in ques- 
tion were conducted in 1984, 1987, and 1991 (unfortunately,  data on 
401(k)s  are not available  for 1984).  By comparing  cross-sectional asset 
patterns  across years, they hope to identify  the effect of 401(k)s.  In par- 
ticular, since 401(k)s  were "newer"  in 1987  than in 1991,  they presum- 
ably could not have had as much of an effect on the level of the cross- 
sectional asset profile.  Thus, under  the hypothesis  that  401(k)s  increase 
saving, Engen, Gale, and Scholz argue  that one would expect to see an 
upward  migration  of the asset profile-relative to some appropriate  con- 
trol group-between  1987  and 1991. 
Table 3 of the paper demonstrates  that various measures of median 
wealth  (financial  assets, net financial  assets, and  net worth)  declined  for 
401(k)  participants  and that this decline exceeded the reduction  in me- 
dian  wealth  for nonparticipants.  Superficially,  this would appear  to con- 
tradict the hypothesis that 401(k)s stimulated  saving. Yet the authors 
have already  admonished  us about  the differences  between participants 
and  nonparticipants,  and  they are therefore  justifiably  reluctant  to make 
too much of this result. It is, for example, difficult  to imagine  a signifi- 
cant decline in the median  net financial  assets of nonparticipants,  given 
that  they start  out (in 1987)  with nothing.  Clearly,  participants  and non- 
participants  have different  underlying  attitudes  toward  saving. 
Engen, Gale, and Scholz note, however, that there may be identifi- 
able subgroups  of nonparticipants  whose attitudes toward saving are 
similar  to those of participants.  In particular,  they point out that IRA 
participants  also tend to be high savers. Moreover, eligibility  for IRAs 
was significantly  curtailed  in the Tax Reform  Act of 1986.  Consequently, 
they argue  that  it is appropriate  to use IRA  participants  who are  not eligi- 
ble for 401(k)s  as a control group  when evaluating  the shift in the esti- 
mated  asset profile  between 1987  and 1991. 
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(which  contains  summary  statistics  for the control  group)  would not, of 
course, control for differences in age, income, education, and other 
characteristics.  Consequently, the authors estimate a median regres- 
sion, which describes net financial  assets as a function of household 
characteristics  (table  5). They also allow participation  in a 401(k)  plan  to 
affect both the level of the age-wealth  profile  (the coefficient  on PART) 
and  the shift  in the age-wealth  profile  between 1987  and 1991  (the coeffi- 
cient on (IN91)(PART)). Their  central  finding  is that the shift in the age- 
wealth profile  for 401(k) participants  is not larger, and indeed may be 
smaller,  than  the shift in the age-wealth  profile  for the control  group. 
The central  problem  with this approach  is that,  just as there  is hetero- 
geneity across various identifiable  subgroups  (such as participants  and 
nonparticipants),  there is also heterogeneity within these subgroups, 
and, moreover,  the composition  of these subgroups  may  change  through 
time. For this reason, the authors'  methodology  continues to be flawed 
by the same sample selection issues that have plagued  this entire liter- 
ature. 
In principle,  there are excellent reasons to believe that the composi- 
tion of 401(k) participants  changed significantly  over the relevant pe- 
riod. It stands  to reason  that  the most motivated  "serious"  savers would 
start participating  as soon as these accounts became available  at their 
firms.  Less motivated,  "occasional"  savers are much  more  likely to pass 
on their first opportunities  to open tax-favored  saving accounts. How- 
ever, it also seems likely that, with the passage  of time, more  occasional 
savers would sign up. 401(k)s  may have become especially common  for 
less serious savers after 1986,  because of the more demanding  nondis- 
crimination requirements that were established for private pension 
plans. Consequently,  between 1987  and 1991,  serious savers may repre- 
sent a declining  fraction  of 401(k)  participants.  In that  case, the authors' 
result would simply  reflect dilution  of the 401(k)  participant  group  with 
less serious savers. 
Likewise, it is also possible that  the composition  of the Engen, Gale, 
and Scholz control group changed through time. The curtailment  of 
IRAs significantly  reduced new account formation  and may have in- 
creased  account  termination.  If termination  is particularly  likely among 
occasional  savers, then serious savers may  represent  an increasing  frac- 
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In the final  revision  of their  paper,  Engen, Gale, and  Scholz acknowl- 
edge these criticisms  and attempt  to deflect them. Their analysis of the 
issue is unconvincing,  however. In part, their response is based on the 
suggestion that, in theory, there may be  considerations that work 
against  dilution.  Despite these theoretical  considerations,  it strikes me 
as unlikely  that serious savers represent  a constant or increasing  frac- 
tion of 401(k)  participants  through  time.2  In any case, I do not believe 
that  this issue can or should  be resolved on purely  theoretical  grounds. 
Engen, Gale, and Scholz present evidence that, they claim, fails to 
support  the hypothesis  that  either  the composition  of 401  (k)  participants 
or the composition  of their  control  group  changed  significantly  between 
1987  and 1991.  In effect, they estimate  wealth  profiles  separately  for the 
two subsamples,  allowing  in each case for the possibility  that  the profiles 
may have shifted  between 1987  and 1991.  With  respect to 401(k)s, they 
find that the financial  asset profile shifted upward  between 1987 and 
1991, while the net financial  asset profile  changed little, if at all. They 
assert that these findings  do not support  the view that  the 401(k)  partici- 
pant group became diluted with more occasional savers between 1987 
and 1991. With respect to the control group, they find that neither  the 
financial  asset profile nor the net financial  asset profile shifted signifi- 
cantly between 1987 and 1991. They argue that these patterns do not 
support  the hypothesis that the control  group  experienced  reverse dilu- 
tion over the relevant  time period. 
I am puzzled by this analysis. The authors' methodology is predi- 
cated on the assumption  that  the preferences  of 401(k)  participants,  and 
the preferences  of the control group, did not change between 1987  and 
1991. This is an identifying  restriction. It appears to me that Engen, 
Gale, and Scholz are, in effect, attempting  to test their identifying  re- 
striction  without  the addition  of new information.  If they have in mind 
some formal  model that allows for group-specific  effects and time-spe- 
cific effects, as well as for the possibility  that  the composition  of various 
population  subgroups  changes through  time, and that nevertheless  per- 
2.  For example, they argue that while some occasional  savers were opening 40 l(k) ac- 
counts, others were cashing out their accounts.  But unless initiation and termination prob- 
abilities changed through time in some particularly serendipitous fashion,  one would ex- 
pect to observe monotone  convergence  of participation rates from an initial value of zero 
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mits  one to infer  the effects of 401  (k)  plans on saving  using  only the data 
discussed  in this section, then  they should  write  this model  down  explic- 
itly so that  the skeptics among  us can verify its validity. 
For myself, I very much doubt that such a model exists. Indeed, the 
patterns  noted  by Engen, Gale, and  Scholz are  easily reconciled  with  the 
existence of the sample  dilution  effects described  above. Consider  their 
evidence on shifting  preferences  (dilution)  for 401  (k)  participants.  Their 
analysis is explicitly based on the premise that the wealth profile for 
401(k) participants  should have shifted upward  (relative to an appro- 
priate  control  group)  through  time. The dilution  effect works in the op- 
posite direction.  Hence, if the net effect is positive, this does not imply 
that dilution  is absent. Rather,  it only proves that the behavioral  effect 
is larger  than the dilution  effect. If the net effect is zero, one can only 
conclude that the two effects are offsetting;  both may be very large, or 
both may be very small. One would expect to observe a downward  shift 
in the wealth profile  only if the dilution  effect is larger  than the behav- 
ioral  effect. 
Next consider  the authors'  evidence on shifting  preferences  (reverse 
dilution)  for the control group. It is easily conceivable that, absent re- 
verse dilution,  the wealth  profile  for this group  might  have shifted  down- 
ward  between 1987  and 1991,  possibly in response to changing  macro- 
economic conditions or because of differences in the accuracy of the 
surveys. (Indeed, Engen, Gale, and Scholz find that, overall, wealth is 
lower in 1991  than  in 1987.)  But in that  case, the absence of a downward 
shift in the wealth  profile  is entirely  consistent with reverse dilution. 
Although  the authors'  evidence sheds little light  on the importance  of 
dilution,  other  evidence is suggestive. According  to table 2 of the paper, 
401(k)  participation  nearly  doubled,  from 13.7  percent  of families  in 1987 
to 25.4  percent  of families  in 1991.  The spread  of 401(k)s  was attributable 
to two factors. First, participation  rates within  plans  rose from  62.7 per- 
cent to 69.8 percent. This is consistent with the notion that, through 
time, 401(k)s  achieved  greater  penetration  to less dedicated  savers. Sec- 
ond, the fraction  of families  eligible  for 401  (k)s rose from  21.9 percent  to 
36.4 percent. Engen, Gale, and Scholz themselves make the case that 
eligibility  is endogenous  and strongly  related  to preferences  for saving. 
This argument  naturally  implies  that  401  (k)s were first  offered  at compa- 
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Additional  evidence on the importance  of compositional  effects can 
be gleaned from a more detailed analysis of 401(k) contributors.  Sup- 
pose for the moment  that  it is possible to observe some variable  that  En- 
gen, Gale, and Scholz did not control  for in their  empirical  specification 
(table  5) and  that is positively correlated  with residual  unobserved  pref- 
erences toward  saving.  Then, under  the dilution  hypothesis, the average 
value of this variable  among  401(k)  contributors  should have declined 
between 1987  and 1991. 
It is possible to implement  the test described  in the preceding  para- 
graph  using data on IRA participation.  IRA participation  among  401(k) 
contributors  is certainly  observable;  Engen, Gale, and  Scholz explicitly 
argue  that it is correlated  with underlying  preferences  ;3 and the authors 
did not control  for IRA participation  among  401  (k) contributors  in table 
5. According  to their paper, 46 percent of 401(k)  participants  also held 
IRA accounts in 1987.  By 1991,  this fraction  had declined  to 35 percent. 
This observation  is consistent with the view that  the composition  of the 
401(k) participant  sample shifted toward less serious savers between 
1987  and 1991  and  that  this mechanically  reduced  the upward  movement 
in the estimated  asset profile  for this group.  It does not, however, consti- 
tute clear  proof, since the decline in IRA  participation  among  401(k)  par- 
ticipants  could, in principle,  be explainable  by changes  in characteristics 
that  the authors  did control  for. At my suggestion,  Gale  has investigated 
this issue. His preliminary  results show that  changes  in observable  char- 
acteristics  explain  roughly  70 percent  of the decline in IRA  participation 
among  401(k)  participants,  relative  to a control  group.  The existence of 
a nontrivial  unexplained  residual  is consistent  with  the dilution  hypothe- 
sis. However, the results of this preliminary  analysis are open to mixed 
interpretations,  owing to the imprecision  of the estimates. 
In their work, Poterba, Venti, and Wise noted this shift away from 
IRAs among  401  (k) participants.  Their  solution  was to drop  households 
with both IRAs and 401(k)s, comparing 401(k) participants  without 
IRAs  to nonparticipants.  I do not endorse  this procedure.  The decline in 
IRA participation  among 401(k)  participants  between 1987  and 1991  is 
merely a symptom  of dilution. IRA participation  is a highly imperfect 
3.  This appears to be true even among 401(k) participants, since those who participate 
in both 401(k)s and IRAs have  significantly more wealth  than those  who  participate in 
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proxy for unobservable  propensities to save. Removing IRA partici- 
pants  from  the analysis  does not homogenize  either  the 401  (k) sample  or 
the control group and therefore cannot preclude either dilution or re- 
verse dilution.4 
After presenting  their preferred  estimates, Engen, Gale, and Scholz 
also explore  the Poterba,  Venti, and  Wise approach  described  in the pre- 
vious paragraph.  Surprisingly,  their  results differ  from  those of the pre- 
vious authors.  The source of the discrepancy  is difficult  to discern. On 
the one hand, Engen, Gale, and Scholz control  for a larger  set of house- 
hold characteristics  than do Poterba, Venti, and Wise. On the other 
hand, the latter authors  allow the coefficients of the independent  vari- 
ables to differ  for 401(k)  participants  and nonparticipants,  whereas En- 
gen, Gale, and Scholz do not. Regardless  of the true explanation  for the 
discrepancy,  I would reiterate  my conclusion that the exclusion of IRA 
participants  treats a symptom  of the dilution  problem,  without solving 
the problem itself. With respect to the Engen, Gale, and Scholz esti- 
mates, I would also add two observations. First, when the authors  use 
this approach,  their  point estimates are generally  more  favorable  to the 
hypothesis that 401(k)s  stimulate  saving than the point estimates based 
on their  original  approach.  The sensitivity  of their  results is at least sug- 
gestive of an underlying  sample  selection  problem.  Second, the impreci- 
sion of the authors' estimates renders  this portion of their analysis in- 
conclusive. Oddly, Engen, Gale, and Scholz note that the estimates do 
not differ  significantly  from  zero, but they fail to add  that  one is also un- 
able to reject the hypothesis that all 401(k)  contributions  represent  new 
saving. 
Finally, Engen, Gale, and Scholz themselves present evidence sug- 
gesting that the dilution  problem  contaminates  estimates based on their 
preferred  approach.  As can be seen in tables 3 and 4 in the paper, net 
worth includes both financial  and nonfinancial  assets. As long as both 
kinds  of assets are  related  to some of the same  unobservable  characteris- 
tics that create preferences for saving, the dilution effect should be 
4.  The direction of the bias resulting from this procedure is not obvious.  On the one 
hand, it may be the case that, among 401  (k) participants without IRAs, unobserved prefer- 
ences for saving are correlated with earlier participation. On the other hand, in light of the 
statutory limitations imposed  on IRAs in 1986, the failure to have an IRA may be more 
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larger  for net worth  than  for financial  wealth. If dilution  roughly  offsets 
the behavioral  effect of 401(k)s when attention  is confined to financial 
wealth (as the authors'  results suggest), then dilution  should  more than 
offset the behavioral  effect of 401  (k)s when both financial  and nonfinan- 
cial assets are considered. This is precisely what one observes. Note 
that  the net worth  of 401  (k)  participants  (including  those who held IRAs) 
fell by $22,111-more than  27 percent-between  1987  and 1991.  In com- 
parison,  the net worth of IRA participants  remained  roughly  constant.5 
It seems to me that  the relative  decline in the net worth  of 401  (k) partici- 
pants is difficult  to explain in the absence of relative dilution.  After all, 
it is very unlikely  that the availability  of 401(k)s  depresses total saving. 
In summary,  I am not convinced that Engen, Gale, and Scholz have 
dealt effectively with the sample selection problems  that have plagued 
previous attempts to measure the behavioral effects of 401(k)s and 
IRAs. Indeed, there is some evidence that the dilution effect is im- 
portant  and that it biases the approach  preferred  by the authors  against 
the finding  that  401(k)s  stimulate  saving.  Certainly,  other  considerations 
may bias their results in the opposite direction. But I see no reason to 
believe that the aggregate  effect of multiple  biases would be offsetting. 
Engen, Gale, and Scholz also use the SIPP data to explore the exo- 
geneity of 401(k)  eligibility.  They conclude  that eligibility  is strongly  re- 
lated  to underlying  preferences  for saving.  This issue is important,  since 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise have attempted to identify the effects of 
401(k)s  by using eligibility  as an instrument.  On this point, I see eye-to- 
eye with Engen, Gale, and Scholz. In fact, I have, in the past, criticized 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise's analysis on precisely these grounds.6  This 
does not, however, support  the inference that 401(k)s are ineffective. 
Rather,  I am simply  left feeling  very pessimistic  about  our  ability  to draw 
reliable inferences concerning the effects of 401(k)s from currently 
available  data. 
5.  These comparisons do not control for changes in household characteristics between 
1987 and 1991. Preliminary analysis by Gale suggests that roughly 60 percent of the differ- 
ence-in-differences  noted in my comparison is attributable to changes in household  char- 
acteristics.  The residual, which amounts to more than $8,500, is unexplained and consis- 
tent with significant dilution. 
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Evidence  on IRAs and Household  Saving 
Using  data from  the  IRS-Michigan  Tax  Panel,  Engen,  Gale,  and 
Scholz attempt to determine whether IRA eligibility affects total saving. 
The availability of a true panel permits the authors to reduce the poten- 
tially adverse effect of sample selection  problems by allowing for fixed 
effects.  Even so, a number of serious problems remain. 
First, the data contain no direct measure of asset  balances.  The au- 
thors infer wealth by capitalizing reported taxable interest and dividend 
receipts. As they acknowledge,  this measure of wealth is somewhat sus- 
pect  and  certainly  very  noisy.  Engen,  Gale,  and  Scholz  difference 
wealth to obtain a measure  of saving.  They  then difference  saving to 
eliminate fixed effects.  Thus, the key dependent variable in their analy- 
sis  is the  second  difference  of a noisy  construct.  One must seriously 
question how much "news" is left over after these operations.  Since the 
dependent  variable is significantly related to certain independent  vari- 
ables, it presumably contains either some news or systematic  noise.  Al- 
though I am unable to identify an obvious  source of systematic  noise,  I 
remain skeptical about the hypothesis that the second difference of capi- 
talized  interest  and dividend  income  could  contain  much news.  I am 
therefore not surprised that results on the effects of changes in IRA con- 
tribution limits are imprecise and, on the whole,  inconclusive. 
Second,  the empirical specification  is problematic.  Although the au- 
thors include a variety of explanatory  variables,  they omit wealth,  de- 
spite the fact that wealth varies with time. Both theory and existing evi- 
dence suggest that wealth is an important determinant of consumption, 
and therefore of saving. The inclusion of wealth as an independent vari- 
able would, however,  raise more complicated econometric  issues,  since 
wealth is also used to construct the dependent variable. The authors also 
omit age (because  of data limitations).  One can think of the constant in 
the differenced specification as the coefficient of age (since the time dif- 
ference  of age is a constant).  However,  the existing  evidence  on age- 
wealth profiles  suggests  that rates of saving accelerate  as households 
age. To capture this pattern, one would have to allow age to affect the 
first difference of saving.  When age is omitted (as it is, of necessity,  in 
the authors' specifications),  spurious relationships may appear between 
the second difference of wealth and any variable that is correlated with 
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The omission  of variables like wealth and age is important because 
the authors' measure of the change in the IRA contribution limit is corre- 
lated with household characteristics.  Prior to 1982, eligibility depended 
on private pension  coverage,  which  is certainly related to wealth  and 
age.  After  1986, eligibility depended  on adjusted gross  income  (AGI). 
Although the authors control for AGI, it is not clear that this control is 
adequate.  Since  they  take  differences,  the  independent  variables  in- 
clude the differenced IRA limit, differenced AGI, and differenced AGI- 
squared. But the differenced IRA limit is related to the level  of AGI in 
1987, which  does  not appear as an explanatory  variable in the differ- 
enced equation. It is easily conceivable  that the level of AGI affects the 
acceleration  of  saving  (for example,  AGI  is  related  to  age).  Conse- 
quently, the IRA limit variable may measure spurious effects. 
None  of the issues  raised above  suggests  that the results  should be 
biased systematically  in any particular direction.  I can think of stories 
that go both ways.  Nevertheless,  I am left with little confidence that the 
coefficient on the IRA contribution limit measures what it is intended to 
measure. 
Engen,  Gale, and Scholz  also challenge  the view  that standard eco- 
nomic theory cannot explain the effects  of IRAs on household  saving. I 
regard this as a central issue and also discuss  it below.  If IRAs affected 
saving through nontraditional mechanisms,  then the authors' analysis of 
the IRS-Michigan  Tax Panel data would  not necessarily  pick this up. 
Suppose,  for example,  that the expansion  of the IRA program in 1982 
encouraged financial institutions to promote retirement saving and that 
this served an important educational function. Then all households  may 
have increased  their saving in response  to the expansion  of eligibility, 
regardless of whether they were previously  eligible.  This would invali- 
date inferences based on the comparisons  in table 11 or the estimates  in 
tables 12 and 13. 
Engen,  Gale,  and Scholz  discuss  three different types  of evidence 
that have been offered as support for the view that the response to IRAs 
was  not grounded in intertemporal rationality.  The first concerns  the 
"false contribution limit." I myself have cited Feenberg and Skinner on 
this point many times,  and I was disturbed to hear that their result is in 
error.7 Nevertheless,  it seems  to me that some  intriguing patterns re- 
7.  Feenberg and Skinner (1989). 162  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1994 
main. I am struck, for example,  by the fact that, among those who could 
have contributed more than $2,000 but who  contributed less  than the 
limit, 47 percent  (875 out of  1,851) contributed  exactly  $2,000.  Even 
among those with a $4,000 limit, 38 percent (401 out of 1,048) of those 
contributing less than the limit contributed exactly  $2,000.8 I think that 
Engen, Gale, and Scholz  have correctly inferred from the data that few 
individuals were falsely constrained by misinformation. Yet the data do 
invite an interpretation that I have always favored: that the well-publi- 
cized,  "officially endorsed" $2,000 figure created a focal target for sav- 
ing, and that the very existence  of this target may have influenced the 
behavior  of many less  serious  savers  (such  as those  contributing less 
than the limit). 
The second type of evidence  concerns the bunching of IRA contribu- 
tions at the end of the tax year. The authors suggest that households  may 
delay contributions as long as possible to preserve liquidity. I am skepti- 
cal. As noted in table 4, in 1984, the typical IRA contributor had roughly 
$13,000 in financial assets  other than IRAs,  and nearly $93,000 of net 
wealth other than IRAs. It is hard to imagine that such individuals would 
benefit significantly from the additional liquidity associated  with a one- 
year delay  in an IRA contribution.  Even  if households  are concerned 
about liquidity, it is hard to rationalize the fact that more of them do not 
make a series  of smaller contributions  to their IRAs  as the year pro- 
gresses.  This would be particularly natural for individuals who pay esti- 
mated taxes on a quarterly basis. 
The third type of evidence  concerns  the "overreaction" of IRA con- 
tributions to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. According to other analysts, 
8.  Incidentally,  I do not agree that "(T)ransactions costs  presumably play a large role 
in explaining why couples  do not open a spousal  IRA of less  than $2,000." The costs  of 
opening and maintaining an IRA are fairly trivial. Moreover, these one-time costs must be 
weighed not against the benefits of a $250 contribution but against the benefits of a $250 
contribution that recurs for 10, 20, or 30 years. I am also very skeptical about the proposi- 
tion  that  one  could  rationalize  the  $2,000  contribution  phenomenon  by  arguing that 
spouses have conflicting objectives.  It is hard to imagine how this would emerge in a formal 
model of household  bargaining, without the introduction of significant transaction costs. 
Moreover, it should be noted that, if saving results from interspousal bargaining, then be- 
havioral theories of saving (such as the notion that decisions  reflect the resolution of con- 
flict between  a "planner" and a "doer," as in Shefrin and Thaler,  1988) may be more de- 
scriptive of actual choices,  and of the effects of tax incentives,  than the standard life-cycle 
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the sharp decline in contributions  was attributable  to misinformation. 
Engen, Gale, and Scholz argue  that, under  the misinformation  hypothe- 
sis, IRAs should  have rebounded.  Engen, Gale, and Scholz also suggest 
four  alternative  explanations  for the sharp  decline. The first  two concern 
other  features  of the 1986  tax reform  that reduced  the tax incentives for 
saving  through  IRAs. I agree  with Engen, Gale, and  Scholz that, in prin- 
ciple, IRAs may have declined sharply  because of these other changes 
and  that  this issue is not yet settled. However, their  third  and  fourth  ex- 
planations  (the growth  of 401  (k)s and  the depletion  of non-IRA  financial 
assets) concern  gradual  phenomena  and cannot explain  the suddenness 
of the decline in contributions.  These phenomena can, however, ac- 
count for the absence of a rebound  under  the hypothesis that misinfor- 
mation  was gradually  corrected. 
Life-Cycle  Simulations 
With  respect to the final  section of the paper,  the basic question  that 
I would  like to raise  is whether  one should  have much  faith  in policy sim- 
ulations  generated  from highly sophisticated  life-cycle models. I do not 
believe that these types of models are descriptive of either decision 
processes or behavior, and I am particularly  suspicious of relying on 
these models  to predict  behavioral  responses to changes  in environmen- 
tal parameters.  Many of my views on this issue are laid out in a recent 
paper,  but it is worth summarizing  the central  points here.9 
Given the state of economic and financial  literacy among  the general 
population,  one ought to be skeptical of the view that personal saving 
behavior is the consequence of highly sophisticated deliberation.  In- 
deed, the evidence suggests that much of the population  is ill-equipped 
to make  even the most basic economic calculations.  For example, only 
20 percent of adults can determine  correct change using prices from a 
menu,10  and many have trouble  determining  whether  a mortgage  at 8.6 
percent  is better  than a mortgage  at 8 3/4 percent.  "  l My own analysis of 
9.  Bernheim (1994b). 
10.  Mary Jordan, "Literacy of 90 Million is Deficient: U.S.  Survey Sounds Alarm over 
Reading, Arithmetic," The Washington Post,  September 9, 1993, p. Al. 
11.  Albert B. Crenshaw, "For Too Many, Managing Money Isn't Child's Play," Wash- 
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a recent survey sponsored  by Merrill Lynch  reveals that two-thirds of 
adults will not even hazard a guess as to the level of the Dow Jones aver- 
age, despite  the fact that this number is widely,  prominently,  and fre- 
quently reported by newspapers,  television,  and radio. Financial con- 
cepts,  such as compound interest,  are widely  misunderstood,12  despite 
the fact that they are at the very heart of the intertemporal maximization 
problem. According to the Merrill Lynch  survey,  roughly one-third of 
adults believe  that $1,000, left in the bank for 30 years at 8 percent,  will 
accumulate to less than $5,000 (whereas the correct answer is well over 
$10,000). The number one source of information and advice on financial 
matters among baby boomers is parents. Advice from employers and the 
government,  collectively,  ranks behind prayer. Clearly, households  are 
not solving the problem described by Engen, Gale, and Scholz's  simula- 
tion model. 
Of course,  the authors' analysis only requires households  to act "as 
if'  they are solving the problem described by the simulation model.  In 
general,  I am sympathetic  to "as if'  arguments.  However,  these  argu- 
ments are not universally  applicable.  They tend to be plausible  in the 
context  of frequently  repeated  decisions,  where  individuals  can learn 
from trial and error. But most important activities  related to saving are 
either not repeated or repeated very few times.  Consider, in particular, 
the problem of saving for retirement. Virtually all individuals expect  to 
retire only once.  They do not have the opportunity to practice the life- 
cycle process.  They do not have the luxury of learning appropriate rates 
of saving through trial and error. Rather, if they have overprovided  or 
underprovided for retirement, they must live with their mistakes. There 
are no second chances. 
In principle,  individuals  might also  learn through vicarious  experi- 
ence,  from observing  others.  But there are several problems with this. 
First, the experiences  of others are difficult to observe.  Financial infor- 
mation is generally regarded as private; a person's  income  and wealth 
are usually not thought of as appropriate subjects for general discussion. 
Second,  vicarious  information  is  necessarily  either  inconclusive  or 
stale. On the one hand, if one learns about the decisions  of those who 
have not yet retired, or who are not far enough along into the retirement 
period,  one  cannot  observe  the  ultimate  outcome  of  their  financial 
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choices. On the other hand, if one acquires  information  about the very 
old, then  one might  be able  to observe both  decisions and  consequences. 
However, in that case, the observations would be of little relevance 
since the economic environment  changes dramatically  over the span of 
decades. 
It is perhaps  conceivable that, despite the obstacles listed above, in- 
dividuals  do learn  basic rules  of thumb  that  produce  approximately  opti- 
mal decisions under  appropriate  economic conditions. For that reason, 
it is not too surprising  that one can fit the data  reasonably  well by simu- 
lating  a life-cycle model, as long as the model allows for sufficient  para- 
metric flexibility. However, there is an enormous difference between 
fitting  observed behavior and fitting behavior out-of-sample  after sig- 
nificant  environmental  changes. Even if individuals  use an optimal  rule 
of thumb  in one economic  environment,  this does not mean  that  they will 
modify their rule of thumb optimally if the environment  changes. In- 
deed, unless they understand  the implications of the environmental 
change, neither  personal  experience nor vicarious  experience will lead 
them to alter  their  retirement  savings  behavior. 
One possible defense of the authors' simulations  is that 401(k) and 
IRA participants  tend to be more financially  sophisticated  than  the rest 
of the population;  consequently,  the model may describe  their  behavior 
better  than  the behavior  of a typical  household. My preliminary  investi- 
gations of this issue do reveal that levels of financial  literacy  are higher 
among  those who save more. However, prevailing  levels of financial  lit- 
eracy are  quite  low even among  high  savers. I encourage  devotees of the 
life-cycle hypothesis  to examine carefully  the methods  and practices  of 
expert financial  planners,  who are almost certainly  more sophisticated 
than the average 401(k) or IRA participant.  The dominant  methods of 
financial  planning  are astonishingly  simplistic  and certainly  bear no re- 
semblance  whatsoever  to the simulation  model in this paper. It is easily 
demonstrated  that these methods yield behavioral  patterns  that differ 
both qualitatively  and quantitatively  from the predictions  of life-cycle 
models. 
I emphasize  that  this is not a blanket  criticism  of all models  that  depict 
households  as sophisticated  decisionmakers.  On  the contrary,  I heartily 
endorse  the use of these models  when decisions are  frequently  repeated, 
when the experiences of others are easily observed, or when there is a 
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conditions  are satisfied in the context  of retirement planning. Different 
analytical tools are useful in different situations. It is important for us to 
recognize when particular tools are applicable and when they are not. 
Joel Slemrod:  The low and declining U.S.  national saving rate has been 
blamed by many economists  for nearly all the ills that have befallen the 
U.S.  in the past decade or two. The low saving rate has been blamed by 
many on a tax system that drives a large wedge between  the pretax and 
after-tax rate of return. Partly in response to this argument, over the past 
15 years a series of plans have been proposed to give tax-related incen- 
tives to saving. 
In this paper Engen, Gale, and Scholz do not evaluate whether these 
programs are appropriate or misguided. Nor do they discuss  whether it 
makes sense to use any kind of fiscal instrument to increase saving. In- 
stead,  in this paper they investigate  a necessary,  though not sufficient, 
condition  for rendering a favorable judgment  on such programs-that 
they increase national saving. (Note that even if they do increase saving, 
there may be better ways  to do so.)  The authors conclude  that saving 
incentives  have not appreciably increased,  and may have reduced,  na- 
tional saving. 
I tend to agree with this conclusion.  I agreed with it before I read this 
paper. Reading this paper has succeeded  in making me more suspicious 
of the arguments against this view.  I am, however,  less persuaded that 
the authors have sealed the case that existing saving incentive plans are 
ineffective  in raising saving. 
The tactics used in this paper for approaching this problem are some- 
what  unusual.  The  authors  first perform some  analysis  of  microeco- 
nomic data to address the relationship between  participation in saving 
incentive plans and changes in wealth, concluding that no evidence  links 
the two. They then present a stochastic  life-cycle  simulation model that 
not only reproduces many of the stylized facts about saving and partici- 
pation in saving incentive  plans, but is also consistent  with their princi- 
pal empirical finding. Interestingly,  the simulation model predicts  sig- 
nificant saving  effects  in the  long  run, although  these  effects  do  not 
appear for two generations.  I will follow  the plan of the paper by first 
discussing the empirical work and then the simulation model. 
The aim of this work is to establish the effect  on saving of the avail- 
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private saving and then adjust for the effect  on national saving of a de- 
crease in tax receipts. 
The first problem one encounters  is measuring saving.  No  data set 
provides a very accurate measure of it. The data sets used here provide 
poor  measures.  The  method  employed  is  to  compute  a  measure  of 
wealth at the beginning of a period and at the end of a period and call the 
difference  saving.  With the  SIPP data for 401(k) plans one  compares 
self-reported measures of wealth at the beginning and end of the period. 
Ignoring the problems of accuracy of self-reported wealth, this measure 
of saving will pick up not only planned net additions to wealth but also 
capital gains.  Capital gains arguably belong in a measure of saving for 
some purposes,  but not, I think, for the purpose of measuring whether 
participation in a 401(k) increased saving. This is especially  true for the 
period January 1987-May  1991, a period of large movements  in stock 
and housing prices. Could this volatility explain their finding that the real 
wealth  of 401(k) plan participants actually fell over  this period,  while 
that of nonparticipants rose? This conclusion  may not be valid holding 
constant the portfolios of wealthholders,  which I expect  differ substan- 
tially between participants and nonparticipants. 
When tax data are used to study IRAs, a different problem arises. The 
measure of saving is again the change in measured wealth, but this time 
wealth  is  imputed  by  capitalizing  reported  interest  and dividend  re- 
ceipts.  This will to some  extent  avoid the capital gains problem I just 
mentioned but surely introduces a large amount of error in the measure 
of saving, since, for one thing, it excludes  a large part of wealth. Differ- 
ences in portfolios within asset categories (such as bank accounts versus 
long-term bonds) can be important and may be systematically  related to 
saving plan participation. I do not have solutions for these problems. At 
a minimum, I urge the authors to openly address the issue of errors in the 
measurement of saving and discuss  what biases  might arise from their 
procedures. 
I have a more fundamental concern about the data analysis.  The au- 
thors  make  much  of  the  notion  that household  heterogeneity  is  im- 
portant to account for, because it implies that families with high propen- 
sities  to  save  will  make  up  a  disproportionate  share  of  those  who 
participate in voluntary plans like IRAs and 401(k)s. They argue that the 
presence of heterogeneity invalidates the making of inferences about the 
effects of saving incentives from the observation that, in a cross-section, 
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They then go on to compare changes  in wealth between  participants 
and nonparticipants. I simply do not see how, if heterogeneity  of saving 
propensities  invalidates  inferences  about  wealth  differences  between 
participants and nonparticipants,  it does  not  invalidate  similar infer- 
ences about changes in wealth or saving. 
The authors try to avoid this problem in their 401(k) analysis by not 
comparing savers  to nonsavers  but by comparing one group of savers 
(401(k) participants) to another group of savers (IRA participants who 
are not eligible for 401(k) plans). But, as the authors admit, 401(k) eligi- 
bility is not randomly assigned,  so it remains an open question whether 
401(k) participants  are bigger  savers  than non-401(k)  eligible  house- 
holds.  If so,  one  cannot  sort out differences  in the propensity  to save 
from the effects  of plan availability. This is a difficult endeavor,  requir- 
ing the investigator to observe variables that influence the probability of 
being eligible for a plan but are not correlated with saving propensity, 
and vice versa. The authors pursue a few analyses that suggest that their 
results are not biased by self-selection,  but I do not find these analyses 
completely  convincing. 
This problem aside,  they find that 401(k) participants'  net financial 
assets  did not rise relative to the wealth of IRA holders not eligible for 
401(k). Given what I think is the direction of heterogeneity  bias (that 
401(k) participants have  a higher  unobserved  propensity  to save  than 
others), this is a striking finding, suggesting that these plans do not raise 
private saving. 
I find more convincing their test of the substitutability of 401(k)s and 
IRAs,  because  it relies on an exogenous  event-the  fact that the 1986 
tax reform restricted the attractiveness of IRAs for some households  but 
not others.  The authors find that those  households  that had their IRA 
deductibility  removed  increased  their  401(k)  balances,  other  things 
equal, implying that they are substitutes. 
This is more convincing,  but there is still a problem, albeit a different 
one. The criteria for removal of eligibility were based on two factors- 
income and the presence  of another pension plan. Thus, relying on this 
estimate means relying on how precisely  the effects  of income and the 
presence of other pension plans is estimated. 
The same set of issues  applies to the IRA analysis.  The 1981 tax act 
made many households  newly eligible for IRAs.  The authors compare 
the subsequent  saving of this newly  eligible group to the group whose 
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criterion for prior eligibility was coverage  by a pension plan, which,  as 
the authors note, is arguably correlated with (unobservable)  saving pro- 
pensities.  So heterogeneity  rears its ugly head again and must temper 
the interpretation of the results. 
Dealing with heterogeneity is tricky. The authors discuss the possibil- 
ity of dealing with it in a formal econometric  model but reject this ap- 
proach.  In the absence  of a formal model,  the potential  biases  intro- 
duced  by  heterogeneity  blur  the  interpretations  of  the  estimated 
coefficients,  and suggestive  tests of the biases remain inconclusive. 
I will not discuss,  but find very convincing,  their debunking of some 
earlier studies that purport to find large positive saving effects of savings 
incentives.  Thus, the paper makes the "little or no increase" case at least 
as plausible as the "large saving increase" case but does  not decisively 
establish the former. 
Having offered some evidence  that saving incentive  plans do not in- 
crease saving, the authors never say exactly  why this is so. There are a 
couple of possibilities.  One is that the intertemporal elasticity  of substi- 
tution is close  to zero,  so that a compensated  increase  in the after-tax 
return to saving, whether achieved  via saving incentives,  a reduction in 
the tax wedge on saving, or an increase in pretax real interest rates, will 
fail to increase saving. 
A second possibility  is that the saving plans studied here and used in 
the United States have fatal design flaws. One flaw is that they all have 
caps on the amount of saving that qualifies for the tax break, both to limit 
the revenue loss and to prevent too much of the tax break from going to 
wealthy high savers.  But this means that much of the tax break is infra- 
marginal and will fail to budge saving. Perhaps the most crippling design 
flaw is that the tax break is not tied to saving but rather to contributions 
to an account. Such contributions can be made, in the absence of saving, 
either by transferring assets into the account or by borrowing. 
Which of these two, or which combination of the two, causes the inef- 
fectiveness  of  savings  plans matters for judging  whether  there  exists 
some  fiscal scheme that will increase saving. If the intertemporal elastic- 
ity of substitution is near zero,  even dumping the income tax for a con- 
sumption tax will not work; transferring resources from the poor to the 
rich might still work, although this strategy did not seem to help much in 
the 1980s. 
If design flaws are the problem,  they  will be difficult to overcome. 
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difficult  for the IRS. A personal expenditure  tax would be extremely 
complicated.  The feasible saving  incentive  plan  is to replace  the income 
tax with a value-added  tax. This is feasible operationally  but  is probably 
not politically feasible, for it would be a wrenching and regressive 
change  in the tax system and would eliminate  all the personalization  of 
the tax burden.  For all this cost, it would increase saving  only to the ex- 
tent that  the intertemporal  elasticity of saving  is above zero. 
The authors  do not resolve the important  issue of why saving plans 
have been ineffective. Instead  they present  a stochastic, life-cycle simu- 
lation model that generates the short-run  ineffectiveness of saving in- 
centive plans and also replicates  fairly  closely the basic features  of sav- 
ing, savings  plan  participation,  and so on. 
This model  is impressive,  yields many  insights,  and  is a great  advance 
over the theoretical models underlying  previous empirical studies of 
saving incentive plans. It generates the important  result that the intro- 
duction  of an IRA plan  will depress,  not increase, national  saving  for at 
least two generations  but after  that, and  forever, national  saving  will be 
increased;  the first  result  is consistent  with  the empirical  results  from  the 
first part of the paper. The second result implies that, if the country 
could only stick with the plans until asset shifting is exhausted, they 
would work. 
Before this conclusion  is accepted, a few cautions  are in order. First 
of all, this is presumably  not the only parameterization  of a stochastic 
life-cycle model that can generate  short-run  saving  plan ineffectiveness 
and also be consistent with other stylized facts. In particular,  this one 
features  what, to my mind, is a high  intertemporal  elasticity of substitu- 
tion of 0.33. The authors  should report  whether  a similar  model with an 
elasticity of, say, 0.10 could also be consistent with short-term  savings 
plan  ineffectiveness  and  other  stylized  facts; my guess is that  the answer 
is yes. On this line I would like to see the authors  use the paper's  model 
and  parameterization  to simulate  the effect of a tax cut like that of 1981, 
in order  to see whether  the predicted  saving response in the model is a 
plausible  one. 
This same point can be made  on a large  number  of dimensions.  Many 
models can generate  ineffectiveness of saving incentive plans. This is a 
very impressive  one that represents  a lot of hard  work  and  careful  think- 
ing. But one should  guard  against  the fallacy that  because the model  fol- 
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One final  point. I believe an exclusive focus on the average  or median 
saving rate is incomplete  and may be misleading.  For example, a large 
fraction of private saving is done by the top 10 percent of savers, but 
little is known about  the saving  behavior  of the rich-what  is their  true 
marginal  rate  on the income  from savings, and  what kind  of portfolio  re- 
sponses can they make in response to changes in the taxation  of capital 
income? 
A related point is that, for a policy evaluation of saving incentive 
plans, it is important  to refer  back to the reason  for wanting  to increase 
saving. Is it that some particular  people do not save enough?  If so, who? 
Do saving  incentive plans influence  these people? If the real problem  is 
the inadequate  saving  of low-income  people, tax-based  measures  are  un- 
likely to be very effective. This issue is especially troublesome  because 
the model developed here does not capture  well the empirical  fact that 
many  people do not save at all. 
The key policy question raised by this paper is, given the apparent 
ineffectiveness of these plans, (i) should  they be dropped  with the reve- 
nue thus gained  used to lower tax rates?  or (ii) should  the country  insti- 
tute new and improved  saving  plans, ones that address  the design flaws 
of the current  plans?  One of the authors  of this paper,  together  with one 
of the discussants, has advocated such a plan. I am less sanguine  about 
the workability  of such plans and suggest that more radical  tax reform 
would  be required  to raise saving, given that  the intertemporal  elasticity 
of saving  is high  enough  to make  this effective. That  leaves the question 
of whether  the change  from  an income  tax to a value-added  tax is worth- 
while, the answer  to which depends on many more considerations  than 
the expected change  in national  saving. 
General Discussion 
Many  members  of the panel  focused on how heterogeneity  and sam- 
ple selection bias might complicate  the interpretation  of the empirical 
results  for 401(k)plans  and IRAs. Chris  Sims and  Gary  Burtless  pointed 
out that-because  table  3 is based on separate  cross-sections  rather  than 
on a panel-the  change in assets between periods may not represent 
saving. In particular,  if the characteristics  of individuals  in each cross- 
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differences  in the composition  of the samples rather  than actual saving 
behavior. For example, Sims pointed out that the median  net worth of 
401(k) participants  in table 3 fell by about $22,000 between 1987 and 
1991,  suggesting  that  the 1991  sample  differed  significantly  from  the 1987 
sample. Gale responded  that all of the reducton  in financial  assets and 
net financial  assets for 401(k)  participants,  and most of the reduction  in 
net worth, could be explained  by changes  in observable  characteristics, 
which were also controlled  for in the regression-based  tests. 
Brigitte  Madrian  called  attention  to the large  increase  in the participa- 
tion in 401(k)  plans between 1987  and 1991.  Because these plans pulled 
in a wider spectrum  of individuals  in 1991, she suggested that the 1991 
sample of 401(k)  participants  likely includes more "nonserious"  savers 
than  the 1987  sample. Further,  because IRAs became less attractive  af- 
ter 1987,  the 1991  IRA sample  likely  includes  more  "serious"  savers than 
the 1987  sample.  Gale responded  that  tests revealed  little evidence of an 
increased  proportion  of "nonserious"  savers among  401(k)  participants 
or an increased  proportion  of "serious"  savers among  IRA participants 
not eligible  for 401(k)  plans, once controls  for observable  characteristics 
were included. Moreover, the authors obtained similar  results for the 
effects of 401(k)s  using other comparison  groups. Barry  Bosworth em- 
phasized the importance  of heterogeneity  in understanding  saving be- 
havior. In particular,  there are many zero savers in the United States 
whose behavior may not be captured  well by the medians used in the 
paper. He reported  that Japan  has a smaller  fraction  of zero savers and 
that this difference  is an important  factor in explaining  Japan's higher 
saving  rate. 
Robert  Moffitt  offered a way to exploit possible heterogeneity  in the 
sample. He suggested  that many segments of the population  would not 
be expected, a priori,  to respond  to IRAs. For example,  low-income  tax- 
payers face low or zero marginal  tax rates and so may not respond to 
tax incentives; high-income  taxpayers are likely saving more than the 
maximum  IRA deduction so that the tax incentives in an IRA will nol 
matter  at the margin;  and young people can be ruled out because they 
will not want to lock up funds in an IRA. Given these likely differences 
across segments  of the population,  Moffitt  suggested  examining  whether 
the effects of IRAs are different  among  these groups. 
Panelists  also focused on the interpretation  of the simulation  model. 
Burtless  agreed  with Douglas Bernheim's  formal  comment  that the sim- 
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model  useful as part  of the policy debate  because it rests on assumptions 
that are widely used by other economists: what would happen  if every 
agent correctly solved his or her dynamic optimization  problem. By 
showing  that, even under  this strained  assumption,  tax preferences  were 
not effective in boosting saving, the simulation  added  force to the other 
empirical  results in the paper. William  Brainard  noted that it would be 
useful to know how sensitive the simulation  results are to the specifica- 
tion and  parameter  values used in the model. He conjectured  that, in re- 
ality, many  individuals  are not saving  on a margin  that is affected  by the 
IRAs. Some may be saving zero and others may be contributing  up to 
or beyond the allowable  IRA limit. These individuals'  marginal  rates of 
return  are unaffected  by tax deductibility.  The more individuals  there 
are in this position, the less sensitive aggregate  short-run  saving  behav- 
ior  will be to alternative  assumptions  about  elasticities. Indeed, for indi- 
viduals  who save beyond the IRA limits, there is no substitution  effect 
to raise saving  at the margin.  Instead, the tax reduction  boosts income, 
leading  to higher  consumption  and  lower saving. 
George Perry warned that the wording of survey questions about 
asset balances  was critically  important.  He noted that the surveys used 
in some earlier  work on IRAs were ambiguous  about  whether  respond- 
ents did or did not include  IRA assets in their  reported  holding  of assets 
by type-such  as stocks, certificates  of deposit, and mutual  funds. Esti- 
mates  of the effect of IRAs on total saving  would  be drastically  different 
if it were assumed that respondents  did not include IRA assets in their 
listing of assets by type (the usual assumption).  For example, if, upon 
the introduction  of IRAs, reported  assets by type rose by $100, as they 
had the year before, while reported  IRA assets rose by $100, the first 
assumption  would show that  all IRA contributions  were a net increment 
to saving; the second assumption  would show IRAs added nothing  to 
saving. 
Benjamin  Friedman  noted that part of the increased  participation  in 
401(k)  plans has occurred  because companies have been dropping  de- 
fined  benefit  plans,  thus ridding  themselves of certain  future  obligations. 
He added  that  there  was some indication  that  defined  contribution  plans 
would be increasing  for state and local government  employees as well, 
and  for the same  reason. Friedman  also suggested  that  marginal  analysis 
of 401(k)  plans  may miss a key feature  of how employees view them. Al- 
though  economists  typically  treat  401  (k)  plans as a great  opportunity  for 
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lieve that employer-matching is necessary  to induce employees  to con- 
tribute to these  plans.  If so,  something very different is going on than 
marginal responses  to marginal changes  in the rate of return. Madrian 
expanded on this, suggesting that many employers offer matching to get 
enough  low-wage  employees  involved  to  satisfy  nondiscrimination 
rules. 
Some panelists discussed  the reasons that policy is concerned  about 
private saving and whether current tax incentives  address the concern. 
Greg Mankiw noted that there are two reasons policymakers  might care 
about saving. First, the level of saving affects the capital available to fu- 
ture generations.  Second,  people may not save enough for retirement. If 
policymakers are mostly concerned about future generations,  then they 
should care about bequest  saving as well as retirement saving.  But, he 
noted, current saving incentives fail to encourage bequests because IRA 
balances  are taxed at death.  Bosworth  suggested  that the main reason 
for saving incentives  is to ensure that individuals save enough for retire- 
ment. To this end, they are not successful  because they leave dissavers 
out. For example,  defined benefit plans put retirement savings in place 
for everyone,  but as firms shift to 401(k) plans some individuals can opt 
out.  Further,  many workers  cash  in their 401(k) holdings  when  they 
changejobs.  For these individuals, the plans simply provide tax benefits 
for  postponed  consumption  rather  than  preparation  for  retirement. 
Bernheim proposed a novel saving incentive,  motivated by the idea that 
the short-run impact of IRAs was muted because they did not represent 
net new saving for many older savers who just shifted assets around. He 
suggested making IRAs available only to people born after 1970 because 
IRA contributions are more likely to represent net new saving for these 
younger individuals. 
Dan Sichel reiterated that the key question is not whether saving in- 
centives  increase private saving,  but whether they cause  enough of an 
increase to offset the revenue loss.  Thus, even granting a wide band of 
uncertainty around the results for private saving in the paper (reflecting 
heterogeneity  or sample selection  problems),  the evidence  in the paper 
strongly suggests  that saving incentives  decrease  national saving,  ex- 
cept perhaps in the very long run. Mankiw noted that saving incentives 
could increase national saving if they were accompanied  by other poli- 
cies that ensured a balanced-budget rule. They effectively  shift the tax 
burden from savers to nonsavers. Eric M. Engen,  William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz  175 
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